Can Connecticut's blind-vendor program place vending machines in quasi-public buildings like transit-district stations or the Metropolitan District Commission's offices?

Subject

Whether Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-303 (the BESB vending-machine priority statute) applies to the Greater Hartford Transit District, the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, the Metropolitan District Commission, and Metro-North Commuter Railroad.

Plain-English summary

Connecticut gives the Board of Education and Services for the Blind (BESB) a statutory priority to operate vending machines, food-service facilities, and newsstands in buildings owned, operated, or leased by "the state or any municipality" under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-303. BESB asked the AG whether four quasi-public Connecticut entities, the Greater Hartford Transit District, the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), and Metro-North Commuter Railroad, count as "the state" or a "municipality" for this purpose.

The AG concluded none of them does. The opinion noted that "municipality" has no single definition in Connecticut law; some statutes use a narrow definition (cities, towns, boroughs), others sweep more broadly to include fire districts, transit districts, school districts, or housing authorities for their particular statutory purposes. § 10-303 itself is silent on the term. With no definition in the statute and no helpful legislative history, the AG defaulted to the narrow common meaning: cities, towns, and boroughs. Because the four entities BESB asked about are political subdivisions or quasi-municipal corporations rather than cities, towns, or boroughs, § 10-303's priority does not extend to their buildings. The AG suggested BESB pursue a legislative amendment if it wanted broader coverage.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2011. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

Connecticut's blind-vendor program is the state's implementation of the federal Randolph-Sheppard Act priority and is administered by BESB. The hook in state law is § 10-303, which directs that the "authority in charge of any building owned, operated or leased by the state or any municipality therein shall grant to the Board of Education for Services of the Blind" a permit to run a food-service facility, vending machine, or newsstand when, in the building authority's opinion, such an operation is "desirable in such location." It is a placement-priority statute, not a guarantee, but in practice it makes BESB the default operator of vending machines in qualifying public buildings, with revenue flowing to the program.

The legal question turns entirely on what counts as a "municipality" in § 10-303. The opinion treats this as a textbook problem of an undefined statutory term. The AG canvassed Connecticut's statute book and showed that "municipality" is a term-of-art that varies by statutory chapter:

• Narrow definitions, limited to "any town, city or borough, consolidated town and city or consolidated town and borough," appear in Chapter 98 (municipal powers) at § 7-148(a), in the municipal-charter statutes (§ 7-187(d)), public recreational-facilities authorities (§ 7-130a(b)), historic districts (§ 7-147a(a)), municipal gas and electric plants (§ 7-213), and municipal resource-recovery authorities (§ 7-273aa(a)(2)).
• Broader definitions, sweeping in fire districts, school districts, regional school districts, taxing districts, housing authorities, and the like, appear in the municipal-finance statutes (§ 7-401(2)), the bond-issuance statutes (§ 7-369), the reserve-fund statutes (§ 7-359), the uniform-fiscal-year statutes (§ 7-381), and the municipal-retirement statutes (§ 7-425(1)).

Layered on top is the common-law concept of "quasi-municipal corporations," which the AG cites from AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Sewer Comm'n, 270 Conn. 409, 425 (2004), Stroiney v. Cresent Lake Tax Dist., 205 Conn. 290, 294 (1987), and Larkin v. Bontatibus, 145 Conn. 570, 576 (1958). Districts that perform municipal functions but are not chartered as cities, towns, or boroughs (tax districts, fire districts, sewer districts) sit in this quasi category. The AG used those authorities to anchor the proposition that, absent a statutory broadening, the term "municipality" in § 10-303 should be read in its narrow common meaning.

The AG then drew on canons of construction. Foley v. State Elections Enforcement Comm'n, 297 Conn. 764, 786 (2010), and Oxford Tire Supply, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Serv., 253 Conn. 683, 699 (2000), stand for the principle that the legislature knows how to extend a statutory category when it wants to; and Cruz v. Montanez, 294 Conn. 357, 370 (2009), holds that courts may not supply language the legislature has chosen to omit. Together, those cases told the AG that adding districts and authorities to § 10-303's definition of "municipality" by interpretation would be an act of judicial drafting, not interpretation.

