Could a Maryland county set its own mileage reimbursement rate for county commissioners, or were they stuck with the state's 10-cent-a-mile rate?

Plain-English summary

Two members of the Maryland House of Delegates asked the Attorney General how much the Cecil County Commissioners could legally receive in mileage reimbursement, and whether a "voucher" for that reimbursement had to include specific information. The opinion traced the history of two overlapping statutes: the general state law, Article 25, §28(a), setting mileage at 10 cents a mile beyond five miles from home, and Cecil County's own public local law, which required only that commissioners submit "a voucher" for reimbursement without specifying a rate. Reviewing amendments to the county law going back to 1866, the opinion found nothing in the legislative history or in the title of the amending acts, which the Maryland Constitution requires to describe an act's subject, showing an intent to let the county set a different, higher mileage rate. It concluded that despite the commissioners' recent practice of being reimbursed at rates above 10 cents, the county was legally confined to the state rate absent clarifying legislation. On the voucher question, the opinion found no statute specifying a required form, so it fell to the County Treasurer to decide what a voucher needed to show, though the opinion suggested that, at minimum, a voucher should show the date, miles traveled, and reason for the trip, drawing on a 1942 case about a county's duty to scrutinize claims before paying them.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1983. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

An editor's note appended to the opinion reports that the General Assembly responded directly the following year, enacting Chapter 58, Laws of Maryland 1984, which amended Cecil County's public local law to require vouchers to include the information called for by the State Standard Travel Regulations and to permit mileage reimbursement at the rate those regulations authorize, superseding the 10-cent rate this opinion applied. Cecil County's public local laws and the state's general mileage and travel-reimbursement statutes may have changed further since 1984; verify the current versions before relying on any specific rate or voucher requirement.

Common questions

Could Cecil County pay its county commissioners more than 10 cents a mile for their travel in 1983?
According to this opinion, no. Even though the county's own public local law required only that commissioners submit "a voucher" for mileage without stating a rate, the opinion found nothing in that law's history or in the title of the acts amending it showing an intent to depart from the state's general 10-cents-a-mile rate in Article 25, §28(a), so that rate controlled.

Did it matter that Cecil County commissioners had already been receiving more than 10 cents a mile for a few years?
No. The opinion noted this practice but explained that "no custom, however long and widely followed, can nullify the clear and manifest meaning of a statute," quoting Arundel Supply Corp. v. Cason, so the existing practice did not change what the law actually allowed.

What did a mileage voucher have to include under this opinion?
The opinion found no statute specifying a set form, leaving that decision to the County Treasurer in the first instance. But it suggested that a voucher should at least "show on its face the fact, authority, and purpose" of the expense, meaning in practice the date, the miles traveled, and the reason for each trip, and it warned that a treasurer would be prudent not to accept anything less.

What happened after this opinion was issued?
The opinion's own editor's note reports that the General Assembly passed a law the next year, Chapter 58, Laws of Maryland 1984, that changed Cecil County's mileage reimbursement rate and voucher requirements to track the State Standard Travel Regulations, which supersedes the 10-cent rate and open-ended voucher rule this opinion applied.

Background and statutory framework

Article 25, §28(a) of the Maryland Code provided that, "unless otherwise provided in the public local laws of a county," county commissioners statewide were entitled to "mileage at the rate of ten cents for every mile over five miles from their places of residence." Cecil County's own public local law, §1-18(a), required commissioners to "submit a voucher to the County Treasurer for reimbursement" of mileage expenses but did not itself state a rate. The opinion worked through the amendment history of §1-18(a) since its original 1894 enactment, noting that from 1894 through at least 1966 the local law either allowed no mileage reimbursement or a rate below 10 cents, and that only in 1959 and 1963 amendments did the county move toward, and eventually to, the state's 10-cent rate. A 1971 amendment added a flat "allowance" for certain trips and required vouchers for "all other mileage expenses," but the opinion found that the title of the 1971 act, which the Maryland Constitution requires to describe an act's subject under Article III, §29, said nothing about changing the underlying mileage rate, so under cases like Kelly v. State and Painter v. Mattfeldt the change could not be read to authorize a different rate. A 1980 amendment, Chapter 486, Laws of Maryland 1980, restructured commissioner compensation again but likewise gave no indication of an intent to change the mileage rate.

