Can a single Arizona Corporation Commissioner demand that a regulated utility hand over records of its political contributions, lobbying spend, and corporate structure, including for affiliates?

Plain-English summary

Commissioner Robert Burns of the Arizona Corporation Commission asked the AG to clarify how much investigatory power a single Commissioner has, particularly when the question is whether a regulated utility's political contributions, lobbying expenses, and corporate-affiliate structure are fair game.

The political-contributions issue had been brewing in Arizona for a while. Pinnacle West Capital Corporation (parent of Arizona Public Service) was widely believed to have spent heavily through dark-money groups to influence Commission elections. Burns wanted to use the Commission's inspection power to look at that money flow.

AG Brnovich's analysis splits along three lines.

Single-commissioner authority under A.R.S. § 40-241. The statute says "[t]he commission, each commissioner and person employed by the commission may, at any time, inspect the accounts, books, papers and documents of any public service corporation." The phrase "each commissioner" is dispositive. An individual Commissioner has the same statutory inspection power as the full Commission. That power covers political contributions, charitable contributions, and lobbying expenditures by the public service corporation, as those are part of "accounts, books, papers and documents."

Affiliates are different. Section 40-241 talks about a "public service corporation," a constitutionally defined term that does not include affiliates. The Arizona Constitution at Article 15, § 2 lists the entities that can be PSCs. Subsidiaries, parents, and holding companies that don't themselves do PSC business aren't on the list. The opinion also notes that other utility-related statutes (like § 40-202(C)(2), (C)(6)) explicitly use the word "affiliate" alongside "public service corporation," implying that when § 40-241 doesn't, the legislature meant the narrower term. So a single Commissioner cannot use § 40-241 to demand records directly from affiliates.

Affiliate reach via Commission action. What an individual Commissioner can't do, the full Commission can. Article 15, § 3 of the Arizona Constitution gives the Commission authority to make rules "reasonably necessary for effective ratemaking." Under that power, the Commission adopted the Affiliated Interest Rules (A.A.C. R14-2-801 to -806), which require utility holding company approval, affiliate transaction approval, and affiliate book inspection where necessary to audit utility transactions. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld these rules in Woods (1992). Article 15, § 13 separately gives the Commission (not individual Commissioners) authority to require reports under oath from PSCs and from any "Public Company" (one that offers stock for sale to the public). Affiliates that are public companies are reachable under this provision.

First Amendment overlay. The opinion notes that compelled disclosure of political affiliations and contributions raises First Amendment associational-rights concerns under NAACP v. Alabama. The Commission's authority to investigate has to be balanced against those concerns when it intersects with political speech. The opinion identifies the Morton Salt reasonableness test and the four Arizona-court factors (within agency authority, demand not too indefinite, information reasonably relevant, not used for harassment) but declines to apply them in the abstract.

The opinion is significant because it gave a single dissenting Commissioner real legal authority to investigate utility political spending, even when the rest of the Commission was unwilling.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2016. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

The Arizona Corporation Commission's authority comes from Article 15 of the Arizona Constitution, written during the progressive era to push back against railroad and mining company dominance.

• Article 15, § 2: Defines what a "public service corporation" is. The list is closed: certain railroad, mining, transportation, water, gas, electrical, telephone, and similar entities engaged in serving the public.
• Article 15, § 3: Gives the Commission ratemaking authority and rulemaking authority "reasonably necessary for effective ratemaking." Modern Arizona courts read this as restricted to ratemaking purposes.
• Article 15, § 4: Gives the Commission AND individual Commissioners power to inspect "the property, books, papers, business, methods, and affairs" of any Public Company or PSC.
• Article 15, § 6: Authorizes the legislature to make rules and regulations for Commission proceedings.
• Article 15, § 13: Gives the Commission (not individual Commissioners) power to require reports from PSCs and Public Companies under oath.

The statutory inspection power at A.R.S. § 40-241 implements Article 15, § 4. Its key textual feature is the phrase "[t]he commission, each commissioner and person employed by the commission." Individual Commissioners can inspect on their own.

