Can Kentucky game wardens enforce Kentucky's fishing, hunting, and boating laws across the whole width of the Ohio River, into Ohio, Indiana, or Illinois waters?

Plain-English summary

The Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources asked the Attorney General how far Kentucky's authority reaches on the Ohio River, where Kentucky borders Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. The river is unusual: Kentucky's border with those states runs along the low-water line on the river's far (northern) bank, so the whole width of the water is geographically within Kentucky's boundary, and Kentucky shares "concurrent jurisdiction" over the river with its neighbors.

Even so, the Attorney General concluded Kentucky's reach is limited by its own statutes. Kentucky's fish and game laws (KRS Chapter 150) and boating law (KRS Chapter 235) are written to govern conduct "within the territorial limits of this state," and Kentucky follows a strong presumption that statutes do not apply outside the state's borders unless the legislature clearly says so. Because neither chapter says so, those laws apply only on the portion of the river inside Kentucky.

From that, the rest follows. Game wardens generally may make arrests and issue citations only inside Kentucky (KRS 150.090). They may seize contraband under KRS 150.120 only when the unlawful act occurred in Kentucky. And for an offense committed on the river, venue is proper in any Kentucky county that borders the Ohio River (KRS 452.530). The opinion notes the legislature could extend Kentucky's reach by statute, and the Department could negotiate interstate agreements to let wardens act across the river, but no such agreements are currently in effect.

What this means for you

Game wardens and fish-and-wildlife officials

Under the opinion, a warden's authority to enforce Kentucky's fish, game, and boating laws stops at the Kentucky border, the low-water line on the river's north bank. The opinion notes that earlier reciprocal agreements with Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois (incorporated through 301 KAR 1:220) expired January 1, 2022, so wardens cannot currently rely on them to operate in the neighboring states' waters. New interlocal agreements (KRS 65.255) or reciprocal agreements (KRS 150.238(1)) would be needed.

Anglers, hunters, and boaters on the Ohio River

The opinion describes which sovereign's law applies based on where conduct occurs relative to the low-water line on the north bank. It is a statement of the Attorney General's view of jurisdiction, not advice about any particular activity, and the practical lines on the water can be fact-specific.

Prosecutors and defense attorneys

The opinion addresses venue directly: for a criminal offense on the Ohio River, venue lies in any Kentucky county bordering the river (KRS 452.530), and territorial jurisdiction over a statutory offense is governed by KRS 500.060, generally requiring some part of the violation to have occurred in Kentucky. The opinion also distinguishes how Indiana (territorial, like Kentucky) versus Ohio and Illinois (broader, by their own statutes) read their criminal jurisdiction over the river.

Common questions

Q: Doesn't Kentucky's border run along the far bank of the Ohio River?
A: Yes. The opinion explains that, because of the 1789 Compact with Virginia and later Supreme Court rulings, Kentucky's border with Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois is the low-water line on the northern side of the river. So geographically the whole width of the water is on the Kentucky side of the line.

Q: Then why can't Kentucky enforce its fishing and boating laws across the whole river?
A: Because, the opinion concludes, Kentucky's statutes only reach conduct "within the territorial limits of this state," and Kentucky presumes its laws do not apply extraterritorially unless the legislature clearly says otherwise. KRS Chapters 150 and 235 do not say otherwise, so they apply only to the part of the river inside Kentucky.

Q: Can a Kentucky game warden arrest someone on the Ohio River in Indiana waters?
A: Generally no, under this opinion. A warden's peace-officer powers extend to "all parts of the state," not beyond, so absent a valid interlocal or reciprocal agreement with the other state, a warden cannot make arrests or issue citations outside Kentucky.

Q: If a violation happens on the river, where is the case tried?
A: The opinion says venue is proper in any Kentucky county that borders the Ohio River, citing KRS 452.530, provided the offense is one Kentucky can prosecute under KRS 500.060.

Q: Could this change?
A: Yes. The opinion notes the General Assembly could enact a statute extending Kentucky's regulatory reach on the river, and the Department could negotiate interstate agreements allowing wardens to act across the river for violations of Kentucky law that occurred in Kentucky.

Background and statutory framework

Jurisdiction over the Ohio River has been litigated since Kentucky's founding. Virginia ceded the territory north and west of the river to the United States but kept the river itself, and Kentucky's 1789 Compact with Virginia made the states' jurisdiction over the river "concurrent." The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed both the low-water-line border (Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U.S. 335 (1980); Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479 (1890); Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380 (1991)) and the shared concurrent jurisdiction (Kentucky v. Indiana, 474 U.S. 1 (1985)).