On the voucher question, the opinion relied on Article 25, §23, which barred county commissioners from allowing "any claim against the county . . . for which the claimant shall not produce a legal voucher," and on the 1942 case Larmore v. State, in which the Court of Appeals upheld a misfeasance conviction against county commissioners who approved fraudulent claims without adequate inquiry. Drawing on out-of-state authority defining "voucher" as a document that "shows on its face the fact, authority, and purpose" of a disbursement, including Robertsons' Guardian v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. and Ford v. Aetna Insurance Company, the opinion concluded that Cecil County's Treasurer, who under §1-30(a) of the Public Local Laws was responsible for disbursing county funds, could require a voucher showing the date, miles traveled, and reason for each trip, even though no statute mandated a specific form.

Citations

Statutes:

• Md. Code Art. 25, §28(a) (general 10-cents-a-mile county commissioner mileage rate)
• Md. Code Art. 25, §23 (bar on allowing claims without a legal voucher)
• Md. Const. art. III, §29 (subject of an act must be described in its title)
• Cecil County Public Local Laws §1-18(a) (commissioner salary and mileage voucher requirement)
• Cecil County Public Local Laws §1-30(a) (County Treasurer's duty over disbursement of county funds)
• Cecil County Public Local Laws §1-31 (referenced alongside §1-30(a))
• Chapter 202, Laws of Maryland 1971 (1971 amendment to §1-18(a))
• Chapter 486, Laws of Maryland 1980 (1980 amendment to §1-18(a))

Cases:

• Kelly v. State, 139 Md. 204 (1921)
• Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466 (1913)
• Commission on Human Relations v. Baltimore, 280 Md. 35 (1977)
• MTA v. Baltimore County Revenue Authority, 267 Md. 687 (1973)
• Arundel Supply Corp. v. Cason, 265 Md. 371, 378 (1972)
• Larmore v. State, 180 Md. 347 (1942)
• Robertsons' Guardian v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 12 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Ky. 1928)
• Ford v. Aetna Insurance Company, 394 S.W.2d 693, 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)
• Secretary of State v. Hanover Insurance Company, 411 P.2d 89, 92 (Ore. 1966)
• Moore v. Gameau, 58 N.W. 179, 180 (Neb. 1894)
• People v. Swigert, 107 Ill. 494, 495 (1883)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1983/Volume68_1983.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

Local Government—County Commissioners—Expenses—Mileage—County Treasurer—"Vouchers" Needed—Cecil County Commissioners' Mileage Expenses Limited To 10¢ A Mile—Form and Contents of Required Voucher.

December 13, 1983

The Honorable Ronald A. Guns
The Honorable Ethel Murray
Maryland House of Delegates

You have requested our opinion on two questions concerning mileage expenses incurred by the County Commissioners of Cecil County. Specifically, you ask: (1) "the amount the Cecil County Commissioners ... are legally allowed for mileage"; and (2) whether vouchers submitted for mileage "should include date, mileage, and reason for the trip."

For the reasons given below, we have concluded as follows:

(1) Given the lack of greater specificity in the applicable public local laws, the maximum amount that the County Commissioners may receive for mileage is that specified in Article 25, §28(a) of the Maryland Code: "ten cents for every mile over five miles from their places of residence". We nevertheless recognize the possibility that the General Assembly might have intended a different result; consequently, we urge the introduction and passage of clarifying legislation.

(2) Absent any local law or regulation to the contrary, it is up to the County Treasurer to specify the precise form and information that he or she considers necessary to assure the validity of any claim. As a general matter, however, a voucher should at least "show[] on its face the fact, authority, and purpose" of the expense. Accordingly, the County Treasurer has the right to require that a voucher for mileage expenses specify the date, miles traveled, and reason for each trip for which reimbursement is sought. And, we believe, prudence suggests that a County Treasurer not accept anything less than that minimal information.