With that framework, the opinion went entity by entity:

Greater Hartford Transit District. Authorized under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-273b as a "body corporate and politic" formed by towns acting alone or in cooperation. Transit districts have power to regulate transit operations, issue bonds, and take property by eminent domain. The AG concluded they are political subdivisions of the State, citing Conn. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 2008-008, but observed that not all political subdivisions are municipalities. State ex rel. Masiano v. Mitchell, 155 Conn. 256 (1967), construes "political subdivision" broadly. Because nothing in the transit-district statutes broadens "municipality" to reach them, § 10-303 does not apply to transit-district buildings.

Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-261(a) describes CRRA as "a body politic and corporate, constituting a public instrumentality and political subdivision of the state of Connecticut," not a department, institution, or agency of the state. CRRA's powers under § 22a-262 cover solid-waste disposal and resource-recovery facilities for municipalities and others. The AG applied the same political-subdivision-but-not-municipality logic and concluded § 10-303 does not reach CRRA buildings.

Metropolitan District Commission. MDC is described in case law (Martel v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 275 Conn. 38 (2005); Rocky Hill Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dist., 160 Conn. 446 (1971)) as a "municipal corporation and political subdivision of the State" created by Special Act No. 511 (1929). MDC has power to tax, issue bonds, and take property by eminent domain, and the legislature has expressly defined MDC as a municipality for some statutes (such as § 7-401(2)) but expressly excluded it from others (such as § 7-381). The AG read that mixed treatment as confirming the legislature's habit of opting MDC into "municipality" status when it wants to. Because § 10-303 does not opt MDC in, MDC buildings are not covered.

Metro-North Commuter Railroad. Metro-North operates the New Haven Line under a compact between Connecticut and New York (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 16-343, 16-344) and is a subsidiary of New York's Metropolitan Transit Authority, a public-benefit corporation organized under N.Y. Pub. Auth. L. § 1260 et seq. The AG concluded Metro-North and MTA buildings are not subject to § 10-303 at all. The implicit reasoning is that an out-of-state public authority operating in Connecticut under an interstate compact is neither "the state" nor a Connecticut "municipality" in any sense § 10-303 would recognize.

The opinion closes with a candid remark: the AG was sympathetic to BESB's mission but could not interpret "municipality" so broadly without legislative help. The remedy, the AG suggested, is to ask the General Assembly to amend § 10-303 to expressly cover transit districts, recovery authorities, MDC, or any other category BESB wants to reach.

Common questions

Q: Did the AG say BESB has zero rights at these entities' buildings?
A: For § 10-303 specifically, yes. The opinion does not address whether BESB might have rights under any other Connecticut statute or under federal Randolph-Sheppard regulations as applied to federal property. BESB might still negotiate a placement at any of these buildings; what it cannot do is invoke § 10-303 as a legal entitlement.

Q: Why did the AG treat MDC differently from a city?
A: MDC is a municipal corporation by special act, not a city, town, or borough. Connecticut's municipal-corporation case law (Martel and Rocky Hill) recognizes that distinction. The legislature also treats MDC asymmetrically: included in the municipality definition for some statutes, excluded from others. Without explicit inclusion in § 10-303, the AG would not assume coverage.

Q: Could BESB get coverage by amending § 10-303?
A: Yes, and that is exactly what the AG suggested. A short legislative amendment defining "municipality" for § 10-303's purposes to include transit districts, resource-recovery authorities, and similar entities, would resolve the issue cleanly. The opinion frames this as the proper path rather than a stretch reading of the existing statute.

Q: Are there other Connecticut statutes that might give BESB analogous rights at these entities?
A: The opinion does not catalog them. A blind-vendor program in this situation would have to look at federal Randolph-Sheppard rules, contractual arrangements with the entity, and potentially RFP processes. None of those provide the automatic priority § 10-303 grants for state and traditional-municipality buildings.

