Was it constitutional for Maryland to exempt only trucks already titled and registered in the state from its new, stricter truck weight limits?

Plain-English summary

The Superintendent of the Maryland State Police asked the Attorney General whether a "grandfather clause" in Maryland's truck weight law was constitutional. To comply with a 1982 federal law standardizing how states measure truck weight, Maryland adopted a new, stricter formula for calculating how much weight a truck could legally carry, but exempted trucks that had been titled and registered in Maryland before December 31, 1983 and that could not meet the new formula, letting their owners keep operating under the old rules through a special permit until 1991.

The Attorney General concluded the exemption did not violate the Commerce Clause. Because the federal Surface Transportation Assistance Act expressly gave states broad authority to design their own grandfather clauses, Maryland's law was neither preempted nor in conflict with federal law. On the separate question of whether the exemption unduly burdened interstate commerce, the opinion found it was not discriminatory on its face, since any business, in-state or out-of-state, had a six-month window to title and register a vehicle in Maryland and qualify, and the state's interest in ensuring vehicles using its grandfather clause had also registered and paid fees in Maryland was substantial and only minimally burdened commerce compared to the benefit of the exemption itself.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1985. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could Maryland legally let only trucks already registered in the state before a certain date skip the new, stricter weight limits?
Yes, according to this opinion. The Attorney General concluded that this kind of "grandfather clause" was expressly authorized by federal highway law and did not violate the Commerce Clause because it applied evenhandedly to anyone, in-state or out-of-state, who titled and registered a qualifying vehicle in Maryland by the December 31, 1983 deadline.

Did the truck weight exemption unfairly favor Maryland-based trucking companies over out-of-state competitors?
The opinion concluded it did not discriminate against interstate commerce, because out-of-state businesses had the same six-month opportunity to register and title a vehicle in Maryland to qualify for the exemption as in-state businesses did, and the registration and titling requirement served the substantial, evenhanded state interest of ensuring highway users had contributed to road maintenance costs.

What happened to trucks that didn't qualify for the exemption?
According to the opinion, those trucks were not shut out of Maryland highways altogether. They simply had to load in compliance with the new weight formula in TR §24-109(b), which the opinion noted matched the weight limits most other states already used on the interstate highway system.

Background and statutory framework

The federal Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 set uniform truck length, width, and weight limits for interstate and federal-aid highways, targeting so-called "barrier states" whose weight laws imposed undue burdens on interstate commerce, and threatened states that failed to conform with loss of federal highway aid under 23 U.S.C. §127(a). To comply, the General Assembly adopted a new "interior bridge formula" for calculating truck weight in Chapter 537, Laws of Maryland 1983, codified at TR §24-109(b) and (c), but Congress had also given states broad discretion to craft grandfather-clause exemptions under 23 U.S.C. §127(a), which Maryland did in TR §24-109(a) for vehicles that could not meet the new formula but had been titled and registered in the state before December 31, 1983.

The opinion applied the two-part Commerce Clause framework: first, whether federal law preempted or conflicted with the state exemption, which it did not because Congress had expressly delegated grandfather-clause authority to the states; and second, whether the exemption itself unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce, applying the discrimination test from Detroit Automotive Purchasing Services, Inc. v. Lee, 463 F. Supp. 954, 961 (D. Md. 1978), and the balancing test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The opinion found no facial discrimination since the titling and registration requirement applied evenhandedly, cited the state's established interest in requiring highway users to contribute their fair share of maintenance costs under Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 503-504 (1947), and Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915), and concluded that the minor cost of titling and registering by the deadline was far outweighed by the benefits to the state, consistent with the judicial deference to legislative economic line-drawing described in Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665 (1975), and Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 22 (1985).

Citations

Statutes:

• §24-109(a) of the Transportation Article (grandfather clause exemption for Maryland-titled vehicles)
• §24-109(b) of the Transportation Article (new interior bridge weight formula)
• §24-109(c) of the Transportation Article (permissible weights under the new formula)
• 23 U.S.C. §127(a) (federal weight formula mandate and grandfather-clause authorization)
• Chapter 537, Laws of Maryland 1983 (adopted the new weight formula)
• §13-814(b)(1) of the Transportation Article (excise tax allocation to Transportation Revenue Sharing Account)
• §13-814(b)(2) of the Transportation Article (excise tax allocation to highway construction bond debt service)
• §8-402(b) of the Transportation Article (registration fees to Gasoline and Motor Vehicle Revenue Account)

Cases:

• South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984)
• Detroit Automotive Purchasing Services, Inc. v. Lee, 463 F. Supp. 954, 961 (D. Md. 1978)
• Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)
• Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 503-504 (1947)
• Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915)
• Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665 (1975)
• Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 22 (1985)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1985/Volume70_1985.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

Constitutional Law—Commerce Clause—Vehicle Laws—Exemptions—An Exemption from Vehicle Weight Limitations Granted to Certain Vehicles Titled and Registered in Maryland does not Violate the Commerce Clause.