The Affiliated Interest Rules (A.A.C. R14-2-801 to -806) are the Commission's rule-based reach into affiliates:

• R14-2-803: Commission approval required for utility holding company organization or reorganization.
• R14-2-804: Commission approval required for transactions between utilities and affiliates; affiliate books and records must be made available for Commission inspection to the extent necessary to audit utility-affiliate transactions.
• R14-2-805: Diversification plan reports required for utilities and utility holding companies.

The Woods decision (1992) upheld these rules against constitutional challenge, finding them "reasonably necessary for effective ratemaking."

The First Amendment overlay comes from a line of Supreme Court cases:

• NAACP v. Alabama (1958): Compelled disclosure of group affiliations can violate First Amendment association rights.
• Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm. (1963): Government must lay an "adequate foundation" for compelled disclosure.
• First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978): Corporations have First Amendment speech rights.
• Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n (1980): Even regulated monopoly utilities can assert First Amendment rights.
• John Doe No. 1 v. Reed (2010): Government interest in disclosure must be compelling/substantial and the means narrowly tailored.

The Arizona courts apply a four-factor reasonableness test for Commission information requests: (1) within agency authority, (2) demand not too indefinite, (3) information reasonably relevant, (4) not a tool of harassment or intimidation. (Morton Salt, Polaris, Carrington.)

Common questions

Q: Can a single ACC Commissioner subpoena a regulated utility's records?
A: Under § 40-241, yes, an individual Commissioner can inspect the utility's accounts, books, papers, and documents. The opinion treats this as direct statutory authority.

Q: Can a single Commissioner demand records from a utility's parent company or sister subsidiaries?
A: Not under § 40-241 directly, because affiliates aren't "public service corporations." The Commission as a whole can reach affiliates through the Affiliated Interest Rules or through Article 15, § 13 reporting requirements (for affiliates that are Public Companies).

Q: Can the Commission ask about a utility's political donations?
A: § 40-241 covers all "accounts, books, papers and documents." Political-contribution records fit within that. But the Commission must satisfy the reasonableness test and respect First Amendment association rights. Information must be relevant to a legitimate Commission purpose (typically ratemaking).

Q: What's the difference between Article 15, § 3 and § 13?
A: § 3 is rulemaking and ratemaking. The Commission can require reports under § 3 if doing so is reasonably necessary for effective ratemaking (the Woods test). § 13 is a separate explicit reporting authority that reaches PSCs and Public Companies (those offering stock to the public).

Q: Does this mean utility shareholders can't shield their political activity?
A: The opinion balances inspection authority against First Amendment concerns but doesn't resolve specific cases. Future litigation will turn on the specific information requested, the Commission's stated purpose, and whether the request is narrowly tailored. The opinion expressly leaves these questions for case-by-case analysis.

Citations and references

Statutes and constitutional provisions:

• Ariz. Const. art. 15, §§ 2, 3, 4, 6, 13
• A.R.S. § 40-241 (inspection authority)
• A.R.S. § 40-202 (affiliates)
• A.R.S. § 40-204 (reports)
• A.R.S. § 40-102(C) (commission majority action)
• A.A.C. R14-2-801 to -806 (Affiliated Interest Rules)

Cases:

• Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. State ex rel. Woods, 171 Ariz. 286 (1992)
• Arizona Public Service Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 157 Ariz. 532 (1988)
• Sierra Club–Grand Canyon Chapter v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 237 Ariz. 568 (App. 2015)
• Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Ariz. Elec. Power Coop., 207 Ariz. 95 (App. 2004)
• Rural/Metro Corp. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 129 Ariz. 116 (1981)
• Carrington v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 199 Ariz. 303 (App. 2000)
• Polaris Int'l Metals Corp. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 133 Ariz. 500 (1982)
• United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950)
• NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
• First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
• Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
• John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010)
• United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.azag.gov/opinions/i16-005-r16-002
• Original PDF: https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/I16-005.pdf