The opinion's key principle is the extraterritoriality canon, the presumption that "unless a contrary intent appears within the language of the statute, we presume that the statute is meant to apply only within the territorial boundaries of the Commonwealth" (Union Underwear Co. v. Barnhart, 50 S.W.3d 188 (Ky. 2001)). Applying that to KRS Chapter 150 (whose purpose is to protect "the wildlife of this Commonwealth," KRS 150.015(1)) and KRS Chapter 235 (which governs only the "waters within the territorial limits of this state," KRS 235.010(6)), the opinion finds no extraterritorial reach. The same logic limits warden arrest powers (KRS 150.090), contraband seizure (KRS 150.120), and sets venue (KRS 452.530).

Citations and references

Statutes:

• KRS Chapter 150 (Kentucky fish and wildlife laws)
• KRS Chapter 235 (State Boating Act)
• KRS 150.090, KRS 150.120, KRS 150.238 (warden powers, seizure, reciprocal agreements)
• KRS 65.255, KRS 452.530, KRS 500.060 (interlocal agreements, venue, territorial jurisdiction)

Cases:

• Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U.S. 573 (1904), concurrent jurisdiction over the Ohio River
• Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U.S. 335 (1980), the low-water-line border
• Union Underwear Co. v. Barnhart, 50 S.W.3d 188 (Ky. 2001), the extraterritoriality canon
• Benham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. 1994), Indiana's matching territorial reading

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.ky.gov/Opinions/Pages/default.aspx
• Original PDF: https://www.ag.ky.gov/Resources/Opinions/Opinions/OAG%2025-03.pdf

Original opinion text

The full opinion as issued by the Office of the Kentucky Attorney General:

March 4, 2025
OAG 25-03
Subject: 1. Do Kentucky’s fish, game, and boating laws apply across
the entire width of the Ohio River where Kentucky shares a
border with Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois?

