When a Maryland historic district commission denies a building permit, how does the appeal process work and how much deference does the reviewing board owe the commission?

Plain-English summary

The Town Attorney for Easton, Maryland asked the Attorney General two related questions about how the town's Historic District Commission decisions get reviewed: first, whether Article 66B of the Maryland Code (the state's zoning enabling law) actually permits Easton's zoning ordinance to route appeals from the Historic District Commission to the town's Board of Zoning Appeals first, with further appeals to the circuit court and then the Court of Special Appeals, and second, how thoroughly the Board of Zoning Appeals is supposed to review the Commission's decisions once an appeal reaches it.

The opinion answered both questions. On the appeal-path question, it worked through a genuinely confusing piece of statutory language, a 1963 provision giving a right of appeal from a historic district commission's decision "similar to that provided from the decision of the zoning board or commission," when the referenced entity's own appeal rights had changed substantially since 1963. Piecing together several rounds of legislative amendment and prior Attorney General opinions, the opinion concluded that current law does give the local Board of Zoning Appeals jurisdiction over Historic District Commission appeals, so Easton's ordinance is valid, while also noting a separate 1975 law that would let Easton choose to allow direct appeal to the circuit court instead, an option the town simply had not exercised. On the scope-of-review question, the opinion concluded that the Board of Zoning Appeals has more than a narrow, deferential appellate role: it can hold its own hearing, take its own evidence, and reach its own decision on the merits. But because Historic District Commission members are specifically required to have expertise in fields like history, architecture, and preservation, the opinion recommended that the Board give especially strong weight to the Commission's views on the specialized aesthetic and historic-value judgments the statute assigns the Commission to make.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1982. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The opinion applied Article 66B of the Maryland Code, the zoning enabling statute in effect in 1982, tracing amendments back to 1957 and forward through 1982, and relied on Maryland case law current through early 1983 (including a Court of Appeals decision the opinion's own editor's note flags as having been decided after the main text was written). Maryland's zoning and historic preservation statutes have since been substantially recodified (Article 66B was reorganized into the Land Use Article), and Easton's own zoning ordinance may have changed. Anyone researching a current historic district appeal in Maryland should consult the current Land Use Article and the applicable local ordinance rather than relying on this 1982 analysis of a since-superseded statute.

Common questions

Why was it so hard to figure out where an appeal from the Historic District Commission was supposed to go?
The 1963 statute creating the right of appeal used circular, dated language, giving an appeal "similar to" whatever appeal existed from the decision of the local "zoning board or commission," without saying which body that was or accounting for how that other body's own appeal rights had changed over nearly twenty years. The opinion had to work through multiple statutory amendments from 1957, 1962, 1971, and 1975, plus a Court of Appeals case, to reconstruct what appeal rights actually existed by 1982, concluding that the reference was to the local planning commission and that the answer had to be evaluated under the law as it stood at the time the question was asked, not as it stood in 1963.

Does the Board of Zoning Appeals just rubber-stamp whatever the Historic District Commission decided, or start over from scratch?
Neither, according to the opinion. The Board is not limited to reviewing only the record the Commission compiled; it can hold its own hearing, hear new evidence, and reach its own independent decision on the issues raised, which the opinion described as more than an ordinary, narrow appellate role. But the opinion did not read this independence as giving the Board free rein to substitute its own aesthetic judgment for the Commission's without good reason.

Why should the Board of Zoning Appeals defer to the Historic District Commission at all if it can decide things independently?
The opinion pointed to the statute's own design: Historic District Commission members are required to have "special interest, knowledge or training" in fields like history, architecture, preservation, or urban design, and the factors the Commission must weigh, things like a structure's historic or architectural significance and its compatibility with the surrounding historic area, are largely subjective, values-based judgments the Commission's members are specifically equipped to make. The opinion recommended the Board give "very strong consideration" to those views for that reason, even though it is not legally bound to adopt them.

Could Easton have set up its appeal process differently?
Yes. The opinion noted that a 1975 amendment to Article 66B lets a local legislative body choose to allow direct appeal from decisions like these straight to the circuit court, bypassing the Board of Zoning Appeals, but that this alternative path is optional, not mandatory. Because Easton had not adopted that alternative, its existing ordinance routing appeals through the Board of Zoning Appeals remained valid under state law.

