Can an Arizona community college develop attainable housing and partner with businesses on workforce training?

Plain-English summary

Arizona Attorney General Kris Mayes concluded that Yavapai College has broad statutory authority to develop real property for housing and to conduct workforce development and job training. The College may work on those efforts alone or with private entities, political subdivisions, or tribal governments.

The opinion states: “We generally agree that these provisions permit the College to develop real property, including for the housing purposes contemplated here.” It also says the College has “broad authority to conduct workforce development and job training efforts.” (Official opinion)

The opinion does not approve a specific housing, development, or training project. The AG expressly wrote, “We express no opinion on whether the College’s contemplated development projects comply with these legal and procedural requirements.” (Official opinion)

Local planning and zoning treatment depends on the project’s objective character. Some projects may be exempt, but the AG said the analysis of their “predominant purposes” cannot rest only on a stated intent and “must be objective.” (Official opinion)

What this means for you

Community college governing boards and administrators

The opinion recognizes authority to contract, construct and repair buildings, buy and lease property, engage in commercial activities, and provide goods or services to political subdivisions or tribal governments. It also cautions that “the College is not permitted to give up policy-making authority to any private entity with which it might contract.” (Official opinion)

Workforce development and job training partners

The AG affirmed that the College may conduct job training and workforce development with private, public, or tribal partners. The opinion quotes A.R.S. § 15-1472(B)(1) as authorizing “job training” and “[p]artnerships with businesses and educational institutions” for “job training purposes.” (Official opinion)

Housing planners, students, and college employees

The opinion says the College generally has power to reserve developed housing for “College staff, students, and/or certain other members of the community,” including “attainable housing” offered at below-market rents under some circumstances. It does not decide whether any particular housing plan satisfies all applicable requirements. (Official opinion)

Local planning, zoning, building, and fire officials

Some college projects may be exempt from local planning and zoning rules or fees, but the result turns on an objective analysis of whether the operation is governmental or proprietary. The opinion separately notes that “community college buildings” may be exempt from local building code while remaining “subject to state fire code.” (Official opinion)

Common questions

Q: Can Yavapai College develop housing with a private company?

A: In general, yes. The AG wrote that the governing statutes “permit the College to partner with a private entity, political subdivision, or tribal government to undertake this type of housing development.” The College may not surrender its policy-making authority to a private contractor. (Official opinion)

Q: Can a community college combine job training with a real estate project?

A: Yes, as a matter of general statutory authority. The opinion says workforce development and job training may occur “in connection with real property or not,” including alongside commercial or entrepreneurial activities. (Official opinion)

Q: Did the AG approve a specific attainable-housing project?

A: No. The AG wrote, “We express no opinion on the compliance or permissibility of any particular project,” and later declined to review conclusions about any specific development proposal. (Official opinion)

Q: Are college development projects automatically exempt from local zoning?

A: No. The opinion says “at least some” projects may be exempt. It uses the governmental-versus-proprietary framework from Book-Cellar, Inc. v. City of Phoenix and requires an objective assessment of the project’s predominant purposes. (Official opinion)

Q: What legal issues did the AG leave unresolved?

A: The opinion identifies procurement law, tax law, the Gift Clause, budgeting, governing-board approval, and funding sources as matters that a specific project may raise. The AG declined to decide those questions without specific facts. (Official opinion)

Background and statutory framework

A.R.S. § 15-1448(H) allows the Attorney General to review an opinion prepared for a community college. Here, the AG affirmed the counsel opinion in part, revised it in part, and declined to review project-specific conclusions.

The real-property analysis draws on powers listed in A.R.S. § 15-1444. Those powers include contracting, constructing and repairing buildings, buying and leasing property, engaging in entrepreneurial and commercial activities, and contracting to provide goods and services to political subdivisions or tribal governments.

The workforce-development analysis also relies on A.R.S. § 15-1472(B)(1), which authorizes job training and partnerships with businesses and educational institutions for job-training purposes.

For planning and zoning, the opinion applies Book-Cellar, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 150 Ariz. 42, 44 (1986), and its distinction between governmental and proprietary operations. The AG revised the underlying opinion by requiring an objective predominant-purpose analysis rather than relying on the project’s stated intent.

