Can a Florida city levy a special assessment against a charter school's property?

Plain-English summary

The City of Miami wanted to levy a special assessment against a charter school's property and asked the Florida AG whether it could. The AG said no. In 2007 the Legislature amended section 1002.33(18)(d), Florida Statutes, to add charter school facilities to the list of items exempt from "assessments for special benefits." That language was the specific, later-enacted provision and so controlled over the older, more general municipal exemption in section 170.201(2), which lists certain favored property categories that a municipality "may" choose to exempt "if the municipality so desires." The AG also pointed out that the 2007 amendment was made retroactive to July 1, 1996, by section 10 of Chapter 2007-234, Laws of Florida.

The opinion relied on the Fifth District's reading in Remington Community Development District v. Education Foundation of Osceola, 941 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). That decision held charter schools were not exempt from special assessments under pre-2007 law because the Legislature had never said so expressly. The 2007 amendment closed that gap.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2016. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: What is a "special assessment"?
A: A charge a local government can levy against specific parcels of property when those parcels receive a special benefit from a public improvement (street paving, drainage, lighting, stormwater) that goes beyond the benefit the general public receives. It is collected through the same tax bill but is conceptually distinct from ad valorem property tax.

Q: Why did the City of Miami think it could assess a charter school?
A: The city pointed to the trailing language in section 170.201(2), which lists categories of exempt property (religious institutions, schools, certain elderly/disabled housing) but qualifies the exemption with "if the municipality so desires." Miami read that as discretion to recognize or deny the exemption case by case. The Fifth District's Remington footnote acknowledged the phrase was "not a model of legislative clarity" and described it as giving the levying authority discretion. The AG, however, treated section 1002.33(18)(d) as the specific, later, controlling rule for charter schools.

Q: What's the difference between sections 170.201(2) and 1002.33(18)(d)?
A: Section 170.201(2) is a 1996 general municipal special-assessment provision listing several favored categories with a discretionary qualifier. Section 1002.33(18)(d) is a 2007 charter-school-specific exemption that lists, among other things, "assessments for special benefits." The AG applied two canons: specific over general, and later expression over earlier expression. Both pointed the same direction.

Q: Does this also exempt charter schools from impact fees or building permit fees?
A: Yes, on the face of section 1002.33(18)(d), which exempts charter school facilities from "assessments of fees for building permits, except as provided in s. 553.80; fees for building and occupational licenses; impact fees or exactions; service availability fees; and assessments for special benefits." But this opinion answered only the special-assessment question presented; do not read the AG as having separately analyzed each item.

Q: What about ad valorem property tax?
A: Section 1002.33(18)(c) handles that and exempts charter school facilities from ad valorem taxation. It was already in place before the 2007 amendment that added the special-benefit exemption.

Background and statutory framework

Charter schools are defined as public schools by section 1002.33(1), Florida Statutes. Section 1002.33(16)(a) generally exempts charter schools from most of the Florida Education Code (chapters 1000 through 1013) except for enumerated provisions. That structural choice, an explicit exception list, is the reason the Fifth District in Remington refused to imply a special-assessment exemption from related Education Code statutes: the Legislature could have said so expressly and had not.

After Remington identified that gap in 2006, the 2007 Legislature enacted Chapter 2007-234, Laws of Florida, which amended section 1002.33(18)(d) to add "assessments for special benefits" to the list of exemptions for charter school facilities. Section 10 of that act applied the amendment retroactively to July 1, 1996, ten years earlier. The legislative signal was clear: charter schools were intended to be exempt all along.

When the City of Miami's question reached the AG, the only real question was whether section 170.201(2)'s discretionary municipal exemption survived as a workaround. The AG held it did not, applying the specific-over-general and later-over-earlier canons. Palm Beach Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000), and McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1994), supplied the general-versus-specific rule. Askew v. Schuster, 331 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1976), supplied the last-expression rule.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• § 1002.33, Fla. Stat. (Charter schools)
• § 170.201, Fla. Stat. (Special assessments)
• Ch. 2007-234, Laws of Fla.

Cases:

• Remington Community Development District v. Education Foundation of Osceola, 941 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), pre-2007, charter school not exempt from special assessments because Legislature had not said so expressly
• Educ. Found. of Osceola v. Remington Cmty. Dev. District, 946 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2006), Florida Supreme Court denied review
• Palm Beach Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000), specific over general
• McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1994), same
• Stevens v. State, 127 So. 3d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), specific statute is exception to general
• Askew v. Schuster, 331 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1976), last legislative expression prevails

Source

• Landing page: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/ag-opinions/charter-schools-municipalities-special-assessment
• Original PDF: https://www.myfloridalegal.com/print/pdf/node/1510

Original opinion text

Ms. Victoria Méndez

City Attorney

City of Miami

Office of the City Attorney

444 Southwest 2nd Avenue, Suite 945

Miami, Florida 33130-1910

RE: CHARTER SCHOOLS – MUNICIPALITIES – SPECIAL ASSESSMENT – EXEMPTION – whether the city may levy a special assessment against the property of a charter school.

