Should Maryland's driver's license penalty points be dated to when a traffic violation happened, or to when the driver was actually convicted?

Plain-English summary

A Baltimore County deputy state's attorney asked the Attorney General to settle a longstanding practice at the Motor Vehicle Administration: when a driver is convicted of a traffic violation and points are added to their license, should those points be dated to when the violation actually happened, or to when the conviction was entered? For roughly 25 years, the MVA had assessed points only after conviction but treated them as if they took effect on the violation date, a practice that changed which two-year window of violations counted toward a suspension or revocation.

The Attorney General concluded that the MVA's practice did not match the statute. Reading §16-402 (points may not be "assessed" until after conviction) together with §16-407 (a point "may not be retained for more than 2 years after its assessment"), the opinion found the two provisions unambiguous when read together: because a point cannot be assessed before conviction, and the two-year clock runs from assessment, points had to take effect on the conviction date, not the violation date. The opinion recognized this meant a real change to MVA's computer systems and administrative practice, so it suggested MVA could hold off implementing the change while the General Assembly considered whether to amend the statute to say what MVA had been doing all along. An editor's note records that the legislature did act, but in the opposite direction: a 1986 law expressly adopted the violation date as the assessment date, the practice the MVA had followed and the opinion had just rejected.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1985. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. As the editor's note to the original opinion records, the General Assembly responded within months by amending the statute (Chapter 88, Laws of Maryland 1986) to provide that points are assessed as of the violation date, effectively superseding this opinion's conclusion going forward.

Common questions

Did Maryland law in 1985 say a driver's license points should be dated to the traffic violation or to the conviction?
According to this opinion, the statute as written required conviction-date assessment, even though the Motor Vehicle Administration had been dating points to the violation date for about 25 years. The Attorney General found MVA's practice inconsistent with the plain language of §16-402 and §16-407 of the Transportation Article.

Why did it matter whether points were dated to the violation or the conviction?
Because points expired after two years, the effective date determined which violations could be added together to trigger a license suspension or revocation. The opinion walked through examples showing that a driver could be treated very differently, suspended under one dating rule and not the other, depending on how long each case took to reach conviction.

Did the Motor Vehicle Administration have to immediately change its computer systems because of this opinion?
Not necessarily right away. The opinion noted that the General Assembly would soon have a chance to consider amending the statute, so MVA could reasonably hold off on implementation changes until the legislature acted, though it would have to implement the conviction-date rule if the legislature declined to amend the law. A 1986 law then adopted the opposite rule, the violation-date approach MVA had already been using.

Background and statutory framework

Maryland's driver's license point system, created by Chapter 736, Laws of Maryland 1959 as former Article 66 1/2, §114A and recodified into §16-401 through §16-407 of the Transportation Article by Chapter 14, Laws of Maryland 1977, required the Motor Vehicle Administration to assess points after a conviction for a vehicle law violation, with the number of points keyed to the offense's seriousness under §16-402(c). Accumulating enough points triggered escalating consequences under §16-404, from a warning at three points to suspension at eight and revocation at 12, while §16-407 provided that a point "may not be retained for more than 2 years after its assessment."

Since a 1961 internal memorandum from a Special Assistant Attorney General to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, the agency had treated points as "relating back" to the violation date rather than the conviction date, reasoning that trial delays could otherwise let dangerous drivers escape sanctions. The opinion rejected that reading using the interpretive principles from Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 710 (1984) (look first to the statute's language) and In Re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 520 (1984) (give words their ordinary meaning), finding no ambiguity once §16-402 and §16-407 were read together, and citing the rule from State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation v. Greyhound Computer Corp., 271 Md. 575, 589 (1974), and Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 66-67 (1973), that even a long-standing administrative practice, otherwise entitled to deference under National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Prince George's County, 292 Md. 75, 80 (1981), cannot override a statute's plain meaning. The opinion surveyed comparable point-system cases from Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Colorado, noting that Colorado's Markham v. Theobald, 383 P.2d 791, 793 (Colo. 1963), had reached the same conviction-date conclusion under similar statutory language before Colorado amended its law to specify the violation date instead, a legislative pattern this opinion anticipated Maryland might also follow.