Each statement in this section is drawn from the quoted statutory discussion and holdings in the official opinion.

Citations and references

Statutes and constitutional provisions:

• A.R.S. § 15-1448(H)
• A.R.S. § 15-1401(7)
• A.R.S. § 15-1444(A)(11)
• A.R.S. § 15-1444(B)(2), (4), (5), (13), and (15)
• A.R.S. § 15-1446
• A.R.S. § 15-1461
• A.R.S. § 15-1472(B)(1)
• A.R.S. § 15-1105
• A.R.S. §§ 34-461(D), 34-461(A), and 34-462
• Ariz. Const. art. IX, § 7

Cases and prior AG opinion:

• Maricopa Cnty. v. Maricopa Cnty. Mun. Water Conservation Dist. No. 1, 171 Ariz. 325, 328 (App. 1991)
• Mountainside MAR, LLC v. City of Flagstaff, 253 Ariz. 448, 451 ¶ 10 (App. 2022)
• Book-Cellar, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 150 Ariz. 42, 44 (1986)
• Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. I06-004 (Oct. 30, 2006)

All citations above appear verbatim in the official opinion.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.azag.gov/opinions/i26-002-r26-002
• Original PDF: https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2026-07/I26-002.pdf

Original opinion text

STATE OF ARIZONA

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION No. I26-002 (R26-002)

By KRIS MAYES, ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: Yavapai College’s Workforce Development and Job Training Authority

July 14, 2026

To: Lynne C. Adams, Osborn Maledon, P.A., on behalf of Yavapai College

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 15-1448(H), this opinion affirms in part, revises in part, and declines to review in part the opinion prepared for Yavapai College (the “College”) regarding the College’s authority to engage in certain housing and other real property development projects in connection with workforce development and job training activities. That opinion is attached as Appendix A.

First, we affirm the opinion’s conclusion that the College has statutory authority to develop real property for housing purposes under some circumstances, on its own or with private, public, or tribal partners.

Second, we affirm the conclusion that the College has statutory authority to undertake workforce development and job training efforts, which may (but need not) be connected to real property development with partners.

Third, we affirm the opinion’s framework for analyzing whether the College’s development projects would be exempt from certain local planning and zoning regulations and any related fees.

Finally, we revise the opinion as discussed below, and we decline to review the opinion’s conclusions as to any specific development project. Any project the College contemplates will involve potential legal and procedural requirements beyond the scope of this opinion.

The College has statutory authority to develop real property for housing, with or without private, public, or tribal partners.

The College is a political subdivision. See A.R.S. § 15-1401(7). Its stated purpose is to “transform[] lives and strengthen[] the local economy through education.” Yavapai College, The College Mission, https://www.yc.edu/v6/office-of-the-president/mission.html. As a “legislative creation[],” the College “possess[es] and exercise[s] only such powers expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied by or incident to the powers expressly conferred, and those essential to the accomplishment of [the College’s] declared objectives and purposes.” Maricopa Cnty. v. Maricopa Cnty. Mun. Water Conservation Dist. No. 1, 171 Ariz. 325, 328 (App. 1991); see also Mountainside MAR, LLC v. City of Flagstaff, 253 Ariz. 448, 451 ¶ 10 (App. 2022).

As the opinion prepared for the College correctly notes, several statutory provisions combine to provide the College broad authority in this area. For example, statutes give the College the powers to

• Contract (A.R.S. § 15-1444(B)(4));
• “Construct, remodel and repair buildings” (A.R.S. § 15-1444(B)(5));
• “Purchase, receive, hold, make and take leases of, sell and convey real or personal property” (A.R.S. § 15-1444(A)(11));
• Lease real property, either as the lessee or the lessor, including entering into lease-purchase agreements for real property, buildings and other improvements to the property (A.R.S. §§ 15-1444(B)(2) and 15-1446);
• “Engage in entrepreneurial and commercial activities” (A.R.S. § 15-1444(B)(13)); and
• “Provide goods and services pursuant to a contract with a political subdivision of the state or a tribal government” (A.R.S. § 15-1444(B)(15)).