I
Rate of Reimbursement

Your first question involves the relationship between two statutes: Article 25, §28(a) of the Maryland Code provides that, "[u]nless otherwise provided in the public local laws of a county", county commissioners are entitled to receive "mileage at the rate of ten cents for every mile over five miles from their places of residence". Section 1-18(a) of the Public Local Laws of Cecil County, in turn, simply provides that, "for all mileage expenses . . . , each commissioner shall submit a voucher to the County Treasurer for reimbursment". The issue is whether §1-18(a) of the Public Local Laws can be read to "otherwise provid[e]" for a rate of reimbursement that differs from the general, 10¢ rate specified in Article 25, §28(a).1

1 Article 25, §28(a) of the Maryland Code provides, in its entirety, as follows: "Unless otherwise provided in the public local laws of a county, the county commissioners of the several counties shall receive three dollars per day for each day they shall be engaged in the discharge of their duties, and mileage at the rate of ten cents for every mile over five miles from their places of residence." §1-18(a) of the Public Local Laws of Cecil County provides, in its entirety, as follows: "The County Commissioners of Cecil County shall receive an annual salary in lieu of all other compensation and shall be allowed an additional amount to cover all expenses incurred in the performance of their duties as county commissioners and shall be required to devote all their time to the duties of the office. Beginning with the term of office commencing after the 1978 general election, and thereafter, the county commissioners shall receive a salary of $16,000 per year. They shall receive $2,000 per year to cover expenses, except that the president of the board shall receive an additional $500. In addition, for all mileage expenses and other expenses related to county business, each Commissioner shall submit a voucher to the County Treasurer for reimbursement." Clearly, §1-18(a) does "otherwise provid[e]" for an annual salary "in lieu" of the $3 per diem compensation specified in §28(a). It is far less clear, however, that the same can be said with respect to mileage expenses.

In a letter of advice concerning this and other matters, Assistant Attorney General Linda H. Lamone concluded that, as to the amount to be paid the County Commissioners for mileage, the rate specified in Article 25, §28(a) applies. That is, §1-18(a) merely supplements the public general law by requiring the submission of "a voucher to the County Treasurer"; but it does not "otherwise provid[e]" for a different rate of reimbursement. See Letter of Advice from Linda H. Lamone, Assistant Attorney General, to Ethel Murray, State Delegate (August 3, 1983).

We fully recognize that, in enacting the quoted provisions of §1-18(a), the General Assembly might have intended a different result, leaving it to the county, in accordance with local law and procedures, to set appropriate reimbursement rates for the county commissioners. Nevertheless, we have serious reservations about whether §1-18(a) can be read to accomplish such a result.

First, the nature and scope of any such intended delegation to the county is at best speculative. For example, did the General Assembly merely intend, as one legislator has suggested, to entitle the commissioners to receive mileage reimbursement at a rate equal to, but not greater than, the rate that the county otherwise allows to county employees generally? Although this might have been a motive behind the present law, to raise the commissioners' rate from 10¢ a mile to a rate on par with that received by others in the county, the language of §1-18(a) simply is not so limited. Or did the General Assembly actually intend a more open-ended authorization, permitting the county commissioners themselves to set whatever rate of reimbursement they think they should be entitled to, whether less than, equal to, or more than the rate applicable to county employees generally? The legislative history of §1-18(a) strongly suggests that this, too, was not the intended result. A review of that history follows.

The public general law in question, now Article 25, §28(a), was first enacted in 1866 to "regulate and make uniform the compensation of County Commissioners". Chapter 134, Laws of Maryland 1866. As to mileage expenses, the law then provided, as it still does, for "mileage at the rate of ten cents for every mile over five miles from their place[s] of resident[ce]". Id. Although express exceptions for specified counties have since been engrafted onto this statute, those exceptions do not include, and apparently never have included, Cecil County.

