Can Florida's Conference of Circuit Judges use private donations to hire a lobbyist?

Plain-English summary

The Conference of Circuit Judges of Florida, a nonprofit corporation made up of the state's circuit judges, wanted to use privately donated money to hire a general counsel who would register as a lobbyist and lobby on the Conference's behalf. It asked whether two statutes, section 11.062(1) (which bars using public funds for lobbying) or section 216.345(1) (which authorizes paying membership dues), would block that.

Attorney General Pam Bondi concluded neither statute restricts the Conference here. Section 11.062(1) applies only to funds available to an "executive, judicial, or quasi-judicial department," and the Conference, even assuming it is a state entity for some purposes, is not a "department." It receives no direct appropriation, administers and governs nothing, and is charged by statute only with making periodic reports and recommendations. The Legislature used "department" in a narrower sense than "state agency" or "judicial branch," as shown by how it worded other statutes. Section 216.345(1), meanwhile, simply lets state entities pay membership dues; it says nothing restricting what dues-receiving organizations may do, so it could not bar the Conference's lobbying either. In fact, the state's practice of paying judges' dues to the Conference, authorized as dues to a "professional or other organization," reinforced that the Conference is not a "department."

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2013. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: What is the Conference of Circuit Judges?
A: A body the Legislature created in 1959 (section 26.55), made up of the state's active and retired circuit judges, charged with reporting to the Supreme Court and Legislature on improvements to the judicial system and the laws. It also hosts educational conferences and, since 2005, has operated as a nonprofit 501(c)(6) corporation.

Q: Why doesn't the public-funds lobbying ban apply?
A: Section 11.062(1) bars lobbying with funds available to a "department." The opinion concluded the Conference is not a "department," a term narrower than "state agency" or "judicial branch," because it gets no direct appropriation and only makes reports and recommendations.

Q: What money was the Conference proposing to use?
A: Private funds: fees from private vendors at Conference functions and voluntary contributions from individual judges. The opinion noted the Conference pays its general counsel from those private sources.

Q: Does the dues statute restrict lobbying?
A: No. Section 216.345(1) authorizes state entities to pay membership dues to a "professional or other organization," but it imposes no limits on what the dues-receiving organization does, so it is not a source of any lobbying restriction.

Background and statutory framework

Section 11.062(1), Florida Statutes, prohibits funds "appropriated to, or otherwise available for use by, any executive, judicial, or quasi-judicial department" from being used for lobbying. The opinion's central move was reading "department" narrowly. Florida statutes do not define a judicial "department," but section 20.03(2) defines "department" (for the executive branch) as "the principal administrative unit within the executive branch," and the Legislature elsewhere distinguished "department" from broader terms like "state agency" and "the judicial branch" (for example in sections 216.345(1) and 216.347). The Conference, which receives no direct appropriation and administers nothing, did not fit that narrow meaning.

Section 216.345(1) authorizes state entities to pay "dues for membership in a professional or other organization." The opinion read it as an authorization to pay dues, not a restriction on the recipient's activities. That the state pays judges' dues to the Conference under this provision, treating the Conference as a "professional or other organization" rather than a "department," further supported the conclusion that section 11.062(1)'s department-focused lobbying ban does not reach the Conference.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• § 11.062, Fla. Stat. (Lobbying with public funds)
• § 216.345, Fla. Stat. (Professional dues)
• § 26.55, Fla. Stat. (Conference of Circuit Judges)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/ag-opinions/conference-of-circuit-judges-lobbying
• Original PDF: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/print/pdf/node/8121

Original opinion text

Mr. Peter M. Dunbar
Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar
Post Office Box 10095
Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095

Dear Mr. Dunbar:

On behalf of Circuit Judge Olin Shinholser, Chairman of the Conference of Circuit Judges of Florida, Inc. ("Conference"), you ask substantially the following question:

Whether section 11.062(1) or section 216.345(1), Florida Statutes, restricts or prohibits the Conference (a non-profit corporation and tax-exempt organization) in the use of funds received from private parties (including voluntary donations made by individual judges) for the purpose of contracting with a general counsel and authorizing its general counsel to register and lobby on behalf of the Conference.

In sum:

Neither statutory provision restricts the Conference's use of funds in these circumstances. Because the Conference is not an "executive, judicial, or quasi-judicial department," the lobbying-related restrictions of section 11.062(1), Florida Statutes, do not apply. Further, section 216.345(1), Florida Statutes, which authorizes state entities in certain circumstances to pay "dues for membership in a professional or other organization[,]" does not restrict the lobbying activities of dues-receiving entities.