2. Do Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources game
   wardens have jurisdictional authority to enforce Kentucky laws
   within the entire width of the Ohio River where Kentucky shares
   a border with Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois?
3. May game wardens seize items under KRS 150.120 if the
   associated acts occurred outside Kentucky’s borders but within
   the waters of the Ohio River?
4. If an individual is cited by a game warden for a criminal
   offense occurring on the Ohio River, what is the proper venue for
   the criminal action?
   Requested by: Steven Fields, Staff Attorney
   Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources
   Written by: Aaron J. Silletto, Executive Director
   Office of Civil and Environmental Law
   Syllabus: 1. Kentucky’s fish, game, and boating laws only apply on that
   portion of the Ohio River that is inside Kentucky’s borders.
5. The Department’s game wardens generally have authority
   to make arrests and issue citations only in Kentucky.
6. Game wardens may seize contraband under KRS 150.120
   only if the property is illegally used or possessed inside Kentucky.
7. For any criminal offense committed on the Ohio River,
   venue for the criminal action is proper in any of the Kentucky
   counties that border the Ohio River.
   Opinion of the Attorney General
   The Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources (the Department) asks several
   related questions concerning the enforcement of Kentucky law on the Ohio River by
   game wardens. Each question will be answered separately.
8. Kentucky’s fish, game, and boating laws do not apply
   extraterritorially.
   Before reaching the Department’s first question regarding the law enforcement
   powers of game wardens, it is necessary to first look at the reach of the laws those
   game wardens will enforce.
   From the Commonwealth’s first days, jurisdiction over the Ohio River was the
   subject of extensive legislative debate and multiple judicial decisions. In 1784,
   Virginia ceded to the United States its territory northwest of the Ohio River,
   reserving the river itself as part of its territory, and later ratified Congress’s plans to
   divide that territory into new states. 1784 Va. Acts 571; 1788 Va. Acts 780. Then, in
   Kentucky’s Compact with Virginia enacted several years later, the Virginia General
   Assembly consented to Kentucky becoming an independent State, with several
   conditions, including that “the use and navigation of the river Ohio . . . shall be free
   and common to the citizens of the United States, and the respective jurisdictions of
   [Virginia], and of [Kentucky], on the river as aforesaid, shall be concurrent only with
   the States which may possess the opposite shores of the said river.” 1789 Va. Acts 17
   (Dec. 18, 1789) § 11 (emphasis added). Congress then consented to Kentucky joining
   the Union as the fifteenth State, effective June 1, 1792, “according to its actual
   boundaries” as they existed on December 18, 1789. Act of Jan. 10, 1791, 1 Stat. 189,
   Ch. IV, § 1. Regarding the conditions Virginia placed on Kentucky’s statehood, the
   U.S. Supreme Court has observed that, “as the consent given by Virginia [to Kentucky
   becoming a State] was conditioned upon the jurisdiction of Kentucky on the Ohio river
   being concurrent only with the states to be formed on the other side, Congress
   necessarily assented to and adopted this condition when it assented to the act in
   which it was contained.” Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U.S. 573, 582 (1904) (citing Green v.
   Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 87 (1823)).
   Because Virginia had earlier ceded its territory north and west of the Ohio
   River to the United States but kept the river itself as a part of its territory, the U.S.
   Supreme Court has held that, when Kentucky became a State in 1792, its border with
   Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois was established by the low-water line on the northern side
   of the Ohio River. Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U.S. 335, 336–37 (1980); Indiana v. Kentucky,
   136 U.S. 479, 519 (1890); Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380, 383–84 (1991); see
   Handly’s Lessee v. Anthony, 18 U.S. 374 (1820); see also KRS 1.200. The location of
   Kentucky’s border with its sister States, standing alone, does not determine whether
   Kentucky’s fish, game, and boating laws can be enforced over the entire width of the
   Ohio River. “What the Virginia compact most certainly conferred on the states north
   of the Ohio” in its reservation of concurrent jurisdiction over the Ohio River “was the
   right to administer the law below low-water mark on the river, and as part of that
   right, the right to serve process there with effect.” Wedding, 192 U.S. at 584
   (emphasis added). Similarly, Kentucky must also have the right to enforce its laws
   on that portion of the Ohio River that is north of the low-water line. And the U.S.
   Supreme Court still acknowledges that Kentucky shares the right to exercise
   concurrent jurisdiction over the Ohio River with its northerly neighbors. See
   Kentucky v. Indiana, 474 U.S. 1, 2 (1985) (“The State of Indiana and the
   Commonwealth of Kentucky each have concurrent jurisdiction over the Ohio River.”);
   Ohio v. Kentucky, 471 U.S. 153, 153 (1985) (“The State of Ohio and the
   Commonwealth of Kentucky each have concurrent jurisdiction over the Ohio River.”);
   see also People v. Lambert, 128 N.E.3d 1137, 1140 (Ill. App. 2019) (noting that the
   Special Master’s proposed decree, which was adopted by the Supreme Court in