Citations

Statutes:

• §16-401 of the Transportation Article (MVA point system requirement)
• §16-402 of the Transportation Article (assessment of points after conviction)
• §16-402(a) of the Transportation Article (points assessed after conviction for vehicle law violations)
• §16-402(b) of the Transportation Article (points assessed only on highest-point offense for simultaneous violations)
• §16-404(a)(1) of the Transportation Article (warning at three points)
• §16-404(a)(2) of the Transportation Article (conference required at five or eight points)
• §16-404(a)(3) of the Transportation Article (suspension at eight points, revocation at twelve)
• §16-405(b) of the Transportation Article (higher point thresholds for employment-required drivers)
• §16-407 of the Transportation Article (points not retained more than two years after assessment)
• §16-206(a) of the Transportation Article (sanctions for habitually reckless drivers)
• Article 27, §388 of the Maryland Code (manslaughter by automobile)
• Article 27, §388A of the Maryland Code (homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated)
• former Article 66 1/2, §114A of the Maryland Code (original 1959 point system statute)
• Chapter 736, Laws of Maryland 1959 (created the point system)
• Chapter 14, Laws of Maryland 1977 (recodified the point system into the Transportation Article)

Cases:

• Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 710 (1984)
• In Re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 520 (1984)
• Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Mayor & Council of Rockville, 272 Md. 550, 556 (1974)
• National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Prince George's County, 292 Md. 75, 80 (1981)
• State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation v. Greyhound Computer Corp., 271 Md. 575, 589 (1974)
• Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 66-67 (1973)
• City of Hagerstown v. Long Meadow Shopping Center, 264 Md. 481, 493 (1972)
• Fairchild Industries v. Maritime Air Service, Ltd., 274 Md. 181, 185-86 (1975)
• Markham v. Theobald, 383 P.2d 791 (Colo. 1963)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1985/Volume70_1985.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

VEHICLE LAWS

Point System—Points to be Assessed as of the Conviction Date, Rather than the Violation Date.

December 31, 1985

Howard B. Merker, Esquire
Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore County

You have requested our opinion about the assessment of points on an individual's driving record when the Motor Vehicle Administration ("MVA") receives notice that the individual has been convicted of a violation of State or local vehicle laws or regulations. Specifically, the question is whether points are to be assessed as of the date of the conviction or as of the date on which the violation occurred.

For the reasons given below, we conclude that present law requires points to be assessed as of the date of the conviction, rather than as of the date on which the violation occurred. However, we recognize that this conclusion requires a change in a long-standing practice. As a practical matter, extensive computer reprogramming and other administrative changes are necessary. Because the General Assembly will shortly have the opportunity to consider whether an amendment to the statute is warranted, we believe that the MVA may appropriately defer implementation of these changes until the General Assembly acts. Of course, if the General Assembly declines to enact such an amendment during the coming session, the MVA must begin at once to implement these changes.

I
Point System

Section 16-401 of the Transportation Article ("TR" Article) requires the MVA to "maintain a point system for the refusal, suspension, or revocation of drivers' licenses." Under TR §16-402, points are to be assessed "[a]fter the conviction of an individual for a violation of Article 27, §388 or §388A of the Code, or of the vehicle laws or regulations of this State or of any local authority."1 The number of points to be assessed for each violation is specified in TR §16-402(c)(1) through (26). As the seriousness of the offense increases, so does the number of points. For example, a conviction of exceeding the speed limit by 10 miles an hour or more, without contributing to an accident, requires the MVA to assess two points against the individual, while a conviction of driving while intoxicated requires the MVA to assess 12 points. TR §16-402(a)(2) and (23).2

Actual suspension or revocation of a driver's license is an administrative action based on the driver's accumulation of a specified number of such points. Accordingly, the MVA must warn any individual who accumulates three points that suspension or revocation may occur. TR §16-404(a)(1). Further, it must "call in for a conference" any professional driver who accumulates eight points or any other driver who accumulates five points. TR §16-404(a)(2). Ordinarily, the MVA must suspend an individual's license for a stated time upon the individual's accumulation of eight points and must revoke it entirely upon the individual's accumulation of 12 points. TR §16-404(a)(3).3 However, if the individual is required to drive in the course of employment, ordinarily his or her license may be suspended only upon the accumulation of 16 points and may be revoked only upon the accumulation of 19 points. TR §16-405(b).

