When two bills in the same legislative session both amend the same statute, does the second one signed cancel out the first?
Apply this to your situation
This page answers the general question as of 1982. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Maryland law, with citations.
Plain-English summary
Governor Harry Hughes asked the Attorney General to review two racing bills for constitutionality and legal sufficiency before signing them: Senate Bill 1042, which abolished the racetrack building fund for mile thoroughbred tracks and shifted that money into the licensees' share of the wagering "takeout," and Senate Bill 1043, which separately raised the overall takeout at those same tracks and allocated the new money to the licensees' share as well. Both bills amended the identical section of Article 78B governing the licensees' takeout percentage, but neither bill accounted for what the other bill was doing to that same number, creating an apparent conflict about what the licensees' actual combined share should be once both became law.
The opinion concluded this was a codification problem, not a substantive conflict, and that both bills could be signed and given full effect. It reasoned that Maryland law requires reading two statutes on the same subject together and giving effect to both where possible, especially when, as here, each bill drew its increase from a different source, one reallocating existing takeout money from an abolished fund, the other authorizing an entirely new increase in the takeout, so neither bill actually purported to undo what the other did. The opinion also found that neither bill's title was broad enough to support reading it as an implied repeal of the other bill's separate, previously enacted increase, and Maryland law generally disfavors implied repeals, especially between bills passed in the same legislative session. The opinion's practical solution was to spell out, in an integrated version of the statute, exactly what combined takeout percentages should apply in each future year once both bills took effect.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1982. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
The opinion applied Article 78B of the Maryland Code, the racing statute in effect in 1982, and analyzed the specific text of Senate Bills 1042 and 1043 as introduced that year. Maryland's racing and wagering statutes have been substantially amended and recodified since 1982, and the specific takeout percentages discussed here almost certainly no longer reflect current law. Anyone researching current Maryland racetrack takeout rates or licensing requirements should consult the current statutory framework rather than this 1982 analysis of a specific pair of bills.
Common questions
Why didn't the legislature just combine both changes into a single bill to avoid the confusion?
The opinion suggested that combining the two measures into one bill would have unnecessarily forced an "all or nothing" outcome, tying the fate of one proposal (reallocating the abolished building fund) to an unrelated proposal (raising the overall takeout rate), when the bill's sponsor evidently wanted each considered separately on its own merits. The opinion treated that legislative choice as legitimate and worked to give effect to both bills rather than second-guessing the decision to introduce them separately.
How could the Attorney General be sure the two bills were meant to work together rather than conflict?
The opinion pointed to the fact that each bill's increase came from a structurally different source, one bill shifted an existing 0.50% of the takeout that had previously funded a capital-improvement fund, while the other authorized a brand-new 2% increase in the overall takeout rate, and neither bill's text purported to amend or override the source of the other bill's increase. Because the two changes were additive rather than contradictory in substance, reading them together produced a coherent, combined result rather than an unresolvable clash.
Doesn't the more recently signed bill normally override an earlier one on the same topic?
Only if the later bill's title is broad enough to cover that kind of repeal, according to the opinion. It noted that each bill's title was narrowly limited to that bill's own specific subject matter, so even the later-signed bill's text could not constitutionally be read as silently repealing part of the earlier bill, since doing so would exceed what its title described. Combined with Maryland's general disfavor of implied repeals, especially for bills passed in the same legislative session, that meant both bills had to be read as standing together.
What did the Governor actually do with this advice?
According to the opinion's own editor's note, the Governor signed both bills into law on June 1, 1982, as Chapters 580 and 581 of the Laws of Maryland 1982, following the reconciled reading of the statute the opinion had worked out.
Background and statutory framework
The request arose in the context of the Governor's routine bill-review process for two racing bills involving Article 78B, the Racing Commission statute. Senate Bill 1042, effective July 1, 1982, abolished the racetrack building fund for mile thoroughbred tracks by repealing Article 78B, §§11(b)(6) and 12, and transferred the 0.50% of the mutuel pool that licensees had been required to set aside for that fund into the licensees' existing takeout share under §11(b)(7), raising that share from 4.41% to 4.91% of the regular mutuel pool (and correspondingly for the multiple mutuel pool and for the post-1985 rates). Senate Bill 1043, effective January 1, 1983, separately raised the overall takeout from regular betting at mile thoroughbred tracks from 15% to 17%, and allocated that entire 2% increase to the licensees' share under the same §11(b)(7), again phrased as an increase to the pre-existing 4.41% (and 3.66% post-1985) baseline, without any adjustment to the multiple mutuel pool.
Because both bills separately amended §11(b)(7) starting from the same pre-existing percentage figures, without acknowledging that the other bill was also changing that figure, a literal reading created ambiguity about what the licensees' combined share should actually be once both bills took effect. The opinion characterized this as "a technical problem of statutory codification and not one of substantive intent or effect," applying the general rule that statutes addressing the same subject matter should be read together and given full effect where possible, even if enacted separately without cross-reference to each other. The opinion emphasized that each bill's increase originated from a distinct source, Senate Bill 1042 reallocated an existing 0.50% that had previously gone to the now-abolished building fund, while Senate Bill 1043 authorized an entirely new 2% increase in the overall takeout, so that neither bill's operative language actually purported to alter or undo the mechanism the other bill relied on.