In 1959, the Legislature by statute created the "Conference of Circuit Judges of Florida," comprised of all active and retired judges of the state's judicial circuits. See Section 26.55, Florida Statutes. The Legislature assigned this body the limited duty of reporting to the Supreme Court and to the Legislature on proposed improvements to the judicial system and laws of this state. In addition to carrying out this statutorily-assigned role, the Conference hosts conferences and seminars and performs other educational activities. For many years, the Conference of Circuit Judges operated as an unincorporated association. Then, in 2005, the Conference of Circuit Judges formed a Florida non-profit corporation and tax-exempt 501(c)(6) organization. You have indicated that the Conference of Circuit Judges has been represented by non-employees performing paid lobbying services since at least the mid-1970s.

You have advised that the Conference receives no direct appropriations from the Legislature. Instead, the Conference receives funding from four distinct sources: (1) annual dues from Conference members (which the state pays on the members' behalf, under the authority of section 216.345, Florida Statutes); (2) revenues received from members attending conferences and educational seminars sponsored by the Conference (some of these revenues include state-reimbursed member expenses or conference fees); (3) fees from private vendors for displays and marketing at Conference functions; and (4) voluntary contributions from Conference members. You have further advised that the Conference pays its general counsel from sources (3) and (4), i.e., sources that necessarily originate as private funds.

Your question asks about the application of two statutory provisions, only one of which directly relates to lobbying. Specifically, section 11.062(1), Florida Statutes, provides that funds "appropriated to, or otherwise available for use by, any executive, judicial, or quasi-judicial department" shall not be used for "lobbying purposes." (emphasis added). The other provision referenced in your question, section 216.345(1), Florida Statutes, authorizes state entities in certain circumstances to pay "dues for membership in a professional or other organization." But section 216.345(1) imposes no restrictions on the lobbying activities of dues-receiving entities; accordingly, it cannot be the source of any prohibition or restriction on the Conference's payment for lobbying activities.

The answer to your question about the application of section 11.062(1), Florida Statutes, turns on the fact that the Conference—even if one assumes that the Conference, although organized as a non-profit corporation, is for some purposes a state entity—cannot reasonably be classified as a "department," the type of entity named in and therefore governed by that provision. While the Florida statutes contain no definition of a judicial "department," section 20.03(2), Florida Statutes, which pertains to the executive branch, defines the term "[d]epartment" as "the principal administrative unit within the executive branch of state government." Similarly, the dictionary defines the word "department" as: "A distinct, usually specialized division of a large organization, especially . . . a principal administrative division of a government." American Heritage Dictionary, 3rd ed. (1992).

Viewed in the larger context of the Florida statutes, it is evident that the term "department" is not synonymous with "any state agency" or with "any state entity." Nor is the term "judicial department" synonymous with the judicial branch generally. For example, there is a clear contrast between the Legislature's use of the term "department" in section 11.062(1) and its far more expansive reference in section 216.345(1), Florida Statutes, to "[a] state department, agency, bureau, commission, or other component of state government, or the judicial branch[.]" See also section 216.011(1)(qq), Florida Statutes (indicating that the term "department" refers to a subset of the broader class of entities that can constitute a "state agency" or an "agency"). Similarly, section 216.347, Florida Statutes, which prohibits the use of "grants and aids appropriations" for lobbying, imposes restrictions on "[a] state agency, a water management district, or the judicial branch[.]"

To reach the conclusion that the Conference is not a "department" for purposes of section 11.062(1), Florida Statutes, one need not determine every possible application of that term. This opinion does not suggest that the term must be interpreted mechanically or that an entity's label is controlling. Instead, the opinion concludes only that, whatever the term "department" means, it cannot reasonably be understood to include the Conference—which receives no direct appropriations, administers nothing, governs nothing, and is statutorily charged only with making periodic reports and recommendations. Only by disregarding the word actually chosen by the Legislature can one reach the opposite conclusion.

Finally, the very fact that the state historically has paid for judges' membership dues in the Conference bolsters the conclusion that the Conference is not a "department" within the meaning of section 11.062(1), Florida Statutes. The authority to pay those dues is found in section 216.345, Florida Statutes. That provision lists a "state department" as a potential payor of dues, and uses the term "professional or other organization" to identify a permissible payee. "Professional or other organization" far more aptly than "department" captures the nature of the Conference.

In sum, since the Conference is not a "department" for purposes of section 11.062(1), Florida Statutes, that provision's restrictions on the payment of funds for lobbying purposes does not apply. Moreover, while section 216.345(1), Florida Statutes, authorizes state entities in certain circumstances to pay membership dues in a "professional or other organization," that provision does not place restrictions on the lobbying activities of dues-receiving entities. Accordingly, neither section 11.062(1) nor section 216.345(1) prohibits the Conference (a non-profit corporation and tax-exempt organization) from using funds received from private parties (including voluntary contributions from individual judges) for the purpose of contracting with a general counsel and authorizing its general counsel to register and lobby on behalf of the Conference.

Sincerely,

Pam Bondi
Attorney General

PB/cm