A point is not effective for an indefinite period. TR §16-407 provides that a point "may not be retained for more than 2 years after its assessment." Thus, a driver who commits minor violations as to which points take effect on widely separated dates is not subject to sanctions designed to prevent habitually dangerous drivers from continuing to drive.

II
MVA Policy

For virtually the full 25 years the point system has been in existence, the MVA's practice has been to assess points only after a conviction, but to give effect to the assessment as of the date on which the violation occurred, instead of the date of the conviction. In determining whether an individual has accumulated enough points to trigger administrative action, the MVA views the two years preceding and the two years succeeding the date of the violation and takes action if the total number of points for any two-year period within that four-year span warrants it.

For example, if a driver were convicted in August 1984 of a three-point violation that occurred in July 1983, that person would be assessed three points for the 1983 date. If the individual had previously been convicted in May 1984 and April 1983 of three-point violations that occurred in October 1982 and June 1981, that driver would have been convicted in a little more than a year of violations totaling nine points. However, the points would have been given effect as of dates spanning more than two years. Because points may not be retained more than two years, the June 1981 points could not be added to those assessed for the July 1983 violation, and the driver's license could not be suspended.

Conversely, a driver might be convicted in July 1985, May 1984, and November 1982 of three-point violations that had occurred in June 1983, May 1983, and October 1981. That person would be assessed a total of nine points for violation dates spanning less than two years, although the convictions spanned nearly three years. Accordingly, that driver's license would be suspended after the conviction in 1985.4

In this latter example, the suspension notice would be issued after the July 1985 conviction, more than two years after the date of the last violation in June 1983. Because the MVA retains a point for only two years, the individual's driving record on the date of the suspension would indicate no current points. Nonetheless, in the MVA's view, the suspension would be proper because all nine points were assessed as of dates within two years of each other.

The MVA's policy in this regard rests on its view that, under TR §16-402, a point is to be assessed as of the date of the violation to which it relates, instead of the date of the conviction that triggers its assessment. In the MVA's view, the prohibition against "retaining" a point for more than two years is to be construed as a prohibition against accumulating points based on one violation with points based on a violation committed more than two years later.

III
History

The point system law was created by Chapter 736 of the Laws of Maryland 1959 and became effective on December 31, 1960, as former Article 66 1/2, §114A. Former Article 66 1/2, §114A(a) provided as follows:

"In addition to, but not in substitution of, any other provisions of this article, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, shall after notice to the general public put into effect a point system for the suspension or licenses revocation of motor vehicle operators' and chauffeurs' issued under this article. Points shall be charged against a licensee after conviction of violation of the motor vehicle laws of this State, and for the purposes of this subtitle, a forfeiture of collateral shall be considered as a conviction. Initial point values shall be assessed as follows." (Emphasis added).

Former Article 66 1/2, §114A(e) provided that "no points assessed hereunder shall be retained for more than two years after their assessment." On January 10, 1961, the then Commissioner of Motor Vehicles was advised that the charging of points under former Article 66 1/2, 114A(a) "relates back to" the date of violation. Memorandum from Eli Baer, Special Assistant Attorney General, to John R. Jewell, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (January 10, 1961).

In counsel's view, the requirement that points be charged "after conviction" was intended to serve two purposes: (1) to ensure that sanctions would be imposed only for violations of which the driver has been convicted; and (2) to establish an easily identifiable event as the triggering event for commencement of the required administrative action. However, he concluded that the points should take effect, for the purpose of determining whether a driver had accumulated eight or more points within two years, as of the date of the violation, rather than the conviction.