The public local law in question, now §1-18(a), was first enacted in 1894 and provided for an annual salary of $500 "in lieu of all other compensation, per diem[,] or mileage". Chapter 387, Laws of Maryland 1894. It has since been amended several times. Significantly, however, from 1894 to at least 1966, whenever the public local law purported to "otherwise provid[e]" with regard to mileage, it either permitted no mileage reimbursement at all or, at most, a rate of reimbursement that was below the 10¢ rate specified in Article 25, §28(a).2

Only in the late 1960s were the County Commissioners first allowed even the 10¢ rate of mileage reimbursement authorized by Article 25, §28(a). In 1959, the General Assembly authorized the commissioners to receive "seven cents for each mile actually traveled in the performance of their duties . . . within the County, not to exceed $700." Chapter 708, Laws of Maryland 1959. Four years later, in 1963, the General Assembly amended the public local law to provide for the following: first, effective June 1, 1963, an annual salary of $3,500, plus an "allow[ance]" of $1,500 "to cover all expenses incurred in the performance of their duties"; then, for terms of office commencing after the 1966 general election, an annual salary of $6,500 "in lieu of any other compensation or expense allowance of any kind". Chapter 664, Laws of Maryland 1963. The post-1966 salary was "in lieu of" any general "expense allowance", such as the $1,500 general expense allowance that became effective in 1963. Presumably, however, it was not in lieu of and did not preclude reimbursement, in accordance with the general provisions of Article 25, §28(a), for actual mileage expenses at the

2 See, e.g., Chapter 149, Laws of Maryland 1933 (annual salary of $1,000 "in lieu of all other compensation, per diem or mileage"); Chapter 245, Laws of Maryland 1935 (annual salary of $1,000, plus "five cents for each mile actually traveled in the performance of their official duties"); Chapter 639, Laws of Maryland 1949 (annual salary of $1,800, plus "five cents for each mile actually traveled in attending . . . meetings of [the] County Commissioners"); Chapter 852, Laws of Maryland 1957 (annual salary of $3,500, plus "Seven Cents for each mile actually traveled in attending . . . meetings of [the] County Commissioners"); Chapter 708, Laws of Maryland 1959 (annual salary of $3,500, plus "Seven Cents for each mile actually traveled in the performance of their duties . . . within the County, not to exceed $700").

statutory rate of 10¢ a mile.3 Thus, as of 1966, the mileage provisions of Article 25, §28(a) would appear to have applied, permitting reimbursement for mileage expenses at the rate of "ten cents for every mile over five miles from their places of residence".

The particular language with which we are now concerned was enacted in 1971. In that year, §1-18(a) was amended by Chapter 202, Laws of Maryland 1971, to provide, in relevant part, for three changes: first, a new $750 general expense allowance; second, "allowed expenses" of 10¢ a mile for two round trips per week, from home to office; and, third, payment of "all other mileage expenses" upon "submit[ting] a voucher to the County Treasurer in order to be reimbursed". Evidently, the second of these changes, the 2-round trip mileage "al­low[ance]", was intended as just that: a flat payment, whether or not the trips were actually made.4 The question at this point, then, is the meaning and effect of the third change, providing for the payment of "all other mileage expenses" upon voucher.

For the answer to this question, we look to the title of the 1971 Act. Article III, §29 of the Maryland Constitution requires that the subject of each Act of the General Assembly be described in the Act's title. If a part of an Act is not so described, it may not be given effect. See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 139 Md. 204 (1921); Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466 (1913). And, where a part of an Act is of doubtful meaning, the title of the Act may be referred to in order to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose. See, e.g., Commission on Human Relations v. Baltimore, 280 Md. 35 (1977); MTA v. Baltimore County Revenue Authority, 267 Md. 687 (1973).

3 The phrase "in lieu of any other compensation or expense allowance" is markedly different from earlier versions of the section, which referred more specifically to a salary "in lieu of all other compensation, per diem or mileage". See, e.g., Chapter 387, Laws of Maryland 1894; Chapter 149, Laws of Maryland 1933.
4 The new reference to "allowed expenses", i.e., a mileage "allowance", is markedly different from earlier versions of the section, which referred only to miles "actually traveled". See, e.g., Chapter 708, Laws of Maryland 1959.