Dear Ms. Méndez:

On behalf of the City of Miami, you have asked for an opinion on the following question:

May a municipality levy a special assessment against the property of a charter school under Chapter 170 of the Florida Statutes?

In sum:

Section 1002.33(18)(d), Florida Statutes, specifically exempts charter schools from assessments for special benefits; hence, the city may not levy a special assessment against the school.

You state that the City of Miami proposes to levy a special assessment against the property of a charter school. Section 1002.33(18)(d), Florida Statutes, provides:

"(d) Charter school facilities are exempt from assessments of fees for building permits, except as provided in s. 553.80; fees for building and occupational licenses; impact fees or exactions; service availability fees; and assessments for special benefits." (e.s.)

You contend that section 170.201(2), Florida Statutes, contains an exception to the general rule stated in section 1002.33(18)(d), Florida Statutes. Section 170.201(2), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part:

"Property owned or occupied by a religious institution and used as a place of worship or education; by a public or private elementary, middle, or high school; or by a governmentally financed, insured, or subsidized housing facility that is used primarily for persons who are elderly or disabled shall be exempt from any special assessment levied by a municipality to fund any service if the municipality so desires." (e.s.)

You suggest that the final phrase in section 170.201(2) – "if a municipality so desires" – gives municipalities the discretion to choose whether to recognize an exemption from a special assessment for a charter school.[1]

In 2006, the Fifth District Court of Appeal considered whether a charter school was subject to a special assessment levied by a community development district located in Osceola County, in Remington Community Development District v. Education Foundation of Osceola.[2] The charter school claimed it was exempt from special assessments based upon a statute in the Education Code,[3] but the court pointed out that such provision, as well as most of the statutes in the Code, did not apply to charter schools.[4] The court considered the provision that you rely upon – section 170.201(2), Florida Statutes – in a footnote, observing that it was "not a model of legislative clarity," and that it appeared to give the levying authority the discretion whether to impose an assessment against school property.[5] This is consistent with your interpretation.

The court concluded that a charter school was not exempt from special assessments, because "the legislature has failed to create a statutory exemption for charter schools."[6] The court noted that the Legislature had expressly exempted charter schools from being subject to ad valorem taxation in section 1002.33(18)(c), Florida Statutes, and from impact fees and service availability fees in section 1002.33(18)(d), Florida Statutes. Based upon this, the court observed: "[H]ad the legislature intended to create a similar exemption from special assessments, it would have done so expressly."[7]

The Legislature thereafter did create an express exemption for charter schools when it amended section 1002.33(18)(d), Florida Statutes, in 2007, to add that charter school facilities are exempt from "assessments for special benefits."[8]

Any ambiguity or possible conflict between sections 1002.33(18)(d) and 170.201(2), Florida Statutes, is resolved by general rules of statutory interpretation. The Legislature is presumed to intend that laws will operate harmoniously, such that a specific statute addressing a particular subject will control over a more general statute addressing the same subject.[9] "[T]he specific statute is seen as an exception to the general statute."[10] In addition, in the event of inconsistency between statutes, "the last expression of legislative will prevails."[11] Section 170.201(2), Florida Statutes, is a general provision addressing exemptions from assessments for a variety of public facilities "if the municipality so desires," and was enacted in 1996. In contrast, section 1002.33(18)(d), Florida Statutes, addresses only charter schools, provides an express and definite exemption, and was added in 2007.

Therefore, it is my opinion that section 1002.33(18)(d), Florida Statutes, controls and prohibits the City of Miami from levying a special assessment against a charter school.

Sincerely,

Pam Bondi

Attorney General

PB/tebg

[1] Section 1002.33(1), Fla. Stat., provides that "[a]ll charter schools in Florida are public schools."

[2] 941 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

[3] Section 1013.51(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

[4] Section 1002.33(16)(a), Fla. Stat., exempts charter schools from all the provisions in Chs. 1000 through 1013, Fla. Stat., except for those enumerated in the statute.

[5] 941 So. 2d at 17 n.1.

[6] Id. at 16.

[7] Id. at 17 n.3. On motion for rehearing, the Fifth District granted the charter school's motion to certify two questions of great public importance, one of which asked: "Are charter schools, which are deemed by statute to be public schools, exempt from special assessments?" Id. at 18. The Florida Supreme Court denied review. Educ. Found. of Osceola v. Remington Cmty. Dev. District, 946 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2006).

[8] In the session law that contained the assessment amendment, the Legislature singled out the provision amending paragraph (18)(d) to apply retroactively to July 1, 1996, ten years earlier. Ch. 2007-234, s. 10, Laws of Fla.

[9] See Palm Beach Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1287 (Fla. 2000); McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994).

[10] Stevens v. State, 127 So. 3d 668, 669-70 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

[11] Askew v. Schuster, 331 So. 2d 297, 300 (Fla. 1976). See also In re Sepe, 421 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).