He reasoned that the General Assembly could not have intended that the date of conviction be the effective date of the points, because delays in criminal proceedings at both trial and appellate levels might postpone the entry of a final conviction long enough to frustrate the purpose of the statute. Therefore, he advised the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles "(1) that before points may be charged against a licensee there shall have been the fact of 'conviction' and (2) that as soon as notice of said conviction has been received by your Department it is required that the administrative process immediately go into action to charge 'points' against said licensee on the basis of the conviction. But,... the charging of such 'points' relates back to the date of violation." (Emphasis in original.) The MVA's current practice is based upon that advice.

Former Article 66 1/2, §114A(a)'s requirement that "[p]oints shall be charged against a licensee after conviction of violation of the motor vehicle laws" remained unchanged until its recodification into TR §16-402(a) by Chapter 14 of the Laws of Maryland 1977. That enactment substituted the phrase "points shall be assessed" for the previous phrase "points shall be charged."

In both the original enactment of the point system and its current version, the provision relating to the duration of points measures from their assessment. See former Article 66 1/2, §114A(e) ("No points assessed hereunder shall be retained for more than two years after their assessment."); TR §16-407 ("A point assessed under this subtitle may not be retained for more than 2 years after its assessment."). Thus, the 1977 recodification's substitution of the term "assessed" for the term "charged" in TR §16-402 was undoubtedly intended to clarify the law by making the language of the provision requiring the assessment of points and that of the provision providing for the duration of points consistent. TR §16-402 states when the points are to be assessed and TR §16-407 states when, after their assessment, the points are to expire.

IV
Legislative Intent

To determine whether the General Assembly intended points to be effective as of the violation date or the conviction date, we must look primarily to the language of the statute itself. Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 710 (1984). The words of the statute are to be given "their ordinary and popularly understood meaning." In Re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 520 (1984). If the statutory provisions are unambiguous, we need not look further in construing the statute. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Mayor & Council of Rockville, 272 Md. 550, 556 (1974).

We are certainly mindful that a long continued and unvarying construction of a statute by an administrative agency is to be given great weight. National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Prince George's County, 292 Md. 75, 80 (1981). Nonetheless, the principle is applicable only when the statute's language is ambiguous. An administrative construction of a statute cannot override the statute's plain meaning. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation v. Greyhound Computer Corp., 271 Md. 575, 589 (1974); Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 66-67 (1973); City of Hagerstown v. Long Meadow Shopping Center, 264 Md. 481, 493 (1972).

In our view, TR §§16-402, 16-404, and 16-407, when read together, are not at all ambiguous concerning whether a point may be made effective as of the date of the violation, rather than the date of the conviction. A point cannot be "assessed" on the date of the violation.

TR §16-402, like its predecessor statute, requires that a point may not be "assessed," (or, under the prior laws, "charged") until after the driver's conviction. The MVA has interpreted that statute to mean only that MVA cannot take action by assessing points until after conviction, thus regarding the statute as silent concerning the effective date of the point. However, TR §16-402 cannot be so read in isolation.

Under TR §16-407, a point "may not be retained for more than 2 years after its assessment." Unquestionably, TR §16-407's establishment of the period during which points are effective also establishes the date on which the points take effect. That date, by the section's plain language, is the date on which the points were assessed.

The date of a driver's conviction is, of course, the date on which it is finally established that the driver has actually violated the motor vehicle laws and, therefore, may be subject to administrative sanctions. Hence, we read TR §16-402 as requiring that the points potentially leading to the imposition of those sanctions take effect on the date of the conviction. By that reading, a driver's exposure to sanctions begins on the date when it is judicially established that the driver should be exposed to sanctions, by no means an absurd result. Cf. Fairchild Industries v. Maritime Air Service, Ltd., 274 Md. 181, 185-86 (1975) (statute should not be construed in such a way as to reach absurd result).5

The MVA has indicated some concern that drivers charged with motor vehicle violations may escape licensing sanctions, notwithstanding their convictions, because the length of criminal proceedings may delay one conviction until more than two years after the preceding conviction. This is a legitimate concern and one with which the General Assembly may be sympathetic. However, action by the General Assembly is necessary if the violation date is to be assigned as the effective date of points.6 Unless the General Assembly amends TR §16-402, the plain meaning of the statute mandates that points be "assessed," be made effective, as of the date of the conviction.

