When an Arizona statute requires notice 'by mail' to political party precinct committeemen, can email satisfy the requirement?

Plain-English summary

A.R.S. § 16-824 says the chair of a county political party committee must give notice of the committee's meeting "by mail" to each precinct committeeman at least ten days in advance. Speaker-Elect J.D. Mesnard asked the Solicitor General whether "by mail" included delivery by email.

The Solicitor General's answer, an informal opinion delivered quickly because the request was time-sensitive, was no. The phrase "by mail" in this context meant postal-service delivery. Email did not satisfy the statute.

The reasoning rested on three points:

1. The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona had defined "mail" in Cachet Residential Builders as "letters, packets, etc. that are sent or delivered by means of the post office," based on a standard dictionary definition.
2. Other Arizona rules of practice, including the Rules of Protective Order Procedure, the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Code of Judicial Administration, all distinguish "mail" from "email." If "mail" already included email, those distinctions would be superfluous.
3. When Arizona authorities have wanted to permit email service, they have said so expressly. The election statute did not.

So a county political party chair who wanted to comply with § 16-824 had to send the meeting notice through the postal service to each precinct committeeman, with the postmark or proof of mailing dated at least 10 days before the meeting.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2017. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Why "informal" mattered

The opinion expressly distinguished itself from a "formal" Attorney General opinion, noting that the formal process "involves several layers of review and is not, therefore, conducive to a speedy turnaround." Speaker-Elect Mesnard had needed an answer before the next county committee meeting cycle, and an informal opinion let the Solicitor General respond in time.

The opinion's substantive analysis nevertheless rested on the same statutory-interpretation tools as a formal opinion: a federal court's interpretation of analogous language, the doctrine that statutory language should not be read to make other provisions superfluous, and the structural observation that other rules expressly authorize email when they want to permit it.

Common questions

Q: Could a precinct committeeman waive the mail requirement and accept email?
A: The opinion did not address waiver. It addressed only what the statute required of the county chair. As a practical matter, parties to a procedural rule often can waive notice defects, but a county chair following the statute would mail the notice rather than rely on the recipient to waive.

Q: What is a "precinct committeeman"?
A: In Arizona's election system, a precinct committeeman is a person elected within a recognized political party to represent a single voting precinct on the county party committee. The county committee then performs party-government functions like filling vacancies in elective party positions.

Q: Did the opinion say anything about fax?
A: No, it did not address fax specifically. The reasoning, however, would extend to any electronic transmission. The opinion observed that Arizona's Code of Judicial Administration § 6-211 distinguishes "mail, fax or email" as three separate methods. Where Arizona law wants to allow non-postal delivery, it lists each method explicitly.

Q: What was the case the opinion cited?
A: Cachet Residential Builders, Inc. v. Gemini Ins. Co., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (D. Ariz. 2007). It interpreted "mail" in Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 4.2(c), holding that the term meant postal-service delivery as defined by Webster's. The Solicitor General used that ruling as a parallel reading for the same word in the election statute.

Q: Did the opinion change Arizona election law?
A: No. AG opinions, including informal ones, are persuasive but not binding. The opinion confirmed an interpretation of existing law; only the Legislature could change the underlying statute.

Background and statutory framework

A.R.S. § 16-824 sits in Arizona's election code, governing the operations of recognized political party committees at the county level. The statute requires the chair of the county committee to mail meeting notices to precinct committeemen at least ten days before any committee meeting.

The reason for the rule is to ensure that all precinct committeemen, who are elected at the precinct level and may not be in the chair's regular communication loop, get advance notice of meetings where party leadership, vacancy fills, and other governance decisions occur. The 10-day mail requirement provides a time buffer that accommodates postal delivery and gives committeemen meaningful notice rather than last-minute email blasts.

By 2017, the practical question was whether modern political committees could substitute email for postal mail to save time and cost. The opinion answered that they could not, at least not under the existing statute as written.

Citations and references

Statute:

• A.R.S. § 16-824 (notice of county committee meetings)

Case:

• Cachet Residential Builders, Inc. v. Gemini Ins. Co., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (D. Ariz. 2007) (defining "mail" as postal-service delivery)

Rules and codes referenced:

• Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 35(c)(1) (distinguishing mail and email)
• Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 10(h) (mail plus electronic delivery in expedited election appeals)
• Ariz. R. Civ. P. 5(c)(2)(C), (D) (mail vs. electronic means)
• Ariz. Code of Jud. Admin. § 6-211 (defining "notify" as "mail, fax or email")

Source

• Landing page: https://www.azag.gov/opinions/i17-001-r17-001
• Original PDF: https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/I17-001.pdf

Original opinion text

Hon. J.D. Mesnard

Arizona House of Representatives

1700 West Washington, Suite H

Phoenix, AZ 85007

Re: I17-001 / R17-001

Meaning of "By Mail" in A.R.S. § 16-824

Dear Speaker-Elect Mesnard:

You requested an opinion from this Office on the following question: "Under A.R.S. § 16-824, does 'by mail' allow for delivery by email?" As you may be aware, our formal opinion process necessarily involves several layers of review and is not, therefore, conducive to a speedy turnaround. We understand time is of the essence regarding your request. For this reason, we offer the following informal opinion regarding the question presented.

Under A.R.S. § 16-824, "[t]he chairman of the county committee shall give notice of the time and place of such meeting by mail to each precinct committeeman at least ten days prior to the date of such meeting." (Emphasis added). At issue in this informal opinion is the meaning of the term "by mail" in this statute.

While judicial authority interpreting the phrase "by mail" under Arizona law is limited, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona recently interpreted the word "mail" as used in Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 4.2(c). Cachet Residential Builders, Inc. v. Gemini Ins. Co., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (D. Ariz. 2007). The court, relying on an established dictionary definition, held that mail is "defined as 'letters, packets, etc. that are sent or delivered by means of the post office.'" Id. at 1030 (citing Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 864 (1989)).

This definition, which focuses on whether the item is "sent or delivered by means of the post office," is consistent with how the term "mail" is used elsewhere under Arizona law. For example, Rule 35(c)(1) of the Arizona Rules of Protective Order Procedure distinguishes between communications by mail and email. Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 35(c)(1) ("A limited jurisdiction court may allow contact by mail or e-mail to arrange parenting time . . . .") (emphasis added). Likewise, the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure specify that "[a] party that serves documents on another party by mail in an expedited election appeal also must deliver the documents by electronic means, including email or facsimile, or as agreed to by the parties." Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 10(h); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 5(c)(2)(C), (D) (distinguishing service by "mailing it" from service "by any other means, including electronic means"). Further, in the Code of Judicial Administration, the term "notify" is defined to mean "written communication by mail, fax or email." Ariz. Code of Jud. Admin. § 6-211 (emphasis added). The distinction between "mail" and "email" in the above rules would be superfluous if "mail" already encompassed email. These authorities also show that, when delivery by email is permitted under Arizona law, Arizona authorities have expressly authorized it.

For purposes of the present question, our preliminary conclusion is that notice requirements elsewhere in Arizona law provide the best analogue to the requirement in A.R.S. § 16-824. Those provisions illustrate that, where email notice is permitted, it is listed separately from "mail." This interpretation is also consistent with dictionary definitions and common usage as explained in Cachet Residential Builders. For these reasons, notice by email appears insufficient to satisfy A.R.S. § 16-824.

Sincerely,

Dominic E. Draye

Solicitor General