Original opinion text

To:

Commissioner Robert L. Burns

Arizona Corporation Commission

Questions Presented

You have requested a formal opinion on the following questions:

"Does A.R.S.§ 40-241 give an individual Commissioner the power to gather information related to a public service corporation and its affiliates' political contributions, lobbying and charitable contributions in order to ensure that all funds expended are consistent with the Commission's authority to set just and reasonable rates? In other words, does the statute give an individual Commissioner the power to look at this information because it is or may be reasonably necessary information for effective ratemaking and to protect the public interest?"

"Does A.R.S. § 40-241 permit an individual Commissioner to investigate the degree to which a public service corporation and its affiliates are intertwined in terms of organization, operation and structure in order to ensure the security and financial health of the affiliates in order to protect consumers from overreaching and abuse by public service corporations and their affiliates such that an affiliate's operations do not hinder the operations of the public service corporation? Specifically, does the statute permit an individual Commissioner to inspect a public service corporation's and/or its affiliates' accounts, books, papers and documents in order to conduct such a review?"

"Does Article XV of the Arizona Constitution give the Commission and/or an individual Commissioner the power to require a public service corporation to report information about itself or about its parent, subsidiary, and other affiliated corporations relevant to the Commission's authority under Article XV, particularly in light of Arizona Corporation Commission v. State of Arizona exrel. Grant Woods, 171 Ariz. 286, 830 P.2d 807 (1992); Arizona Public Service Company v. Arizona Corporation Commission, 157 Ariz. 532, 760 P.2d 532 (1988), and Article 8 of the Arizona Administrative Code (Affiliated Interest Rules)?"

Summary Answer

The questions presented inquire regarding the authority of the Arizona Corporation Commission (Commission) and individual Commissioners under Article XV of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 40-241.

The Commission has broad constitutional authority relating to reporting requirements and inspection of any Public Service Corporation ("PSC") and its affiliates. Under Article XV, Section 13 of the Arizona Constitution, the Commission has the power to require reports from PSCs and companies whose stock is offered for sale to the public ("Public Companies"), which could include PSC affiliates. Furthermore, under Article XV, Section 3, the Commission has the authority to adopt rules reasonably necessary for effective ratemaking. Pursuant to this authority, the Commission has adopted the Affiliated Interest Rules, Ariz. Admin. Code ("A.A.C.") R14-2-801 through -806, which include reporting requirements that apply to both PSCs and certain affiliates.

The Legislature has also granted individual Commissioners limited powers under A.R.S. § 40-241. Under this statute, an individual Commissioner is authorized to inspect the accounts, books, papers, and documents of a PSC. It also authorizes an individual Commissioner to examine under oath officers, agents, and employees of a PSC in relation to the PSC's business and affairs. Therefore, a Commissioner may use the statutory authority provided by Section 40‑241 to gather information from a PSC related to the amount spent by a PSC on political and charitable contributions and lobbying, so long as that authority is exercised within constitutional bounds. This authority also permits an individual Commissioner to gather information from a PSC regarding the degree to which it is intertwined with its affiliates (in terms of organization, operation, and structure). But, applying rules of statutory construction, the term "public service corporation" in this statutory provision does not include affiliates.

Background

Relevant Sources of Commission Authority

The Commission is a regulatory check on corporations "designed to promote both democratic control and competitive economic forces." Ariz. Corp. Comm'n v. State ex rel. Woods, 171 Ariz. 286, 291 (1992). The Framers drafted Article XV of the Arizona Constitution, which establishes the Commission, with a "pronounced, progressive-era concern with regulating corporations, a concern enhanced by the perceived dominance of large railroad and mining companies during the territorial era." John D. Leshy, The Arizona State Constitution 356 (2d ed. 2013). The Framers did, however, "limit [the Commission's] most sweeping regulatory jurisdiction to [PSCs]." Id. at 357.