December 16, 1985

Colonel George B. Brosan
Superintendent
Maryland State Police

Your predecessor requested our opinion on whether an exemption from certain Maryland vehicle weight limitations is unconstitutional. More specifically, the question is whether §24-109(a) of the Transportation Article ("TR" Article), under which vehicles titled and registered in the State prior to December 31, 1983 are exempted from the new limitations, violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that TR §24-109(a) does not violate the Commerce Clause.

I
Federal and State Truck Weight Legislation
A. Weight Limitation Formula

The federal Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, which authorizes appropriations for highway construction, also establishes uniform length, width, and weight limitations for the interstate highway systems and other federal-aid highways. 23 U.S.C. §§103, 104, and 127. One stated aim of the Act was to "eliminat[e] the... so-called 'barrier states' which have not adjusted their weight laws in conformity with the other states and which thus impose an undue burden on interstate commerce." H.R. Rep. No. 555, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 23, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong, and Ad. News 3639, 3661. States that fail to conform their laws to the federal formula for calculating truck weights risk the loss of certain federal highway aid. 23 U.S.C. §127(a).1

In compliance with this federal mandate, the General Assembly altered Maryland's formula for determining the gross weight of trucks. Chapter 537, Laws of Maryland 1983. This formula and the permissible weights derived from it are set out in TR §24-109(b) and (c). The effect of the change is to force some trucks to carry less weight than their capacity.

B. Exemption

The federal Act also confers broad authority for states to determine what vehicles will enjoy the benefit of a "grandfather clause" exemption, that is, permission for continued access to federal-aid highways even though, under the federal weight measurement formula, the trucks are overweight. The Act provides as follows:

"This section shall not be construed to deny apportionment [of federal funds] to any State allowing the operation within such State of any vehicles or combinations thereof which the State determines could be lawfully operated within such State on July 1, 1956, except in the case of the overall gross weight of any group of two or more consecutive axles, on the date of enactment of the Federal-Aid Highway enactments of 1974." 23 U.S.C. §127(a).

The legislative history indicates a congressional intent "that deference be given to the state's determination of whether their laws comply with the grandfather clause." 128 Cong. Rec. H8917 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1982).

The Maryland grandfather clause, under which certain vehicles are exempted from the new truck weight measurement formula, is set out in TR §24-109(a):

"(1) The provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section providing for the formula to be applied to interior axle measurements may not apply to those vehicles qualified in this subsection. For those vehicles qualifying under this subsection the measurement may be made only between the first and last axles of the vehicle or combination of vehicles.

(2) To qualify under this subsection the vehicle must have been titled and registered in this State prior to December 31, 1983, and... cannot comply with the weight limitations imposed by the interior axle measurements.

(3) This exception shall also apply to a single unit vehicle that has been titled and registered in this State prior to December 31, 1983, and which cannot comply with the weight limitations imposed by the exterior axle measurements.

(4) Upon application to the Department [of Transportation] by the owner of a vehicle qualifying under paragraph (2) or (3) of this subsection, the Department may issue a special registration or permit to allow the operation of the vehicle under the exemption provided in this subsection until April 30, 1991."

It is our understanding that the impact of the change in method of weight measurement under the new law is greatest for comparatively small trucks. These trucks "cannot comply with the weight limitations," because physical compliance would lead to serious economic losses. The purpose of the grandfather clause is to allow truck owners time to depreciate their current fleet and purchase trucks that can legally carry loads up to their full capacity.

II
Analysis of State Exemption Under Commerce Clause
A. Introduction

The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to "regulate commerce... among the several States." U.S. Const, art. I, §8, cl. 3. The jurisprudence of the Commerce Clause divides into two broad inquiries: whether federal legislation precludes a state's regulation of interstate commerce; and whether, apart from congressional action, a state's regulation impinges too severely on the flow of interstate commerce. See generally Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Constitutional Law 266-68 (1983).

With respect to the first inquiry, "Congress has complete authority to define the distribution of federal and state regulatory power over what is conceded to be interstate commerce." Tribe, American Constitutional Law 377 (1978). Thus, if Congress has demonstrated, either explicitly or implicitly, an intent to occupy a given field, state legislation in that field is preempted. Similarly, if the federal and state laws conflict, the federal law governs.2

The second broad inquiry under the Commerce Clause examines the impact of state legislation on interstate commerce. If the questioned provision on its face discriminates against interstate commerce, the statute is invalid. Even if no such discrimination is found, a statute would violate the Commerce Clause if it burdened interstate commerce. This analysis entails a balancing of the local interests protected by the statute against the burden imposed by it. See Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 376-384.

B. Exercise of Congressional Power

As discussed in Part I above, the federal Act expressly gives the states broad authority to fashion grandfather clauses. Because there is no federal occupation of the field, TR §24-109(a) is not preempted.

For the same reason, there is no conflict between TR §24-109(a) and the federal Act.