   Illinois v. Kentucky, 513 U.S. 177 (1995), provides that Kentucky and Illinois “each
   have concurrent jurisdiction over the Ohio River”).1 But the fact that the
   Commonwealth has the right to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the entire width
   of the Ohio River does not mean that it has elected to do so.2
   Kentucky law has embraced “the well-established presumption against
   extraterritorial operation of statutes.” Union Underwear Co. v. Barnhart, 50 S.W.3d
   188, 190 (Ky. 2001); see OAG 24-11, 2024 WL 4920590, at *3; see also Restatement
   (First) of Conflict of Laws § 57 (1934) (observing that, in general, “a state cannot
   exercise executive jurisdiction within the territory of another state”). This is called
   the “extraterritoriality canon.” Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
   Legal Texts (West 2012), at 268–72. The rule is that “unless a contrary intent appears
   within the language of the statute, we presume that the statute is meant to apply
   only within the territorial boundaries of the Commonwealth.” Union Underwear, 50
   S.W.3d at 190 (citation omitted). Kentucky courts do not infer the extraterritorial
   1 “Concurrent jurisdiction” over a river “means the jurisdiction of two powers over one and the same
   place.” Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 316 (1909) (quoting Wedding, 192 U.S. at 584). Concurrent
   jurisdiction allows either State to exercise criminal or civil jurisdiction over the entire width of the
   river when the act at issue is prohibited by both States. Id. at 320. But where the act is prohibited in
   one State and allowed in the other, the State in which the act is prohibited may not enforce the
   prohibition in the territory of the State where the act is allowed. Id. at 321.
   2 “And we think it clear that no limitation upon the power of [the Commonwealth of Kentucky] to
   protect fish within her own boundaries by proper legislation resulted from the mere establishment of
   concurrent jurisdiction by the Virginia Compact.” Nicoulin v. O’Brien, 248 U.S. 113, 114 (1918)
   (emphasis added).
   reach of a statute “absent a positive showing . . . that the General Assembly intended
   that the Act be applied extraterritorially.” Id. at 191.
   Kentucky’s fish and game laws are codified in KRS Chapter 150. The purpose
   of that chapter, and the policy of the Commonwealth embodied in it,
   is to protect and conserve the wildlife of this Commonwealth so as to
   insure a permanent and continued supply of the wildlife resources of
   this state for the purpose of furnishing sport and recreation for the
   present and for the future residents of this state; to promote the general
   welfare of the Commonwealth; to provide for the prudent taking and
   disposition of wildlife within reasonable limits, based upon the adequacy
   of the supply thereof; to protect the food supply of this state, and to
   insure the continuation of an important part of the commerce of this
   state which depends upon the existence of its wildlife resources.
   KRS 150.015(1) (emphasis added). The Department is empowered to promulgate
   administrative regulations, which may “apply to a limited area or to the entire state.”
   KRS 150.025(1)(h) (emphasis added). Fishing licenses issued by the Department
   allow fishing “from any waters in any county of this state.” KRS 150.175(1) (emphasis
   added); see also KRS 150.175(3) (allowing commercial fishing “from the waters of the
   state”). Game permits issued by the Department, including deer permits, allow the
   taking of certain game species “in any designated open area of this state.” KRS
   150.175(17) (emphasis added). In short, KRS Chapter 150 only speaks to conduct
   occurring, and the protection of fish and wildlife, inside the Commonwealth. No
   provision of KRS Chapter 150 contemplates, much less expressly authorizes, the
   extension of Kentucky’s fish and game laws over that portion of the Ohio River inside
   the territory of the States of Ohio, Indiana, or Illinois.
   In addition to KRS Chapter 150, the Department also enforces the State
   Boating Act, KRS Chapter 235. KRS 235.030. The Department is authorized by the
   Act to promulgate administrative regulations to “govern the fair, reasonable,
   equitable, and safe use of all waters of this state.” KRS 235.280. But the “waters of
   this state” means only the “waters within the territorial limits of this state.” KRS
   235.010(6) (emphasis added). Thus, like KRS Chapter 150, KRS Chapter 235 only
   governs the use of the waters inside the Commonwealth’s borders, and no statute in
   KRS Chapter 235 expressly authorizes the Act’s extraterritorial application.
   Because neither KRS Chapter 150 nor KRS Chapter 235 contains a provision
   expressly stating otherwise, both chapters apply only within the territorial limits of
   the Commonwealth of Kentucky. In the specific context of the Ohio River, this means
   that Kentucky fish, game, and boating laws apply only to acts occurring south of the
   low-water line on the north bank of the river, where Kentucky borders Ohio, Indiana,
   and Illinois.3 North of that line, the Kentucky game and fish laws do not apply.
   This construction of Kentucky law is congruent with how Indiana construes its
   own criminal statutes. See Benham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 133, 137 (Ind. 1994) (holding
   that, although Indiana and Kentucky each have concurrent jurisdiction over the Ohio
   River, Indiana’s jurisdiction over criminal offenses is limited to its “actual territorial
   boundaries”). Admittedly, Ohio and Illinois courts interpret their criminal laws
   differently, allowing their enforcement across the entire width of a border river over