Article XV, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution grants the Commission, but not individual Commissioners, the authority to set rates and make reasonable rules, regulations, and orders governing the transaction of business by PSCs in Arizona. While some earlier cases construed the Commission's powers under this Section more broadly, Arizona courts have more recently assumed that the Commission's regulatory power under Section 3 is "restrict[ed] . . . to its ratemaking function," while acknowledging that the Commission has discretion in "determin[ing] . . . what regulation is reasonably necessary for effective ratemaking." Sierra Club—Grand Canyon Chapter v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 237 Ariz. 568, 572 ¶ 10 (App. 2015), review denied (Feb. 9, 2016) (quoting Woods, 171 Ariz. at 294); see also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Ariz. Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 207 Ariz. 95, 111 ¶ 54 (App. 2004). Although Section 3 does not expressly address inspection, investigation, or reporting, the Arizona Supreme Court, based on the authority that Section 3 confers, upheld the Commission's Affiliated Interest Rules. Woods, 171 Ariz. at 297. These rules require: (1) Commission approval of a utility holding company's organization or reorganization and transactions between utilities and affiliates; (2) that books and records of affiliates that transact business with a utility be made available for inspection in certain respects; and (3) that reports of diversification plans for utilities and utility holding companies be provided to the Commission. See A.A.C. R14-2-801 through -806.

Under Article XV, Section 4 of the Arizona Constitution, the Commission and individual Commissioners may "inspect and investigate the property, books, papers, business, methods, and affairs of any [Public Company] . . . and of any [PSC] doing business within the state." The Legislature has also provided the Commission and individual Commissioners statutory authority regarding PSC inspections and examinations:

The commission, each commissioner and person employed by the commission may, at any time, inspect the accounts, books, papers and documents of any public service corporation, and any of such persons who are authorized to administer oaths may examine under oath any officer, agent or employee of such corporation in relation to the business and affairs of the corporation.

A.R.S. § 40-241(A).

Finally, Article XV, Section 13 authorizes the Commission, but not individual Commissioners, to require reports to the Commission under oath from PSCs and Public Companies, and to require that such companies provide such information "concerning their acts and operations" as may be required by law or by the Commission. See also Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 157 Ariz. 532, 536 (1988) (interpreting Commission order issued under Section 13); A.R.S. § 40-204 (relating to reports by PSCs to Commission).

Limitations on Commission Authority

The United States Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right-of-association privilege against "compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). The Supreme Court enforced this privilege when the government "laid no adequate foundation for its direct demands." Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm.,372 U.S. 539, 555 (1963). The Supreme Court has further clarified that corporations, including those granted government monopolies, are generally entitled to First Amendment speech protections. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775-76 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963); Consol. Edison Co. of NY v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n. 1 (1980) ("Nor does Consolidated Edison's status as a privately owned but government regulated monopoly preclude its assertion of First Amendment rights.").

When First Amendment concerns arise, courts considering allegations of the government's intrusion on speech or associational rights must evaluate whether there is a compelling or substantial government interest in doing so. See, e.g., Alabama, 357 U.S. at 463. Arizona's specific authorizations noted above (allowing the Commission and its members to investigate PSCs' affairs in order to achieve the Commission's purposes on behalf of the public interest) will satisfy this inquiry where any request is substantially related to those purposes. See, e.g., John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010).

Courts also review exercises of agency inspection and investigation authority for reasonableness. See Carrington v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 199 Ariz. 303, 305 ¶ 9 (App. 2000) (citing People ex rel. Babbitt v. Herndon, 119 Ariz. 454, 456 (1978)). The United States Supreme Court has identified a three-part test for reasonableness: "[I]t is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant." United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). The Morton Salt test is consistent with the first three factors Arizona courts commonly use for reasonableness in cases of Commission requests for information. See Carrington, 199 Ariz. at 305, ¶ 9, 18 P.3d at 99 (citing Herndon, 119 Ariz. at 456). Consistent with further explication by the United States Supreme Court, Arizona courts also have provided a fourth requirement: if an inquiry becomes "a tool of harassment and intimidation rather than a means to gather appropriate information, the appropriate court may intrude and stop the incursion into the constitutional liberties of the parties under investigation." Polaris Int'l Metals Corp. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 133 Ariz. 500, 507 (1982); see also United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964); Carrington, 199 Ariz. at 305 ¶ 9 (stating all four factors).