If the MVA is concerned that a particular licensee may escape administrative sanction because of delays in obtaining a final conviction, it may charge the licensee with violating TR §16-206(a). Under that provision, the MVA is authorized to impose sanctions if a licensee "has been convicted of moving violations so often as to indicate an intent to disregard the traffic laws and the safety of other persons on the highways [or is] an unfit, unsafe or habitually reckless or negligent driver." Thus, the MVA is by no means powerless to prevent dangerous drivers from continuing to drive.

V
Conclusion

In sum, it is our opinion that the MVA's current point-assessment practice does not conform with TR §16-402. Instead, points should be assessed as of the date of the driver's conviction of the violation for which the points are being imposed. If the MVA desires to continue assessing points as of the date on which the violation occurred, it must seek legislative amendment of TR §16-402 during the next legislative session. Pending a decision by the General Assembly on such a proposal, the MVA may appropriately defer implementation of changes in its computer system.

Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General
Edward R. K. Hargadon, Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

Editor's Note: In Chapter 88, Laws of Maryland 1986, the General Assembly provided that points are to be assessed as of the date of violation.

1 Article 27, §388 creates the misdemeanor of "manslaughter by automobile," punishable by up to five years' imprisonment and $1000 fine. Article 27, §388A creates the misdemeanor of "homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated," punishable by up to three years' imprisonment and $1000 fine.

2 When an individual is convicted of more than one offense committed at the same time, the MVA may assess points only on the one offense that carries the highest point assessment. TR §16-402(b).

3 Under TR §16-404(b), suspension or revocation is accomplished by serving the individual with a notice of the intended action and of the individual's right to request an administrative hearing. If the individual does not request a hearing, the suspension or revocation takes effect 10 days after the notice is sent.

4 In each of these cases, assessing points as of the conviction date would lead to the opposite result. Thus, in the first example, the driver's license would be suspended because the convictions occurred in a little more than a year, from April 1983 to August 1984. In the second example, the license would not be suspended. Under TR §16-407, the points assessed as of the 1982 conviction could not be added to those assessed as of the 1985 conviction.

5 We do not, however, suggest that the MVA's present interpretation leads to an absurd result. We conclude only that it does not accord with the statutory language.

6 A number of cases from other jurisdictions bolster our view in this regard. For example, under the Pennsylvania point system, the effective date of a point is the date on which the violation was committed. See, e.g., Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Pompeo, 458 A.2d 327, 328 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983); Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Vail, 440 A.2d 651, 652 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982); Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Sheets, 410 A.2d 1295, 1296 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). These cases all revolve around a provision of the Pennsylvania point system law, 75 Pa. C.S. §1535(a), that states:

"(a) A point system, for driver education and control is hereby established which is related to other provisions for use, suspension and revocation of the operating privilege as specified under this title. Every driver licensed in this Commonwealth who is convicted of any of the following offenses shall be assessed points as of the date of violation."

In Baggett v. Peters, 271 S.E.2d 581, 582 (N.C. App. 1980), the court noted that North Carolina's point system specifically requires the Division of Motor Vehicles to assign points as of the date of the commission of the offense, but only after conviction.

In contrast, in Markham v. Theobald, 383 P.2d 791 (Colo. 1963), the court reviewed a statute that provided the agency with the authority to suspend the license of any operator "who has, in accordance with the schedule of points set forth in this section, been convicted of traffic violations resulting in the accumulation of twelve points in one year." (Emphasis in original.) From this language, the court concluded that the legislature intended the controlling date for purposes of point assessment to be the conviction date. 383 P.2d at 793. The Colorado statute was amended and now specifically provides that points are to be accumulated from the date of violation. C.R.S. 42-2-123(2)(a).