   which they have concurrent jurisdiction. See City of Cincinnati v. Dryden, 698 N.E.2d
   538, 540 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1998) (holding that, by statute, Ohio courts have “jurisdiction
   beyond the north or northwest shore of the Ohio river extending to the opposite shore
   line” when a criminal offense occurs “on” the water, but that such courts have
   jurisdiction over criminal offenses occurring on the bridges spanning the river only
   for “those activities [that] occur north of the boundary line declared by the Supreme
   Court”); see also People v. Pitt, 435 N.E.2d 801, 803 (Ill. App. 1982) (“In our opinion,
   it is not material whether, at the time of the occurrence, such persons happened to be
   over the water of the river or over an island in the river, or at one side of the main
   channel or the other. One of the reasons for establishing this concurrent jurisdiction
   was to prevent the escape of criminals on account of the uncertainty that so frequently
   arises as to whether the act was committed on one side of the middle of the main
   channel or the other side of it.”). In Ohio’s case, that holding was driven by the text
   of a state statute, which expressly extends the jurisdiction of its courts to offenses
   occurring south of its border with Kentucky to the southern shore of the Ohio River.
   See Ohio Rev. Code § 1901.027. The Illinois decision rested on its interpretation of
   the Act of Congress admitting Illinois to the Union. See Pitt, 435 N.E.2d at 802–04.
   The Ohio and Illinois decisions, therefore, are not useful in interpreting KRS
   Chapters 150 and 235.
   The General Assembly could, of course, enact a statute extending Kentucky’s
   jurisdiction to regulate hunting, fishing, and boating to the northern bank of the Ohio
   River. But not having done so, the current text of KRS Chapters 150 and 235 does
   not regulate acts occurring in the territorial waters of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.
   3 Violations of KRS Chapters 150 and 235 are generally misdemeanors or violations. See KRS
   150.990; KRS 235.990. Territorial jurisdiction over a “statutory offense” in Kentucky is governed by
   KRS 500.060. Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 698 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Ky. 1985). Generally, that statute
   requires some part of a violation of “the law of this state” to have occurred in Kentucky before a
   Kentucky court would have jurisdiction. See KRS 500.060(1).
9. Kentucky game wardens only have law enforcement powers
   while inside Kentucky.
   Having determined that Kentucky’s fish, game, and boating laws do not
   regulate conduct occurring outside Kentucky’s territorial limits, the next question to
   be answered relates to the extent of the jurisdiction of the Department’s game
   wardens.4 Stated differently, if a violation of Kentucky law occurs inside Kentucky,
   may a game warden make an arrest or issue a citation for that offense anywhere on
   the Ohio River, or only within that portion of the river inside Kentucky’s territorial
   limits?
   As a general rule, and “subject to exceptions, a peace officer’s jurisdiction to
   arrest and to issue citations typically encompasses the territorial limits of the
   appointing authority.” Smith v. Norton Hosps., Inc., 488 S.W.3d 23, 29 (Ky. App.
   2016) (citing Abramson, 8 KY. PRACTICE: CRIM. PRAC. & PRO. § 18:114 (5th ed. 2010)).
   But one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule allows a peace officer to make
   an arrest or issue citations inside the boundaries of another governmental unit, if his
   appointing authority has an agreement for cooperative action with the other
   governmental unit. Abramson, supra, § 18:114; see KRS 65.240(1) (allowing “a public
   agency of this state” to enter into an interlocal agreement with, inter alia, “any public
   agency of any other state”); KRS 65.255 (permitting interlocal agreements
   “provid[ing] for cooperative action in the utilization of peace officers”); KRS
   150.238(1) (authorizing the Department to enter into reciprocal agreements with
   other States “relating to violations of hunting and fishing laws”).5
   Game wardens “shall have full powers as peace officers for the enforcement of
   all of the laws of the Commonwealth,” including KRS Chapters 150 and 235. KRS
   150.090(2). “Each game warden is individually vested with the powers of a peace
   officer and shall have in all parts of the state the same powers with respect to criminal
   matters and enforcement of the laws relating thereto as sheriffs, constables, and
   police officers in their respective jurisdictions.” KRS 150.090(3) (emphasis added)6; see
   4 Specifically, the Department asks, “Do the [Department’s] Game Wardens possess the same
   authorities and protections while operating inside the territory of Ohio, Indianna, or Illinois but within
   the bounds of the Ohio River, to the same extent and same manner as they enjoy as Peace Officers
   within the territory of Kentucky?”
   5 To be effective, any agreements under KRS 150.238(1) must be incorporated by reference into an
   administrative regulation. Id. Previously, the Department had entered into such reciprocal
   agreements regarding enforcement of fishing laws on the Ohio River with Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.
   See 301 KAR 1:220 §§ 6–8. But the regulation incorporating those agreements by reference expired
   January 1, 2022, by operation of KRS 13A.3102.
   6 “[S]heriffs have county-wide arrest powers,” Commonwealth v. Monson, 860 S.W.2d 272, 273 (Ky.
   1993), and likewise may serve process “in his county, or upon any river or creek adjoining his county,”