The relevant portion of the title to Chapter 202, Laws of Maryland 1971, refers only to providing for "an expense account . . . , including mileage expenses". This language, referring to an expense "account", or "allowance", for mileage, adequately reflects the first two of the changes noted above, but the third change not at all. With regard to "all other mileage expenses", the title is silent: it simply contains no reference to or indication of any intent to change the status quo from that in effect since 1966; that is, it contains no reference to or indication of any intent to modify, let alone increase, the basic, 10¢ mileage rate specified in Article 25, §28(a). Hence, to the extent that §1-18(a) is of doubtful meaning, the title indicates that there was no intent to, in the words of Article 25, §28(a), "otherwise provid[e]" for a different rate of reimbursement. Indeed, even if the 1971 amendment to §1-18(a) had been more explicit, for example, expressly authorizing the County Commissioners to receive a rate of, say, 25¢, it is doubtful that such an authorization could have been given effect, because it was not reflected in the title. Thus, as of 1971, the basic mileage provisions of Article 25, §28(a) would have continued to apply, permitting reimbursement only at the rate of "ten cents for every mile over five miles from their places of residence".5

The next, and last, significant change occurred in 1980, on enactment of Chapter 486, Laws of Maryland 1980. Chapter 486 amended §1-18(a) to: (i) increase the County Commissioners' annual salary to $16,000 a year (plus further increases keyed to increases in the Consumer Price Index); (ii) increase the general expense allowance to $2,000 a year; (iii) repeal the 2-round trip mileage allowance; and (iv) provide, much as be-

5 To the extent that a change in the wording of a statute merely continues or reiterates already existing law, the change need not be reflected in the Act's title. See, e.g., Bill Review Letter (H.B. 1756) from Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General, to Harry Hughes, Governor (March 30, 1981). For this reason also, the title to the 1971 Act was not deficient in its failure to refer expressly to the newly added requirement that vouchers be submitted to the County Treasurer for reimbursement. Article 25, §23 of the Maryland Code already provides that the county commissioners of a county "shall allow no claim against the county not properly chargeable to the same and for which the claimant shall not produce a legal voucher". And, by public local law, that responsibility is shared with the Treasurer. See §§1-30(a) and 1-31 of the Public Local Laws of Cecil County, discussed in Part II of this Opinion.

fore, that for "mileage expenses" the commissioners must "submit a voucher to the County Treasurer for reimbursement". These changes do reflect an intent to repeal the flat, 2-round trip mileage allowance in exchange for an increase in salary and in the general expense allowance; of themselves, however, they do not suggest any intent to otherwise change the law governing mileage expenses generally. There is nothing in the 1980 Act, its title, or, as near as we can tell, any legislative files to indicate that the General Assembly intended other than to again continue the status quo in this regard, i.e., to continue to permit reimbursement for mileage expenses in accordance with Article 25, §28(a): "ten cents for every mile over five miles from their places of residence".

We understand that, for a few years now, the county commissioners have been receiving mileage reimbursement at rates greater than 10¢. Nevertheless, "[i]t is fundamental . . . that no custom, however long and widely followed, can nullify the clear and manifest meaning of [a] statute". Arundel Supply Corp. v. Cason, 265 Md. 371, 378 (1972). The language of Article 25, §28(a), at least, is quite clear and manifest: "Unless otherwise provided in the public local laws of a county, the county commissioners . . . shall receive . . . mileage at the rate of ten cents for every mile over five miles from their places of residence". And, given the history reviewed above, we have considerable difficulty in reading §1-18(a) of the Public Local Laws of Cecil County as "otherwise provid[ing]" for a different rate of reimbursement.

To be sure, the 10¢ rate specified in Article 25, §28(a) is somewhat dated, having been set almost 120 years ago. And we do not dismiss the possibility that the General Assembly somehow intended to provide the commissioners with a more realistic rate of reimbursement. But, absent some express manifestation of such an intent, we are necessarily limited to the language and history of the governing statutes themselves.

We therefore urge that §1-18(a) be clarified to specify the true intent of the General Assembly in this regard. Absent such clarification, we believe it likely that a court, if presented with this issue, would conclude that the commissioners are limited to the rate specified in Article 25, §28(a) of the Maryland Code: "ten cents for every mile over five miles from their places of residence".

II
Voucher Requirement

Your second question involves the requirement in §1-18(a) that the commissioners submit a "voucher" to the County Treasurer for reimbursement of mileage expenses. You ask whether "there is a set form for these vouchers which should include date, mileage, and reason for the trip."