Background and statutory framework

Article 66B's historic district zoning provisions, §§8.01 through 8.15, apply to all non-chartered Maryland counties and to all Maryland municipalities except Baltimore City, including the Town of Easton, incorporated in 1790. Section 8.14, unchanged since its original 1963 enactment, gives a person aggrieved by a decision of a historic district commission "a right of appeal therefrom similar to that provided from the decision of the zoning board or commission within the county or municipal corporation." Easton's own zoning ordinance, §512-N, implements this by sending appeals from its Historic District Commission first to the town's Board of Zoning Appeals, then to the Circuit Court for Talbot County, and finally to the Court of Special Appeals, and the Town Attorney asked whether this structure actually complies with Article 66B.

Answering that question required untangling what "zoning board or commission" meant, since that exact phrase does not appear consistently in Article 66B and the underlying appeal rights of whatever body it referenced had changed substantially over time. The opinion determined that the reference was to the local "planning commission" (sometimes called a "planning and zoning commission" in various counties), not to a "board of appeals," based on textual clues in the statute. It also found that, as of 1963 and even through the January 1971 Court of Appeals decision in Urbana Civic Association, Inc. v. Urbana Mobile Village, Inc., there was in fact no right of appeal to a court from decisions of a local planning commission at all, meaning §8.14, if evaluated as of its 1963 enactment date, provided no judicial appeal right whatsoever. Rather than treat that as fatal to the appeal right, the opinion concluded the correct approach is to evaluate §8.14's cross-reference as of the date the question is asked, not as of 1963, tracking subsequent amendments that created appeal rights where none had existed.

The key amendment was Chapter 793, Laws of Maryland 1971, enacted just months after the Urbana decision exposed the gap, which gave local boards of appeals jurisdiction to review "any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative official" in enforcing Article 66B or any ordinance under it. Building on a 1979 Attorney General opinion that had already concluded this 1971 amendment let a board of appeals review a planning commission's approval or denial of a subdivision plat (reading a multi-member commission as an "administrative official" for these purposes, a reading later confirmed by the Court of Appeals in Howard Research and Development Corp. v. Concerned Citizens for the Columbia Concept, decided in 1983 and noted in this opinion's editor's note), the opinion concluded the same logic extends to a historic district commission's decisions on building or alteration applications. It also noted a separate 1975 amendment, Chapter 267, Laws of Maryland 1975, letting local legislative bodies choose to permit direct appeal to the circuit court instead of routing through a board of appeals, an optional alternative Easton had not adopted, meaning its existing ordinance remained valid.

On the scope-of-review question, the opinion looked to Article 66B, §4.07's general provisions governing boards of appeals, which require the initial decision-maker to transmit the full record, provide for a public hearing, and give the board power to affirm, reverse, or modify the decision and make "such order, requirement, decision or determination as ought to be made," with "all the powers of the officer from whom the appeal is taken." The opinion read this as authorizing the Board of Zoning Appeals to exercise independent judgment, take its own evidence, and reach its own conclusions, rather than being confined to a narrow, deferential review of the Commission's record. At the same time, because Article 66B, §8.03 requires Historic District Commission members to have "special interest, knowledge or training" in fields like history, architecture, preservation, or urban design, and because the factors the Commission must weigh under §8.06 (historic and architectural significance, compatibility with the surrounding historic area, and similar aesthetic judgments) are inherently value-laden and suited to that expertise, the opinion recommended the Board give the Commission's views "very strong consideration," while stopping short of reading Article 66B to mandate a narrowly deferential standard of review, noting that other states' historic preservation statutes take a range of approaches to this same tension between board independence and commission expertise.

Citations

Statutes:

• Article 66B, §§8.01 to 8.15 of the Maryland Code
• Article 66B, §7.03 of the Maryland Code
• Article 66B, §8.01(a)(2) of the Maryland Code
• Article 66B, §8.14 of the Maryland Code
• Chapter 874, Laws of Maryland 1963
• Article 66B, §2.07 of the Maryland Code
• Article 66B, §3.01(c) of the Maryland Code
• Article 66B, §§3.02(b)(2), 3.04(a), 4.05(d), 4.05(e), 7.01(c)(1), 9.01(a), and 9.01(c)
• Article 66B, §§2.08, 4.07, and 6.02
• Chapter 793, Laws of Maryland 1971
• Chapter 321, Laws of Maryland 1957
• Chapter 36, Laws of Maryland 1962
• Chapter 825, Laws of Maryland 1982 (Article 66B, §7.01(c))
• Article 66B, §4.07(d)(1) of the Maryland Code
• Chapter 267, Laws of Maryland 1975 (Article 66B, §4.08(f))
• Article 66B, §8.03(a) of the Maryland Code
• Article 66B, §4.08(f) of the Maryland Code
• Article 66B, §4.07(e) of the Maryland Code
• Article 66B, §4.07(g) of the Maryland Code
• Article 66B, §4.07(h) of the Maryland Code
• Article 66B, §8.03 of the Maryland Code
• Article 66B, §8.05 of the Maryland Code
• Article 66B, §8.06 of the Maryland Code
• §512-N of the Town of Easton Zoning Ordinance
• Connecticut General Statutes §7-147a et seq.
• Rhode Island General Laws Annotated §45-24.1-1 et seq.
• Massachusetts Annotated Laws, Chapter 40C, §12