The opinion also considered, and rejected, the possibility that the two bills should instead be read as inconsistent, with the later-enacted bill implicitly repealing the earlier one's change. It invoked the general rule disfavoring implied repeals, particularly between acts passed in the same legislative session, and noted that each bill's title was narrowly confined to that bill's own specific subject, meaning that a later-signed bill's title (for example, Senate Bill 1043's title referring only to increasing the takeout and allocating the increase to licensees) would not constitutionally support reading that bill as also repealing part of the earlier bill's separate 0.50% reallocation. Having concluded both bills could stand together, the opinion set out a specific integrated formulation of what the combined statute should say for calendar year 1982, for 1983 and 1984, and for 1985 and beyond, spelling out the precise combined percentages that would result from reading both enactments together, to guide the eventual codification of the statute.
Citations
Statutes:
- Senate Bill 1042 (Chapter 580, Laws of Maryland 1982)
- Senate Bill 1043 (Chapter 581, Laws of Maryland 1982)
- Article 78B, §11(b)(6) of the Maryland Code
- Article 78B, §12 of the Maryland Code
- Article 78B, §11(b)(7) of the Maryland Code
Cases:
- Surratts Associates v. Prince George's County, 286 Md. 555 (1979)
- City of Baltimore v. German-American Fire Ins. Co., 132 Md. 380 (1918)
Source
- Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
- Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1982/Volume67_1982.pdf
Original opinion text
Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.
STATUTES
Inconsistent Enactments—Legislative Intent—Substantive Integration—Codification—Purpose and Title Require Giving Effect to Inconsistent Amendments to Same Statute, Regardless of Difficulty in Codification
May 24, 1982
The Honorable Harry Hughes,
Governor
We have reviewed for constitutionality and legal sufficiency Senate Bill 1042 (Racing—Racetrack Building Funds) and Senate Bill 1043 (Racing—Takeout at Thoroughbred Tracks), both involving provisions of Article 78B ("Racing Commission").
Although both bills may be signed into law, we have noted and resolved an apparent inconsistency between the bills that we wish to bring to your attention.
I
Description of Bills
A. Senate Bill 1042
Senate Bill 1042, effective July 1, 1982, was enacted for the purpose, inter alia, of abolishing the racetrack building fund for mile thoroughbred tracks and providing for the reallocation of the money presently allocated to this fund.
Under present Article 78B, §11(b)(6), each mile thoroughbred licensee is required to set aside an amount equal to .50% of the mutuel pool on all races conducted by it and to allocate this amount to the Racing Fund for capital improvements in accordance with §12. Senate Bill 1042 repeals §§11(b)(6) and 12, and it transfers that .50% amount to the licensees' share of the takeout now provided for in §11(b)(7).
Thus, the licensees' present share of the takeout on all pools under §11(b)(7) is to be increased by .50%: that is, for each calendar year through 1984, the licensees' share of the takeout is increased from 4.41% to 4.91% of the regular mutuel pool and from 5.41% to 5.91% of the multiple mutuel pool; and, for the calendar year 1985 and each year following, the share of the takeout from the regular mutuel pool increases from 3.66% to 4.16%, and the share from the multiple mutuel pool increases from 4.66% to 5.16%.
B. Senate Bill 1043
Senate Bill 1043, effective January 1, 1983, was enacted for the purpose, inter alia, of increasing, from 15% to 17%, the overall takeout from the regular betting at mile thoroughbred tracks.
This bill also amends §11(b)(7) by allocating the additional 2% to the licensees' share of the takeout. It does this by increasing, for calendar years 1983 and 1984, the licensees' present 4.41% share of the regular mutuel pools by an additional 2%, for a total share of 6.41%; and by increasing, for calendar year 1985 and each year following, the present 3.66% share of the regular mutuel pools by an additional 2%, for a total share of 5.66%.
Unlike Senate Bill 1042, this bill makes no change in the share of the takeout from the multiple mutuel pools.
II
Analysis
The seeming inconsistency created by the bills is that neither bill considers the effect of the increase in the licensees' share caused by the other. In our opinion, however, this seeming inconsistency is a technical problem of statutory codification and not one of substantive intent or effect.
It is a general rule of statutory construction that, where two statutes deal with the same general subject matter, they should be construed together and, to the extent possible, full effect given to each, notwithstanding the fact that both may have been enacted at different times and with no reference to each other. E.g., Surratts Associates v. Prince George's County, 286 Md. 555 (1979). In this instance, each bill was designed for a separate distinct purpose, and, although each required an amendment to the same section of the law, we believe that the intention of the General Assembly is clear when reading both bills together.