We generally agree that these provisions permit the College to develop real property, including for the housing purposes contemplated here.[1] We also agree that these provisions permit the College to partner with a private entity, political subdivision, or tribal government to undertake this type of housing development. But, importantly, the College is not permitted to give up policy-making authority to any private entity with which it might contract. See Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. I06-004 (Oct. 30, 2006).

Finally, we make clear that any specific housing development project the College undertakes will involve other legal and procedural requirements beyond the scope of this opinion (e.g., the Gift Clause, Ariz. Const. art. IX, § 7; annual budgeting, under A.R.S. § 15-1461). In attempting to achieve its objectives, we agree that the College has a variety of methods at its disposal. We also agree, generally, that it has the statutory power to reserve developed housing for use by College staff, students, and/or certain other members of the community, or as “attainable housing” offered at below-market rents under some circumstances. See A.R.S. § 15-1444(A)(11) (providing the power to engage in certain real estate transactions for the College’s benefit). However, whether a particular project complies with all applicable legal requirements will depend on its specific facts. We express no opinion on the compliance or permissibility of any particular project.

The College has statutory authority to undertake workforce development and job training efforts, with or without partners, in connection with real property or not.

Similarly, on this front, we agree with the opinion’s conclusion that the College’s workforce development and job training efforts are within its statutory powers. Broadly speaking, those efforts are within its educational/vocational ambit and consistent with its mission to “strengthen[] the local economy.” And more specifically, we agree that the Legislature has authorized the College to engage in “job training” activities and in “[p]artnerships with businesses and educational institutions” for “job training purposes.” A.R.S. § 15-1472(B)(1). Some of the same statutory provisions discussed above also permit the College to contract with private, public, or tribal entities to provide such job training or workforce development benefits. See A.R.S. § 15-1444(B)(4), (B)(15). We agree with the opinion’s conclusion that “[t]he plain language of the statutes that delineate the College’s authority indicates that it can enter into contracts with private entities or with other political subdivisions of the state.” Opinion at 7. And setting aside whether it is true that “[t]here is no limitation on the subject matter of such contracts,” id., the statutory grant of authority is undoubtedly broad and flexible in nature.

Thus, the College has broad authority to conduct workforce development and job training efforts, including in the context of “commercial or entrepreneurial activities,” A.R.S. § 15-1444(B)(13), and in conjunction with the types of real property development contemplated by the opinion. But any project must, of course, comply with all other legal and procedural requirements, many of which are again beyond the scope of this opinion.

The College may be exempt from certain local planning and zoning regulations and fees.

We affirm the opinion’s conclusion that at least some of the College’s contemplated development projects may be exempt from certain local planning and zoning regulations and fees.[2] We also affirm the opinion’s analytical framework on this topic—which relies on Book-Cellar, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 150 Ariz. 42, 44 (1986) and its discussion of proprietary versus governmental operations—with one potential clarification: the focus on “predominant purposes” suggested by the opinion (at 9) cannot simply rest on the stated intent of any relevant project. Rather, the analysis must be objective.

In the absence of specific facts, we decline to review or otherwise offer an opinion on the propriety of any particular development project the College may be considering. Such projects may implicate various areas of the law, including procurement law, tax law, and the Gift Clause. They also may implicate procedural issues like budgeting, governing board approval, and funding sources. We express no opinion on whether the College’s contemplated development projects comply with these legal and procedural requirements, and we decline to review any aspects of the opinion touching on these other issues.

Kris Mayes

Attorney General

[1] At various points, the opinion draws on authority applicable to the K-12 school district system to analogize to the community college district system. There are distinct statutory frameworks that govern each, reflecting different policy considerations. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 15-1105 (school districts’ leasing authority must connect to a lawful purpose, including, among other things, an educational or other civic or governmental purpose in the interest of the community). We take the opportunity to note that, while some policies may be applicable to both contexts, authority applicable to one does not necessarily transfer or apply to the other.

[2] We note that, to the extent the projects include “community college buildings,” they may be exempt from local building code, pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 34-461(D) and 34-462. The statute does not define “community college buildings,” but exempts any such buildings from local building code. Still, the statute makes clear that any such projects remain subject to state fire code. See A.R.S. § 34-461(A).