Cases:

• Urbana Civic Association, Inc. v. Urbana Mobile Village, Inc., 260 Md. 458 (1971)
• Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 271 Md. 265, 288 (1974)
• Cecil County v. Gaster, 285 Md. 233 (1979)
• Howard Research and Development Corp. v. Concerned Citizens for the Columbia Concept, 297 Md. 357, 365-66 & n.5 (1983)
• Gunley v. Board of Selectmen of Nantucket, 358 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass. 1977)
• Sleeper v. Old King's Highway Regional Historic District Commission, 417 N.E.2d 987 (Mass. App. 1981)
• Hayes v. Smith, 167 A.2d 546 (R.I. 1961)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1982/Volume67_1982.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

ZONING

Historic Area Zoning—Appeals—Manner of Appeal From Historic District Commission—Scope of Review By Board of Zoning Appeals

December 20, 1982

L. Clark Ewing, Esquire
Town Attorney, Town of Easton

On behalf of the Mayor and Town Council of the Town of Easton, Maryland, you have asked for our opinion on whether Article 66B of the Maryland Code authorizes appeals from decisions of the Town's Historic District Commission in the manner set forth in §512-N of the Town's Zoning Ordinance, that is, an appeal to the Town's Board of Zoning Appeals in the first instance, with subsequent appeals to the Circuit Court for Talbot County and, thereafter, the Court of Special Appeals.1 You have also asked for our opinion on the proper scope of review by the Board of Zoning Appeals.

For the reasons given below, we conclude that §512-N of the Zoning Ordinance accords with Article 66B. We also conclude that the Board of Zoning Appeals, in matters related to interpretation or enforcement of the Historic District Ordinance, has more than ordinary appellate jurisdiction: It may conduct de novo hearings and make its own determination of disputed issues; however, because the members of the Historic District Commission possess special interest, knowledge, or training in pertinent fields, we believe that the Board of Zoning Appeals should give especially strong consideration to the views expressed by members of the Commission on the various factors prescribed by Article 66B, §8.06 for consideration in reviewing applications for permission to build or change structures.

I
Manner of Appeal from Historic District Commission

A. Introduction

In connection with your primary question, Article 66B, §8.14 provides:

"Any person or persons, firm, or corporation aggrieved by a decision of the historic district commission has a right of appeal therefrom similar to that provided from the decision of the zoning board or commission within the county or municipal corporation."

The language of this section has remained the same since it was originally enacted by Chapter 874, Laws of Maryland 1963. Your question therefore becomes: What is the right of appeal of an aggrieved person "from the decision of the [local] zoning board or commission"?

Unfortunately, this question is not easy to answer. It engenders several difficult subsidiary questions: First, what is the local "zoning board or commission"? Second, as of what date is the right of appeal from a decision of this entity to be evaluated, as of 1963, when §8.14 was enacted, or as of the date when the question arises? Finally, do we look to the appeal provisions of Article 66B itself or to local implementing ordinances to see what rights of appeal exist?

B. Meaning of "Zoning Board or Commission"

On the first of these subsidiary questions, we note that the term "zoning commission" appears only rarely in the current text of Article 66B. Section 2.07, a section applicable only to Baltimore City, speaks of a "zoning commission"; but the reference in §8.14 cannot be to this commission, because Baltimore City is not covered by §8.14. Section 3.01(c) also refers to a "zoning commission", and, alternately, to a "planning and zoning Commission" and a "planning or zoning commission", as a predecessor of the body now established by Article 66B as the local "planning commission". There are several other references in Article 66B to the term "planning and zoning commission". E.g., §§3.01(c), 3.02(b)(2), 3.04(a), 4.05(d), 4.05(e), 7.01(c)(1), 9.01(a), and 9.01(c).