One bill increases the total takeout from the regular mutuel pool by 2% and adds that increase to the licensees' share that is provided for in present §11(b)(7) [Senate Bill 1043]; the other bill reallocates a portion of the present takeout from both the regular and the multiple mutuel pools, by transferring .50% from the Racing Fund to the licensees' share that is provided for in present §11(b)(7) [Senate Bill 1042]. The net effect of these bills, when read together, allows for: (i) a .50% increase in the licensees' share of the takeout from both the regular mutuel and the multiple mutuel pools [Senate Bill 1042]; and (ii) an additional 2% increase of the takeout from the regular mutuel pools [Senate Bill 1043]. Thus, as to the regular mutuel pool under both bills, these bills create a combined 2.5% increase in the licensees' share, resulting in a combined total takeout share of 6.91% in 1983 and 1984 and 6.16% in 1985 and subsequent years.
It is significant, we believe, that the immediate source for each of these increases (in one case, a portion of the present takeout; in the other case, a newly-enacted increase in that takeout) is different, and that neither bill purports to amend the statutory source for the increase provided by the other bill.
The only alternative to the two bills would have been to combine both measures into one bill. But this alternative would have effectively, and, we believe, unnecessarily, conditioned the enactment of one proposed law, with one specific purpose, on the enactment of another proposed law, with yet another specific purpose. The sponsor of these bills obviously desired that each proposal be considered separately on its own merits, rather than in one bill that would have required "all or nothing". Such a desire is generally appropriate, and it would certainly defeat the legislative intent if both bills, having been separately approved by the General Assembly, could not now be signed into law and given effect.
In this regard, we note that repeals by implication are disfavored, particularly where the two acts in question, as here, were passed at the same session of the General Assembly. E.g., City of Baltimore v. German-American Fire Ins. Co., 132 Md. 380 (1918). We also note that the title of each bill is limited to the specific subject matter of that bill. Thus, even if both bills are signed into law, the title of whichever bill will be the later signed is not, in our view, sufficiently broad enough to permit us to read that bill as having repealed the effect of the other, previously signed, bill. For example, the title to Senate Bill 1043 refers simply to "increasing the takeout from the regular betting . . . and providing for the allocation of the increased amount to thoroughbred track licensees"; if Senate Bill 1043 were signed after Senate Bill 1042, its title would be unconstitutional if we were to read Senate Bill 1043 as not only increasing the licensees' share by 2% but, also, decreasing the licensees' share by the .50% increase previously enacted by Senate Bill 1042.
III
Conclusion
In sum, if you were to sign both of these bills into law, we think that it would be appropriate to read them together as if they were codified in new §11(b)(6) in the following, integrated manner:
"(6)(i) [For calendar year 1982, effective July 1, 1982, as increased by S.B. 1042:] 4.91 percent of the regular mutuel pool and 5.91 percent of the multiple mutuel pool of all races during the year shall be retained by the licensee from which 0.25 percent of both pools shall be paid by the licensee to the Maryland Race Track Employees Pension Fund to be administered by representatives of the licensee and the employees and from which 0.75 percent of both pools, in calendar year 1982 only, shall be allocated by the licensee, with the approval of the thoroughbred racing board, solely to pay the cost of track maintenance, physical improvements, personnel related expenses, and to ensure the maintenance of proper living conditions in the backstretch.
(ii) [For 1983 and 1984, as increased by S.B. 1042 and S.B. 1043:] 6.91 percent of the regular mutuel pool and 5.91 percent of the multiple mutuel pool of all races during the year shall be retained by the licensee from which 0.25 percent of both pools shall be paid by the licensee to the Maryland Race Track Employees Pension Fund to be administered by representatives of the licensee and the employees and from which 0.75 percent of both pools, in calendar years 1983 and 1984 only, shall be allocated by the licensee, with the approval of the thoroughbred racing board, solely to pay the cost of track maintenance, physical improvements, personnel related expenses, and to ensure the maintenance of proper living conditions in the backstretch.
(iii) [For 1985 and after, as increased by S.B. 1042 and S.B. 1043:] Effective January 1, 1985, the percent of the mutuel pools retained by the licensee shall be 6.16 percent of the regular mutuel pool and 5.16 percent of the multiple mutuel pool from which 0.25 percent of both pools shall be paid by the licensee to the Maryland Race Track Employees Pension Fund to be administered by representatives of the licensee and the employees."
Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General
Avery Aisenstark, Chief Counsel,
Opinions and Advice
Editor's Note: On June 1, 1982, Senate Bills 1042 and 1043 were signed into law as Chapters 580 and 581, respectively, Laws of Maryland 1982. The preceding Opinion was originally written as a bill review letter; because of the novelty of the issue addressed, it is published here in a slightly revised format.
Get today's answer for your situation
You just read a 1982 opinion on this question. Ezel checks the current Maryland statutes and case law and answers your specific situation, with citations.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer cites the law it relies on.