While the subject matter of the questions presented may implicate these limitations, application of any potential First Amendment or reasonableness factors without specific facts and circumstances to evaluate would be speculative; thus further analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this opinion.

Analysis

Question 1: The authority of an individual Commissioner under A.R.S.§ 40-241 to gather information about a PSC and its affiliates' political contributions, lobbying, and charitable contributions.

Section 40-241 empowers the Commission or an individual Commissioner to gather information in two ways. First, the Commission, each Commissioner, and any person employed by the Commission may "at any time, inspect the accounts, books, papers and documents" of any PSC. Second, any Commissioner or Commission employee who is authorized to administer oaths may also "examine under oath, any officer, agent or employee of such [PSC] in relation to the business and affairs of the [PSC]." A.R.S. § 40-241.

Section 40-241 confers power on individual Commissioners as well as the entire Commission. The plain language of Section 40-241(A) specifically refers to not just "[t]he commission" but also "each commissioner." By using the language "each commissioner," the Legislature clearly authorized individual Commissioners to exercise the powers in this statute. J.D. v. Hegyi, 236 Ariz. 39, 40-41 ¶ 6 (2014) ("If the language [of a statute] is 'subject to only one reasonable meaning,' [courts] apply that meaning." (citation omitted)); see also Fields v. Elected Officials' Ret. Plan, 234 Ariz. 214, 218 ¶ 16 (2014) (stating that "the legislature generally avoids redundancy").

The authority conferred by Section 40-241 applies to inspections of PSCs and examinations of PSC personnel; it does not extend to affiliates of PSCs. Section 40-241(A) refers to any "public service corporation," which is not defined in the Arizona Revised Statutes but in the Arizona Constitution. Ariz. Const. art. XV, § 2. Therefore, the term's interpretation should be consistent with its constitutional definition, which does not include affiliates. See id.; Stoecker v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 194 Ariz. 448, 453 ¶ 17 (1999) ("The statute's text is read in pari materia with the constitutional provision that authorizes it.") (citation omitted)); cf. Rural/Metro Corp. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 129 Ariz. 116, 118 (1981) (noting that Article XV, Section 6 of the Arizona Constitution "does not allow the legislature to give 'public service corporation' designation to corporations not listed in Article 15, § 2"). This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that another pertinent statute specifically refers to "affiliate" separately from a PSC, even though that language was enacted after Section 40-241. See 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 209, § 23 (2d Reg. Sess.) (amending A.R.S. § 40-202(C)(2), (C)(6)); State v. Garza Rodriguez, 164 Ariz. 107, 111 (1990) ("[W]hen determining legislative intent, court[s] may consider both prior and subsequent statutes in pari materia." (citation omitted)).

In sum, pursuant to Section 40-241, an individual Commissioner may gather information regarding a PSC's political and charitable contributions, and lobbying expenditures, by inspecting the books and records of a PSC, and examining under oath PSC personnel.

Question 2: The authority of an individual Commissioner under A.R.S.§ 40-241 to investigate a PSC and its affiliates' corporate organization, operation, and structure to ensure the security and financial health of the affiliate in order to protect consumers.

Consistent with the answer to Question 1, based on the statute's plain language, Section 40-241 confers power on individual Commissioners, not just the Commission as a whole. Based on the use of the term "public service corporation," the statute empowers a Commissioner to investigate by inspecting the accounts, books, papers, and documents of a PSC, but not any affiliates. The statute also authorizes an individual Commissioner to investigate by examining under oath officers, agents, and employees of a PSC in relation to the PSC's business and affairs. As noted in this question, such an investigation's purpose would be to ascertain any risks the affiliates create regarding the financial wellbeing or effective operation of the PSC.