It appears that the body generally referred to in Article 66B as the "planning commission" is currently called a "planning and zoning commission" in many local jurisdictions (for example, Carroll County [see §3.02(b)(2)] and Somerset County [see §9.01(c)]).2 It also appears that the name "planning and zoning commission" was a more standard name at some earlier time. See §§3.01(c) and 9.01(a). The term "zoning board" is never used in Article 66B, although that Article provides for bodies known as "boards of appeals" or "boards of zoning appeals". §§2.08, 4.07 and 6.02.

In deciding what §8.14 means by "a right of appeal . . . similar to that provided from the decision of the zoning board or commission", it is also worthy of note that, at least until July 1, 1971, the effective date of Chapter 793, Laws of Maryland 1971, neither the planning commission sections (Subtitle 3) nor the subdivision control sections (Subtitle 5) of Article 66B provided for a right of appeal to a court from the decision of a local planning commission. Urbana Civic Association, Inc. v. Urbana Mobile Village, Inc., 260 Md. 458 (1971).3 Furthermore, the local planning commission (or "planning and zoning commission") then, as now, had no final decision-making power in connection with local zoning. Therefore, in 1963, when §8.14 was originally enacted, there was no right to appeal to a court from any final decision of a local "planning and zoning commission". On the other hand, there was a right of appeal to the circuit court and, thereafter, to the Court of Appeals, from the decision of a local "board of appeals". See Chapter 321, Laws of Maryland 1957 (dividing what was then Article 66B, §22, dealing with the board of appeals, into subsections and adding a provision for appeal to the Court of Appeals); Chapter 36, Laws of Maryland 1962, Sections 1 and 41 (amending then Article 66B, §22(i) and repealing §22(j) and (k)).

Despite this possible justification for concluding that the "zoning board or commission" referred to in §8.14 is the "board of appeals", we cannot accept such a reading. Section 8.14 refers to the "zoning board or commission" as a singular body, suggesting that it might be called either a "zoning board" or a "zoning commission". We do not believe that a board of appeals qualifies for both of these names: whether or not it could be called a "zoning board", it could not properly be called a "zoning commission". Therefore, in our opinion, the reference in §8.14 to the "zoning board or commission" is a reference to the commission established under Article 66B, §3.01, that is, the entity that is most often referred to today as the local "planning commission".4

Although §8.14 thus apparently provided no right of appeal to any court before July 1, 1971, we think the question of what appeal rights §8.14 affords must be addressed, not as of 1963, but as of the date the question arises. Thus, if we wish to know what rights §8.14 affords today, we must examine the "right of appeal . . . [now] provided from the decision of the [local planning commission]".

C. Applicable Right of Appeal

We addressed this latter question in some detail in 64 Opinions of the Attorney General 349 (1979). In that Opinion, we noted that, as a result of Chapter 793, Laws of Maryland 1971, local boards of appeals were newly authorized to entertain appeals arising out of the enforcement of any part of Article 66B or of a local ordinance passed under any of the subtitles of Article 66B.5 Thus, we specifically concluded, Chapter 793 authorized an appeal to the local board of appeals from action of a local planning commission in approving or disapproving a subdivision plat under local subdivision regulations. 64 Opinions of the Attorney General at 350-51.

We similarly conclude here that Chapter 793, Laws of Maryland 1971, authorized an appeal to the local board of appeals from action of a local historic district commission in approving or disapproving an application to build or change a structure under Subtitle 8 of Article 66B and the local historic district ordinance.6 As we explained in our 1979 Opinion, we believe that a multi-member body such as a local planning commission, or, in this case, an historic district commission, qualifies as "an administrative official" within the meaning of Article 66B, §4.07(d)(1). 64 Opinions of the Attorney General at 351 n. 4.

In our 1979 Opinion, we also noted changes made by Chapter 267, Laws of Maryland 1975. That legislation added a new subsection (f) to §4.08 of Article 66B, authorizing local legislative bodies to provide for direct appeal to the circuit court of "any matter arising under the planning and zoning laws of the county or municipal corporation". We concluded that Chapter 267 authorized local jurisdictions to provide for direct appeal to the circuit court from approvals or disapprovals of subdivision plats by local planning commissions. 64 Opinions of the Attorney General at 351-52. We expand that Opinion here and similarly conclude that Chapter 267 enabled local jurisdictions to provide, if they wish, for direct appeal to the circuit court from decisions of local historic district commissions under historic area zoning provisions.