   KRS 70.070. Similarly, “[a] constable may exercise the duties of his or her office in any part of the
   county.” KRS 70.350(2). State police troopers have “the powers of a peace officer . . . in all parts of the
   KRS 235.310(1) (granting game wardens “the general powers of a peace officer” while
   enforcing the Commonwealth’s boating laws). While enforcing the State Boating Act,
   game wardens “shall have the right to enter upon all waters of this state, either
   private or public.” KRS 235.310(1) (emphasis added).7
   Nothing in KRS Chapters 150 or 235 expressly grants to game wardens
   extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce Kentucky’s fish, game, and boating laws
   outside the Commonwealth. Therefore, absent an interlocal agreement or a reciprocal
   agreement with the other States that would allow them to exercise jurisdiction
   anywhere on the Ohio River, the Department’s game wardens may only make arrests
   and issue citations while they are inside Kentucky.8
10. Kentucky game wardens may seize contraband only if it is
    illegally used or possessed in Kentucky.
    The Department next asks whether game wardens may seize items as
    contraband under KRS 150.120 if the associated acts occurred outside Kentucky’s
    borders but within the waters of the Ohio River. Based on the answers to the two
    prior questions, the answer to this question is no.
    Game wardens are empowered to “seize and take possession of any and all”
    contraband that has been “taken, used, transported, or possessed contrary to any law
    or regulation adopted under” KRS Chapter 150. KRS 150.120(1). Because, as
    discussed above, Kentucky’s fish and game laws have no extraterritorial effect, if an
    act occurs outside Kentucky’s borders—even if within the Ohio River—such an act
    cannot be “contrary to” KRS Chapter 150. For that reason, a game warden may not
    seize contraband under KRS 150.120 if the associated acts occurred in the territorial
    waters of Ohio, Indiana, or Illinois. The statute only allows a game warden to seize
    contraband located in Kentucky, and only if the associated acts occurred in Kentucky.
    state.” KRS 16.060. County police officers have “jurisdiction coextensive with the whole county for
    which they are appointed.” KRS 70.540. City police officers have jurisdiction “anywhere in the county
    in which the . . . city is located.” KRS 95.019(1). Accordingly, none of these peace officers is explicitly
    granted extraterritorial jurisdiction to make arrests or issue citations.
    7 As mentioned previously, “‘[w]aters of this state’ means any waters within the territorial limits of
    this state.” KRS 235.010(6) (emphasis added).
    8 The Department asks two more related questions. First, “[i]f [authority to enforce Kentucky laws
    within the entire width of the Ohio River] exists, does that authority apply to enforcing Kentucky’s
    laws against residents of Kentucky, Indiana, Ohio, Illinois and other states?” But this question is moot
    because game wardens have no such authority. Second, “[d]o [game wardens] possess the same
    authorities and protections while operating inside the territory of Ohio, Indiana, or Illinois but within
    the bounds of the Ohio River, to the same extent and same manner as they enjoy as Peace Officers
    within the territory of Kentucky?” The answer is no, because the game wardens have no peace officer
    powers outside Kentucky’s borders, unless there is a valid interlocal agreement or a reciprocal
    agreement with the other States in place.
11. Venue is proper for a criminal action involving a crime
    committed on the Ohio River in any Kentucky county bordering
    that river.
    Finally, the Department asks, “If individuals are cited or charged with a
    criminal charge by a Game Warden, for an act that occurred outside Kentucky’s
    borders but within the waters of the Ohio River, which court would be the appropriate
    venue for the criminal action?” As discussed above, Kentucky game wardens cannot
    make an arrest or issue a citation for an act that occurred outside Kentucky’s borders.
    In short, Kentucky’s fish, game, and boating laws do not apply to acts occurring
    outside Kentucky, and game wardens currently have no peace officer powers outside
    Kentucky. So, at present, a game warden may not issue a citation while outside
    Kentucky’s borders, or for an act occurring in the territorial waters of Ohio, Indiana,
    or Illinois.
    As also discussed previously, Kentucky law does authorize interlocal
    agreements with agencies of other States regarding “the utilization of peace officers”
    and reciprocal agreements with other States “relating to violations of hunting and
    fishing laws.” KRS 65.255; KRS 150.238(1). Neither of these statutes would permit
    the Department to extend the reach of Kentucky’s substantive fish, game, and
    boating laws north of Kentucky’s Ohio River border.
    But those statutes would allow the Department to negotiate agreements with
    other States empowering game wardens to make arrests and issue citations in the
    territorial waters of Ohio, Indiana, or Illinois, so long as the violation of Kentucky
    law at issue occurred inside Kentucky.9 If such an agreement were in place, then
    venue for the criminal action would be proper in any Kentucky county bordering on
    the Ohio River. KRS 452.530.
    Russell Coleman
    Attorney General
    Aaron J. Silletto, Executive Director
    Office of Civil and Environmental Law
    9 Conceivably, the Department’s agreements with other States also could allow Kentucky game
    wardens to enforce the laws of those other States on the Ohio River. But no such agreements currently
    exist.