Question 3: The Commission and individual Commissioners' authority under Article XV of the Arizona Constitution, Affiliated Interest Rules, and related case law to require a PSC to report information about itself or its parent, subsidiary, and other affiliated corporations relevant to the Commission's constitutional authority.

Reporting requirements pursuant to Article XV, Section 3, including the Affiliated Interest Rules.

Under Article XV, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, the Commission may require reports pursuant to rules that are reasonably necessary for effective ratemaking. Section 3 grants the Commission authority to "prescribe . . . just and reasonable rates" and "make reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, by which [PSCs] shall be governed in the transaction of business within the state." Ariz. Const. art. XV, § 3. The authority conferred by Section 3 (ratemaking and rulemaking) must ultimately be exercised by the Commission, not an individual Commissioner. See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. XV, § 6 (empowering the Legislature to make rules and regulations for Commission proceedings); A.R.S. § 40-102(C) (requiring assent of a majority of Commissioners for an action or order to be "the act of the [C]ommission," or a "finding, order, or decision of the [C]ommission"). In addition, Section 3 refers to the "corporation commission." Other provisions of Article XV refer to "the several members" of the Commission, showing that the drafters knew how to confer authority on individual Commissioners and did not do so here. See Ariz. Const. art. XV, § 4; Roubos v. Miller, 214 Ariz. 416, 420 ¶ 20 (2007) (where the Legislature knows how to do something, as shown elsewhere in the statutory scheme, absence of such language indicates absence of such intent).

Section 3 does not expressly address requiring reports from PSCs. However, in 1990, the Commission adopted the Affiliated Interest Rules. Woods, 171 Ariz. at 288. The rules, which apply to the largest utilities, require Commission approval of the organization or reorganization of a utility holding company and transactions between utilities and affiliates. A.A.C. R14-2-801(5), 803, 804(B). They also require that the books and records of affiliates that transact business with utilities be made available for Commission inspection to the extent necessary to audit transactions with utilities. A.A.C. R14-2-804(A). In addition, the rules require reports to the Commission of diversification plans for utilities and utility holding companies. A.A.C. R14‑2-805. In Woods, the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed whether these rules were constitutional under Article XV, Section 3. See Phelps Dodge Corp., 207 Ariz. at 116 ¶ 83 (discussing Woods's approach to question of rules' constitutionality). The court upheld the rules, concluding that they were "reasonably necessary for effective ratemaking." Woods, 171 Ariz. at 294, 297. Under Woods, the Commission has authority to adopt additional reporting requirements for PSCs and affiliates under Article XV, Section 3, so long as the additional requirements are reasonably necessary for effective ratemaking. See id.

Reporting requirements under Article XV, Section 13.

Under Article XV, Section 13, the Commission, but not individual Commissioners, may require reports and information concerning the "acts and operations" of a PSC or Public Company. Because the language of Section 13 authorizes reports "as may be required by law, or by the corporation commission," the authority to require reports is not conferred on an individual Commissioner. See also A.R.S. § 40-204(A), (B) (vesting authority in the Commission). The power of the Commission to require reports from companies other than PSCs under Article XV, Section 13 was litigated in Arizona Public Service Co.,157 Ariz. 532. The court concluded that a corporation that is not a PSC is subject to the powers set forth in this section if it is a Public Company:

[T]he powers conferred upon the Commission to inspect and investigate under § 4 and to require reports under § 13 extend to all corporations which offer stock for sale to the public. They do not extend to those corporations which do not do so.

Id.at 535. Therefore, this power could relate to an affiliate of a PSC only if the affiliate is a Public Company.

Conclusion

As set forth in this opinion, the Commission, and in some instances individual Commissioners, have the authority to gather information, inspect, and require reports related to the topics specified in the questions presented, subject to fact-specific constitutional considerations.

Mark Brnovich

Attorney General