Q: What does "quasi-municipal corporation" actually mean here?
A: It is the doctrinal category courts use for entities that perform municipal functions but were not chartered as cities, towns, or boroughs. Tax districts, fire districts, and sewer districts are typical examples. Quasi-municipal corporations get the benefit of municipal-corporation rules in many areas (sovereign immunity contours, governmental-function analysis), but they are not municipalities for purposes of statutes that depend on the narrow city/town/borough definition.

Citations

• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-303 (BESB vending-machine and food-service priority in state and municipal buildings)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-148(a), § 7-187(d), § 7-130a(b), § 7-147a(a), § 7-213, § 7-273aa(a)(2) (narrow "municipality" definitions)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-359, § 7-369, § 7-381, § 7-401(2), § 7-425(1) (broader "municipality" definitions for specific statutory schemes)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-273b, § 7-273d, § 7-273e, § 7-273g (transit-district enabling statutes)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-261(a), § 22a-262 (CRRA enabling statute)
• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-343, § 16-344 (Connecticut-New York rail compact)
• Conn. Spec. Act No. 511 (1929) (Metropolitan District Commission charter)
• N.Y. Pub. Auth. L. § 1260 et seq. (New York Metropolitan Transit Authority)
• AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Sewer Comm'n, 270 Conn. 409 (2004); Stroiney v. Cresent Lake Tax Dist., 205 Conn. 290 (1987); Larkin v. Bontatibus, 145 Conn. 570 (1958) (quasi-municipal-corporation doctrine)
• Foley v. State Elections Enforcement Comm'n, 297 Conn. 764 (2010); Oxford Tire Supply, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Serv., 253 Conn. 683 (2000); Cruz v. Montanez, 294 Conn. 357 (2009) (statutory-construction canons)
• State ex rel. Masiano v. Mitchell, 155 Conn. 256 (1967) (broad meaning of "political subdivision")
• Martel v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 275 Conn. 38 (2005); Rocky Hill Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dist., 160 Conn. 446 (1971) (MDC's status as municipal corporation and political subdivision)
• Conn. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 2008-008 (Apr. 30, 2008) (transit districts as political subdivisions)
• Conn. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 98-008 (July 1, 1998) (distinguishing municipalities from other political subdivisions for Municipal Auditing Act)

Source

• Landing page: https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Opinions
• Original PDF: https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/ag/opinions/2011/opinionsigman072911-pdf.pdf?rev=c5aa05a636194c768237fa01992b634f

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

GEORGE C. JEPSEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Office of The Attorney General
State of Connecticut

July 29, 2011

Brian Sigman
Executive Director
Board of Education and Services for the Blind
184 Windsor Ave.
Windsor, CT 06095

Dear Mr. Sigman:

55 Elm Street
P.O. Box 120
Hartford, CT 06141-0120

Your agency has requested this office's opinion as to whether Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-303 applies to various governmental entities such as the Greater Hartford Transit District, the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, the Metropolitan District Commission, and Metro-North Commuter Railroad. Section 10-303 allows the Board of Education and Services for the Blind (BESB) to operate vending machines and stands in buildings owned, operated or leased by the State or any municipality. We conclude that none of the governmental entities about which you inquire is the State or a municipality within the meaning of § 10-303, and therefore the statute does not apply to their buildings.

Section 10-303(a) provides in pertinent part:

The authority in charge of any building owned, operated or leased by the state or any municipality therein shall grant to the Board of Education for Services of the Blind a permit to operate in such building or on such property a food service facility, a vending machine or stand for the vending of newspapers, periodicals, confections, tobacco products, food and such other articles as such authority approves when, in the opinion of such authority, such facility, machine or stand is desirable in such location.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-303(a) (emphasis added). Under this statute, the BESB places, and collects revenue from, vending machines in many State and municipal buildings.

The governmental entities about which you inquire are not State entities. Therefore, the question of § 10-303's applicability to them depends on whether they constitute municipalities within the meaning of the statute. Section 10-303 itself, however, does not define the term "municipality." The legislative history of § 10-303 provides no guidance.