C. Impact on Interstate Commerce

An intent by Congress to remove state actions altogether from the reach of the Commerce Clause must be "unmistakably clear." South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984). Hence, we believe that TR §24-109(a) must also be examined in light of its actual impact on interstate commerce.

1. Discrimination Against Commerce

The initial inquiry is whether the questioned provision, on its face, discriminates against out-of-state businesses. If the law is facially discriminatory, it "is unconstitutional without any further consideration." Detroit Automotive Purchasing Services, Inc. v. Lee, 463 F. Supp. 954, 961 (D. Md. 1978).

Such discrimination is not present here. In-state as well as out-of-state vehicles were subject to the same titling and registration qualifications for the exemption under TR §24-109(a). Any business or person wishing to take advantage of the exemption had six months after the effective date of the legislation to register and title a vehicle.3 This six-month "grace period" put the exemption within reach of anyone who desired to qualify for it, including both in-state and out-of-state businesses. For these reasons, it is our view that TR §24-109(a) does not discriminate against interstate commerce.

2. Local Interests

If a "statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Thus, the next step in analyzing a statute under the Commerce Clause is to ascertain what local interests the law seeks to protect.

The State's interest in requiring vehicles to have been registered and titled in Maryland in order to qualify for the exemption is substantial. The requirement assures that those who are given the right to drive heavy loads on Maryland highways have contributed their fair share to the maintenance and repair of those highways. The State's right to exact compensation from those who use its highways is clear, as is its right to exact more compensation from those whose vehicles inflict greater damage. See Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 503-504 (1947).4

In addition, the relationship between the fees paid and the benefits conferred under this statute is clear.5 Twenty percent of the excise tax is earmarked for the Transportation Revenue Sharing Account in the Transportation Trust Fund. TR §13-814(b)(1). The remainder is used for debt service on unpaid highway construction bonds. TR §13-814(b)(2). Any balance left from the excise tax, and all registration fees, are paid into the Gasoline and Motor Vehicle Revenue Account of the Transportation Trust Fund. TR §8-402(b). This account is used to pay the allocations of highway user revenues to the counties, municipalities, and Baltimore City, with the remainder to be used for other Transportation Trust Fund purposes.

The requirement that the grandfathered vehicles be registered and titled in Maryland also serves the related State purpose of reducing potential damage to its highways. By imposing this limit, the State protected its highways from being flooded with heavily loaded trucks diverted from other routes or sold to companies with Maryland routes in order to take advantage of the Maryland exemption.

In sum, the exemption serves to protect legitimate and important state interests.

3. Balancing of Local Interests Against Burdens Imposed

Finally, Commerce Clause analysis requires that the local interests be weighed against the burden, if any, that the law imposes on interstate commerce. The burden in this case was the cost of titling and registering the vehicle by the deadline. This burden is minor in comparison to the benefits accruing to the State, especially in light of the fact that the owner is also receiving a benefit. In general, courts are reluctant to interfere with legislative policy decisions regarding the imposition of taxes and other economic burdens, and will usually defer to the legislative judgment if what is involved is simply part of a "reasonably fair distribution of burdens." Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665 (1975). See also Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 22 (1985).

Furthermore, failure to have titled and registered a vehicle in the State does not result in a total exclusion from Maryland highways. Rather, those who do not qualify for the exemption still have full access to the State highway system, so long as they load their trucks in compliance with the formula in TR §24-109(b). With respect to the vast majority of vehicles in interstate commerce, which primarily use the interstate system, compliance requires no more than that they meet the same weight limits to which they are subject in nearly every other state.

IV
Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that TR §24-109(a) does not violate the Commerce Clause.

Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General
Robert A. Zarnoch, Assistant Attorney General
Kathryn Rowe, Staff Attorney

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

1 Federal law requires that vehicular weight be calculated using a wheelbase measurement from the second to the last axle. 23 U.S.C. §127(a). This is known as the "interior bridge formula." Prior to 1983, Maryland law required calculation of vehicular weight under the "exterior bridge formula," using a wheelbase measurement from the first to last axle. See former TR §24-109(a)(2).

2 This principle arises not only from the Commerce Clause, but also from the Supremacy Clause, under which "the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land... any Thing in the... Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Art. VI, cl. 2.

3 The effective date of the legislation was July 1, 1983; the cut-off date for obtaining the exemption was December 31, 1983.

4 Indeed, Maryland could require all vehicles which use its highways to be registered and titled in the State. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915). This practice is followed by some states with respect to trucks.

5 In fact, it apparently has been the administrative practice not to collect the excise tax from truck companies that are residents of other states but that title their vehicles in Maryland in order to benefit from the State's grandfather clause. We do not believe that this practice, which favors out-of-state concerns, is constitutionally required. In any event, the fact that out-of-state vehicles have not been made to pay full compensation for the use of State highways does not change our analysis or undermine the constitutionality of TR §24-109(a).