D. Summary

Thus, we advise you that, in a jurisdiction that has created an historic district commission under Article 66B, §8.03(a), current State enabling law [Article 66B, §4.07(d)(1)] gives the local board of appeals the power to hear and decide appeals from decisions of that commission. Section 512-N of the Easton Zoning Ordinance is consistent with this enabling law.

In addition, current State law [Article 66B, §4.08(f)] permits a local legislative body to provide an alternative right of appeal directly to the circuit court. In the case of the Town of Easton, the local legislative body has evidently chosen not to provide such an alternative. Because §4.08(f) is clearly permissive and not mandatory, Easton is in compliance with State law.7

II
Scope of Review by Board of Appeals

In connection with your second question, we are aware of no Maryland authority directly on point. However, Article 66B, §4.07 gives general guidance on the scope of the review to be conducted by a board of appeals.

Section 4.07(e) provides that "[t]he officer from whom the appeal is taken shall forthwith transmit to the board all the papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken". Section 4.07(g) provides for a public hearing at which any party may appear. Section 4.07(h) gives the board power to reverse, affirm, or modify the decision appealed from and to "make such order, requirement, decision or determination as ought to be made"; it expressly gives the board, for that purpose, "all the powers of the officer from whom the appeal is taken".

In our view, §4.07 calls for the board of appeals to exercise its own judgment on matters appealed to it. Although the board of appeals receives a record from the initial decision-maker, it is not bound by that record alone; it can take independent testimony and arrive at its own decision. However, its basic function is to serve as a check on erroneous decisions of other bodies and officials, not to usurp the authority and discretion invested initially in those other bodies and officials.

In its consideration of historic zoning matters, a board of appeals is particularly justified in giving greater than usual weight to the views of the members of an historic district commission. Article 66B, §8.03 specifies that the members of such a commission shall be "qualified by special interest, knowledge or training in such fields as history, architecture, preservation or urban design". The historic district commission reviews applications for permission to build or change structures if the changes involved would affect exteriors visible from public ways in an historic district. §8.05. In reviewing these applications, the commission is required to consider such factors as "the historic or architectural value and significance of [the structures]", the "relationship [of particular structures] to the historic value of the surrounding area", "the relationship of the exterior architectural features of the structure to the remainder of the structure and to the surrounding area", and "the general compatibility of [the proposed] exterior design, arrangement, texture, and materials". §8.06. These statutory criteria involve value judgments that members of a local historic district commission are especially equipped by their knowledge and experience to make.8

Notwithstanding our recommendations that boards of appeals give deference to the views of members of a local historic district commission, we do not mean to suggest that Article 66B mandates a narrow scope of review in historic zoning matters: Article 66B, §8.14, in providing for an appeal "similar to" the appeal available to one aggrieved by the decision of a local planning commission, makes no distinction as to the mandated scope of review between appeals from an historic district commission and appeals from a local planning commission. In our opinion, therefore, while the board of appeals should give considerable weight to the decision of the historic district commission, the board of appeals ultimately is called on to conduct its own review and, in doing so, exercise its own judgment under the general provisions of Article 66B, §4.07, discussed above.

III
Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that the Zoning Ordinance of the Town of Easton is valid under and consistent with Article 66B insofar as it provides for appeals from the Historic District Commission to the Board of Zoning Appeals. In reviewing decisions of the Historic District Commission, we believe that the Board of Zoning Appeals may consider the record of proceedings before the Commission, as well as any other evidence or argument it chooses to hear, and that it may make its own decision on any issue raised. At the same time, we think that the Board should give very strong consideration to the views expressed by members of the Historic District Commission, particularly where these views relate to largely subjective aesthetic and other value judgments that the expertise of the Commission members renders them especially qualified to make.

Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General
Judith A. Armold, Assistant Attorney General
Avery Aisenstark
Chief Counsel,
Opinions and Advice

1 The historic area zoning provisions of Article 66B, §§8.01 to 8.15, are applicable to all nonchartered Maryland counties and to all Maryland municipal corporations except Baltimore City. §§7.03 and 8.01(a)(2). See 60 Opinions of the Attorney General 569 (1975). They are, accordingly, applicable to the Town of Easton, which was incorporated in 1790.