There is no single legal definition of the term municipality. A common definition is

[a] legally incorporated or duly authorized association of inhabitants of limited area for local governmental or other political purposes. A body politic created by the incorporation of the people of a prescribed locality invested with subordinate powers of legislation to assist in civil government of the state and to regulate and administer local and internal affairs of the community. A city, borough, town, township or village.

Black's Law Dictionary, 1018 (6th ed.) (citations omitted).

Throughout our statutes, municipality is defined differently for different statutory purposes. For example, under Chapter 98 of the General Statutes relating to municipal powers, a municipality is defined as "any town, city or borough, consolidated town and city or consolidated town and borough." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-148(a). This same basic definition is found in the statutes relating to municipal charters, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-187(d); public recreational facilities authorities, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-130a(b); historic districts, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-147a(a); municipal gas and electric plants, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-213; and municipal resource recovery authorities, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-273aa(a)(2).

By contrast, many other statutes define municipality more broadly, often to include, in addition to towns, cities and boroughs, certain districts or other entities for purposes of the specific statutory scheme. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-359 (for purposes of municipal reserve fund statutes, including "any fire district" in definition of municipality); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-369 (for purposes of municipal bond issuance statutes, including "any metropolitan district, any district, as defined in section 7-324, and any other municipal corporation having the power to levy taxes and to issue bonds, notes or other obligations" in definition of municipality); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-381 (for purposes of municipal uniform fiscal years, defining municipality as "any political subdivision of the state having the power to make appropriations or to levy taxes, including any town, city or borough, whether consolidated or unconsolidated, any village, school, sewer, fire or lighting district, beach or improvement association, and any other tax district or association, but not including The Metropolitan District of Hartford County"); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-401(2) (for purposes of municipal finance statutes, including "any school district, regional school district, district, as defined in section 7-324, metropolitan district, and each municipal corporation, organization or authority and taxing district"); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-425(1) (for purposes of municipal retirement statutes, including "school district, regional school district, taxing district, fire district, district department of health, probate district, housing authority, regional work force development board . . ., regional emergency telecommunications center, tourism district . . ., flood commission or authority").

In addition to the varying statutory definitions is the common law principle that tax districts, fire districts, sewer districts and the like are not municipalities themselves but "quasi-municipal corporations" to which the law of municipal corporations generally applies. AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Sewer Comm'n, 270 Conn. 409, 425 (2004); Stroiney v. Cresent Lake Tax Dist., 205 Conn. 290, 294 (1987); Larkin v. Bontatibus, 145 Conn. 570, 576 (1958); see also Black's Law Dictionary, 1017-18 (6th ed.) (defining quasi-municipal corporation as "[b]odies politic and corporate, created for the sole purpose of performing one or more municipal functions . . . but not municipal corporations proper, such as cities and incorporated towns").

With this background in mind, it is apparent that the legislature may choose to include districts and other local or regional entities within the definition of municipality depending on the purpose of a particular statutory scheme. The differently tailored definitions illustrate that the legislature knows how to create a more expansive meaning of the term municipality when it deems it appropriate. See Foley v. State Elections Enforcement Comm'n, 297 Conn. 764, 786 (2010) (legislature knows how to extend a requirement to certain circumstances if it wants to); Oxford Tire Supply, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Serv., 253 Conn. 683, 699 (2000) (same). When the legislature has not chosen to provide a more expansive definition, we are appropriately hesitant to read into the statute a broader meaning of municipality. See Cruz v. Montanez, 294 Conn. 357, 370 (2009) (court may not supply language the legislature has chosen to omit). What is common among all these definitions, however, is that towns, cities and boroughs are municipalities. In the absence of a specific definition or some other evidence of intent, we cannot presume that the legislature intended to include local or regional entities other than towns, cities and boroughs when it used the word municipality in § 10-303.

Because the various entities about which you inquire each have a different statutory genesis, we evaluate each separately.