Section 1-18(a), of course, does not specify a "set form", nor do we know of any public general law or public local law that does. Hence, in the first instance at least, and absent any local law or regulation that might provide otherwise, we believe it would be up to the County Treasurer to specify the information that he or she considers necessary to assure the validity of any claim for reimbursement. This is so because, by public local law, the County Treasurer is directly responsible "for the collection and disbursement of all moneys coming into his hands for the county". §1-30(a) of the Public Local Laws of Cecil County. See also §1-31 of the Public Local Laws.6 Absent statutory specificity, therefore, we can here only suggest guidelines, and cautions, that a County Treasurer might well consider.

A case illustrative of the need for care in the disbursement of public funds is that of Larmore v. State, 180 Md. 347 (1942). The case is particularly relevant here in that it involved a statutory voucher requirement analogous to §1-18(a). Article 25, §23 of the Maryland Code provides: "They [the county commissioners of a county] shall allow no claim against the county not properly chargeable to the same and for which the claimant shall not produce a legal voucher."

6 This is not to say that the County Commissioners do not themselves share in the responsibility. As discussed below, Article 25, §23 of the Maryland Code imposes a similar, if not paramount, responsibility of care on them as well.

In Larmore, the County Commissioners of Wicomico County had been jointly indicted and convicted of the common law crime of misfeasance in office, by "approving and passing for payment fictitious and fraudulent claims made up by a dishonest clerk". 180 Md. at 348. Specifically, the indictment charged that: "[T]he commissioners 'unlawfully and negligently did allow, approve and pass for . . . payment . . . fictitious and fraudulent claim[s] against Wicomico County designated as Voucher No[s]. 49,599 [and 49,276] in the amount[s] of $228 [and $135, respectively], without first having inquired and found out for themselves whether any such claim was due by Wicomico County and for which they, while acting in the capacity of commissioners, . . . were authorized and required by law to pay'" 180 Md. at 350.

The commissioners demurred to the indictment and appealed the subsequent conviction. In support of their demurrer, they argued that the indictment's charge "demands the exercise of an impossible degree of care on the part of the commissioners, and wrongly supposes that they are denied any right to rely on the honesty and care of their clerk". Id.

The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the conviction. Even though there had been no evidence to indicate that the commissioners had actual knowledge of the clerk's fraud, they "remain charged with the management of the county's finances". Id. In this context, the Court specifically referred to the commissioners' duty, set forth in Article 25, §23 (then §10), to "allow no claim . . . not properly chargeable to the [county] and for which the claimant shall not produce a legal voucher". 180 Md. at 349.

As to the commissioners' claim on demurrer that "th[e] charge demands the exercise of an impossible degree of care", the Court said: "[T]he court does not see that it is properly subject to this criticism. Considered apart from the subsequent evidence, as it must be considered on the demurrer, the charge is nothing more than that of passing payments negligently, without making the inquiries that would enable them to perform their statutory duty of verifying the indebtedness. There is no restriction to any particular method, and no denial of any particular reliance. Passing for payment without any inquiry is the gist of the charge, and that action would constitute a dereliction of duty." 180 Md. at 350-51.

The "gist" of the offense in Larmore was the failure to make "any inquiry" into the claims in question. Hence, there was no need for the Court to further define the general obligation of the commissioners to "mak[e] the inquiries that would enable them to perform their statutory duty of verifying the indebtedness". Indeed, as the Court itself noted, "[t]here is no restriction to any particular method". Presumably, however, one acceptable method, referred to in the statute itself, is a "legal voucher", properly evidencing the validity of the claim in question.

To our knowledge, the Maryland courts have not defined the meaning of the term "voucher" in this context, let alone specify any particular form or contents. The courts of other states, however, have provided guidance. In Robertsons' Guardian v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 12 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Ky. 1928), the court defined "voucher" as follows: "A voucher means, when used in connection with the disbursement of money, a written or printed instrument, in the nature of a bill of particulars, account, receipt, or acquittance, that shows on its face the fact, authority, and purpose of the disbursement." Accord Ford v. Aetna Insurance Company, 394 S.W.2d 693, 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). See Secretary of State v. Hanover Insurance Company, 411 P.2d 89, 92 (Ore. 1966) (statement of money spent for rations that does not designate from whom rations were purchased is not valid "voucher"). See also Moore v. Gameau, 58 N.W. 179, 180 (Neb. 1894); People v. Swigert, 107 Ill. 494, 495 (1883).7

Much the same analysis applies to the County Treasurer's responsibility under §§1-18(a) and 1-30(a) of the Public Local Laws of Cecil County. The voucher required by the Treasurer should contain sufficient information to enable the Treasurer, as was required of the county commissioners in Larmore, "to

7 A virtually identical definition of "voucher" has also been adopted by one of the leading legal dictionaries: "When used in connection with disbursement of money, a written or printed instrument in the nature of an account, receipt, or acquittance, that shows on its face the fact, authority, and purpose of disbursement." Black's Law Dictionary 1414 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).

perform [his or her] statutory duty of verifying the indebtedness". Although, to borrow from Larmore, "[t]here is no restriction to any particular method", we believe that the voucher should at least "sho[w] on its face the fact, authority, and purpose of the disbursement". That is, it should contain sufficient information to permit, if necessary, further "inquiry", e.g., on periodic audit, into the validity of the claim.

With regard to mileage expenses in particular, therefore, we believe that the County Treasurer certainly has the right to require that the voucher specify the date, miles traveled, and reason for any trip for which reimbursement is sought.8 Indeed, in our view, prudence suggests that a County Treasurer not accept anything less than this minimal information.9

In summary, then, the form and contents of the voucher is, in the first instance at least, a matter to be decided by the County Treasurer. The Treasurer, along with the County Commissioners themselves, is responsible to "mak[e] the inquiries" necessary to verify the indebtedness. While "[t]here is no restriction to any particular method", a voucher should "sho[w] on its face the fact, authority, and purpose" of the expense. In our view, such a showing ordinarily would include the date, miles traveled, and reason for the trip for which reimbursement is sought.10

8 By way of analogy, we note that the State of Maryland Expense Form calls for just such information to be given by a claimant.
9 For example, the statutory "authority" for the receipt of mileage expenses requires that these expenses be "related to county business" and have been incurred by the commissioners "in the performance of their duties as county commissioners". [§1-18(a). See also §28(a) ("in the discharge of their duties").] Thus, a voucher that "shows on its face the fact, authority, and purpose" of the reimbursement would contain enough information about the reason for a trip to indicate that it was "related to county business" and incurred "in the discharge of [official] duties". Whether and to what extent a court might consider less specificity to be sufficient is a matter of conjecture, and may well depend on the context in which the issue arises. For example, a civil suit against a county treasurer or against the treasurer's bond for making an unauthorized disbursement would likely involve different considerations than, for example, a criminal action against a county treasurer for misfeasance in office.
10 You also have asked if it would be "permissible" for a "set form for these vouchers ... to be added by legislation". It would, of course, be permissible for the General Assembly to enact a law that specifies the form or contents of the required voucher. We note, however, that it is relatively unusual for legislation to reach that level of specificity in administrative matters such as this.

III
Conclusion

In conclusion, it is our opinion that:

(1) Given the lack of greater specificity in the applicable public local laws, the maximum amount that the County Commissioners of Cecil County may receive for mileage is that specified in Article 25, §28(a) of the Maryland Code: "ten cents for every mile over five miles from their places of residence". We nevertheless recognize the possibility that the General Assembly might have intended a different result; consequently, we urge the introduction and passage of clarifying legislation.

(2) Absent any local law or regulation to the contrary, it is up to the County Treasurer to specify the precise form and information that he or she considers necessary to assure the validity of any claim. As a general matter, however, a voucher should at least "sho[w] on its face the fact, authority, and purpose" of the expense. Accordingly, the County Treasurer has the right to require that a voucher for mileage expenses specify the date, miles traveled, and reason for each trip for which reimbursement is sought. And, we believe, prudence suggests that a County Treasurer not accept anything less than that minimal information.

Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General
Avery Aisenstark, Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

Editor's Note: Since the issuance of this Opinion, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 58, Laws of Maryland 1984, amending §1-18(a) of the Public Local Laws of Cecil County to require all vouchers for reimbursement of expenses to "include the information required by the State Standard Travel Regulations" and to permit reimbursement for mileage expenses "at the rate authorized under the State Standard Travel Regulations".