2 The name "planning and zoning commission" is common enough that it, rather than "planning commission", was used as the general term in Chapter 825, Laws of Maryland 1982, which added §7.01(c) to Article 66B. Subsection (c)(1)(i) of that section defines "commission" as "the planning and zoning commission or similar body of the county".

3 See note 4 below.

4 Although our conclusion means that §8.14 provided for no appeal before July 1, 1971, we do not believe that this is a totally unreasonable interpretation. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in the Urbana case, decided in January of 1971, there was then no right of appeal from decisions of local planning commissions in the enforcement of local subdivision ordinances. At that time, Article 66B, §4.07(d)(1) only authorized the board of appeals "to hear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement of this subtitle [i.e., Subtitle 4 on Zoning] or of any ordinance adopted pursuant thereto".

The General Assembly, however, presumably was not even aware of this "problem" until the Urbana case was decided; and it immediately acted to remedy the situation. On May 28, 1971, Chapter 793, Laws of Maryland 1971, was enacted to amend §4.07(d)(1) to provide the board of appeals with jurisdiction to review "any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement of this article [i.e., Article 66B] or any ordinance adopted pursuant thereto".

5 See note 4 above.

6 In an earlier Opinion, this Office stated that "[a]n appeal from a decision of the historic district commission goes directly to the Circuit Court". 62 Opinions of the Attorney General 490, 495-96 (1977). The point emphasized in that Opinion, however, was that the decisions of an historic district commission were not reviewable by "the local governing body"; furthermore, the jurisdiction involved was Annapolis, which had specifically provided for direct appeal of decisions of its historic district commission to the Circuit Court. See Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 271 Md. 265, 288 (1974). The Opinion relied in part on a footnote from the Urbana case, 260 Md. at 460 n. 1, which suggested that Article 66B, §8.14 gave a right to judicial review not given by Article 66B, Subtitle 3 or Subtitle 5. We cannot reconcile this unexplained suggestion with our reading of §8.14.

[Editor's Note: In reaching this conclusion, the 1979 Opinion "considered with respect" the fact that, in Cecil County v. Gaster, 285 Md. 233 (1979), the Court of Appeals expressed "considerable doubt as to whether [a planning] commission is 'an administrative official'" within the meaning of Article 66B, §4.07(d)(1), since "[t]he term 'an administrative official' seems to connote an individual, not a group of individuals". 64 Opinions of the Attorney General at 351 n. 4. The Opinion went on to explain why, notwithstanding the "considerable doubt" expressed in Gaster, the term "administrative official" should be read to include a multi-member body. Id.

The Court of Appeals has since addressed this issue anew. For reasons similar to those set forth in the 1979 Opinion, the Court concluded that, as used in a statute of this sort, the term "administrative official" means "administrative official or officials", including a multi-member administrative agency. See Howard Research and Development Corp. v. Concerned Citizens for the Columbia Concept, 297 Md. 357, 365-66 & n. 5 (1983).]

7 Enabling laws in other states vary in their provisions for appeal from decisions of historic district commissions. For example, Connecticut General Statutes, §7-147a et seq., provide for direct appeal to the courts. On the other hand, Rhode Island General Laws Annotated, §45-24.1-1 et seq., provide for intermediate appeal to a zoning board; and Massachusetts Annotated Laws, Chapter 40C, §12, allows a city or town to provide for intermediate review by "a person or persons of competence and experience in such matters".

8 In Gunley v. Board of Selectmen of Nantucket, 358 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass. 1977), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that, on intermediate appeal of the decision of an historic district commission to the local legislative body, the scope of review was narrow. The court read the applicable enabling legislation to give the commission "a substantial measure of discretionary power with respect to 'the appropriateness of exterior architectural features' and congruity to historic aspects of the surroundings and the district". 358 N.E.2d at 1015. The court concluded that provisions for appeal did not transfer this discretionary power to the reviewing body and that the decision of the commission could be disturbed on review only if "it is based on a legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary". Id. See also Sleeper v. Old King's Highway Regional Historic District Commission, 417 N.E.2d 987 (Mass. App. 1981). On the other hand, in Hayes v. Smith, 167 A.2d 546 (R.I. 1961), Rhode Island's highest court ruled that, on appeals from decisions of an historic zoning commission, a zoning board does not merely exercise appellate jurisdiction; rather, it is authorized to consider the questions raised de novo.