Greater Hartford Transit District

The Greater Hartford Transit District is authorized by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-273b, which provides in pertinent part:

Any town, city or borough may, by itself or in cooperation with one or more municipalities, form a transit district, in the manner and for the purposes hereinafter provided. The district shall be a body corporate and politic . . . .

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-273b(d). Transit districts are authorized to assume the powers of the Department of Transportation to regulate and supervise the operation of any private transit system within the district or to operate a transit system in the district. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 7-273d, 7-273e. They may issue bonds and acquire property by eminent domain. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 7-273e(c), 7-273g.

Transit districts are political subdivisions of the State. See Conn. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 2008-008 (Apr. 30, 2008). This does not end our inquiry, however. All municipalities are political subdivisions, but not all political subdivisions are municipalities. See State ex rel. Masiano v. Mitchell, 155 Conn. 256, 263-64 (1967) (broadly construing political subdivision as any subordinate division of the State established for the purpose of carrying out a public purpose of the State); Atty. Gen. Op. No. 98-008 (July 1, 1998) (distinguishing between municipalities and other political subdivisions for purposes of the Municipal Auditing Act). Nothing in the statutory provisions governing transit districts suggests they should be treated as municipalities for purposes of § 10-303. Lacking evidence that the legislature meant to include transit districts within the ambit of § 10-303, we must conclude that it does not apply to the buildings of the Greater Hartford Transit District.

Connecticut Regional Resources Recovery Authority

The Connecticut Regional Resources Recovery Authority (CRRA) is

a body politic and corporate, constituting a public instrumentality and political subdivision of the state of Connecticut established and created for the performance of an essential public and governmental function. . . . [It] shall not be construed to be a department, institution or agency of the state.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-261(a). Among other things, the CRRA is authorized to own and operate solid waste disposal and resource recovery facilities and to provide solid waste management services to municipalities and others. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-262. As discussed above, although the CRRA is a political subdivision of the State, that does not mean that it is a municipality for purposes of § 10-303. Because there is no evidence that the General Assembly intended to include the CRRA within the meaning of municipality in § 10-303, we must conclude that § 10-303's provisions do not apply to the CRRA's buildings.

Metropolitan District Commission

The Metropolitan District Commission (MDC) is a municipal corporation and political subdivision of the State created by a special act with authority relating to sewage disposal, water supply and regional planning among other things. Martel v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 275 Conn. 38, 41 (2005); Rocky Hill Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dist., 160 Conn. 446, 450-51 (1971); Conn. Spec. Act No. 511 (1929). Under its charter, it has the power to tax, issue bonds and take property by eminent domain. Id. The MDC is expressly defined as a municipality for the purposes of some statutes and not for some others. Compare, e.g. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-401(2) (included) with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-381 (excluded). Its characterization as a municipal corporation and political subdivision and its significant governmental powers alone do not answer the question whether it is a municipality for purposes of § 10-303. In the absence of some evidence that the legislature specifically intended to include the MDC within the meaning of the term municipality in § 10-303, we must conclude that it did not.

Metro-North Commuter Railroad

The Metro-North Commuter Railroad (Metro-North) is a commuter rail service for New York City, its northern suburbs and southwestern Connecticut. The New Haven Line is operated pursuant to a compact between the State of Connecticut and the State of New York. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 16-343, 16-344. Metro-North is a subsidiary of the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), a public benefit corporation created under New York law. N.Y. Pub. Auth. L. § 1260 et seq. Any buildings owned, operated or leased by Metro-North or the MTA, therefore, are not subject to § 10-303.

Although the applicability of § 10-303 to other governmental entities may require a case-by-case analysis, the above discussion should provide some basic guidance. I am sympathetic to your agency's mission and appreciative of its good work on behalf of its clientele. However, without more evidence of a legislative intent, I cannot conclude that the entities about which you have inquired are "municipalities" within the meaning of your statute. You might wish to consider approaching the General Assembly to seek to change the law in this regard.

We trust that this answers your questions and we remain available to address any other specific questions you may have as to § 10-303's applicability.

GEORGE JEPSEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL