Why did the Arkansas AG reject Scott Trotter's 2017 multi-issue constitutional amendment about jury damages, campaign-finance disclosure, and legislative powers?

Plain-English summary

Little Rock attorney Scott Trotter submitted an unusually broad multi-subject constitutional amendment for AG certification in July 2017. It would have done several things at once:

1. Required the Arkansas Ethics Commission to propose campaign-disclosure rules that the General Assembly would have to enact for the 2019 session, with judicial-campaign contribution limits matching non-federal contribution caps.
2. Banned individual legislators (or groups of them) from designating who or how appropriated funds get spent.
3. Required a two-thirds (rather than simple majority) override of the Governor's veto.
4. Allowed the legislature to amend Supreme Court rules of pleading, practice, and procedure that it found "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."
5. Barred the legislature from passing any law abridging "a jury's right to determine damages in a civil action."
6. Prevented the legislature or the Constitution from imposing any restrictions on attorney-client fee contracts.

The AG rejected the popular name and ballot title and identified seven specific problems:

Popular Name Defects:

1. "Preserving the right of juries to set damages" was misleading. Arkansas courts have long had inherent power to reduce excessive jury awards (Martin v. Rieger, 289 Ark. 292 (1986)). Saying the amendment "preserves" an absolute right falsely implies one exists.
2. "Requiring disclosures in elections" was misleading. Arkansas Constitution Article 19, Section 28 and Ark. Code Ann. § 7-6-201 et seq. already require election disclosures. The popular name suggested no such requirements existed.
3. "Imposing limits on the Legislature" was vague and likely partisan, the kind of "inviting catch words" Arkansas Women's Political Caucus v. Riviere and Kurrus v. Priest warn against.

Ballot Title Defects:

4. The Ethics Commission's role under the proposed Article 19, Section 32 was ambiguous. The proposal said the General Assembly "shall enact laws ... consistent with [Commission] proposals" but also subjected those laws to "rule-making, compliance, and enforcement authority of the Arkansas Ethics Commission" with no legislative oversight. Voters could not tell whether the Commission's "proposals" had the binding force of regulations or were merely suggestions.

5. The proposal omitted procedures for Commission rule-making. It said only that Commission proposals would be made "after notice for public comment and hearing." Whether the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act applied was unclear.

6. The phrase "individual legislator or group of individual legislators" in the proposed Amendment 14 amendment was ambiguous. Did it include the Joint Budget Committee, the Legislative Council, or other established subgroups of the General Assembly? The implications for state budgeting and contracting were significant.

7. "Substantive right" was a technical legal term used without definition (in the rules-amendment provision). The Court has consistently disapproved technical terms "not readily understood by voters" (Wilson v. Martin, 2016 Ark. 334).

8. The "shall enact no law that abridges, limits or impairs a jury's right to determine damages" language repeated the popular-name problem. There is no absolute right.

9. The "Arkansas Constitution shall impose no restrictions on the right of a client to contract with an attorney" language, read literally, would prevent any future constitutional amendment imposing such restrictions, in tension with Article 5, Section 1 (initiative and referendum) and Article 19, Section 22 (legislative amendment proposals).

The AG declined to substitute corrected language and instructed Trotter to redesign the proposal.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2017. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

The certification framework is the same as in the recurring Berry/Morris cannabis rejections of the same period (Opinions 2017-091, 2017-093, 2017-097, 2017-081). Under Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-107, the AG must certify or reject ballot titles based on whether they "honestly, intelligibly, and fairly set forth the purpose of the proposed amendment or act" (Arkansas Women's Political Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463 (1984)).

The Arkansas Supreme Court has elaborated on the duty to disclose changes in current law:

It is evident that before determining the sufficiency of the present ballot title we must first ascertain what changes in the law would be brought about by the adoption of the proposed amendment. For the elector, in voting upon a constitutional amendment, is simply making a choice between retention of the existing law and the substitution of something new. It is the function of the ballot title to provide information concerning the choice that he is called upon to make. (Bradley v. Hall, 220 Ark. 925 (1952))

This is especially important for amendments that materially change separation-of-powers arrangements or remove rights voters currently have.

The AG's reasoning

The popular name's misleading claims. The AG focused on three phrases. "Preserving the right of juries to set damages" implies an absolute right exists. Martin v. Rieger, 289 Ark. 292 (1986), confirmed Arkansas courts have inherent remittitur power. So the amendment would create a new right rather than preserve an existing one. "Requiring disclosures in elections" was equally misleading: Article 19, Section 28 and Ark. Code Ann. § 7-6-201 et seq. already require disclosures. "Imposing limits on the Legislature" was vague enough to function as partisan rhetoric. Kurrus v. Priest, 342 Ark. 434 (2000), forbids "catch phrases or slogans that tend to mislead or give partisan coloring to a proposal."

The Ethics Commission ambiguity. The proposed Article 19, Section 32 created a strange hybrid. Commission "proposals" are typically suggestions or drafts, but the proposal also gave the Commission "rule-making, compliance, and enforcement authority" without any General Assembly oversight. The AG could not summarize this for voters because the precise relationship between the Commission and the General Assembly was unclear. Were the Commission's "proposals" really binding rules dressed up in suggestion language? Or were they suggestions the General Assembly would have meaningful discretion to modify?

The AG referenced Ark. Code Ann. § 7-6-217 (current Commission rule-making authority under the APA) for comparison. Under existing law, the Commission can promulgate rules under the APA "to implement and administer" Article 19, Section 28. The proposed expansion was unclear in scope and procedure.

Cox v. Daniels and the limits of speculation. The AG cited Cox v. Daniels, 374 Ark. 437 (2008), where the Court refused to speculate on permissible "State lotteries" given the General Assembly's clear authority under the lottery amendment. The same principle applies here: when a proposal leaves substantive scope to future legislation or rule-making, the ballot title must convey the uncertainty rather than guess.

The "group of individual legislators" puzzle. The proposed Amendment 14 amendment would have prohibited the General Assembly from passing acts that "allow, or result in, an individual legislator or group of individual legislators designating, directly or indirectly," how appropriated funds get spent. The Joint Budget Committee, Legislative Council, and other subgroups all play roles in state budgeting. The AG could not tell whether the proposal would prohibit those bodies' standard work. That ambiguity required clarification before a ballot title could honestly summarize it.

Substantive right as a technical term. The proposal would have let the General Assembly amend Supreme Court rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." The Court has long recognized "substantive right" as a technical legal concept (ProAssurance Indem. Co. v. Metheny, 2012 Ark. 461 (2012)). Wilson v. Martin, 2016 Ark. 334 (2016), warned that technical terms used in ballot titles without definitions place voters "in a position of either having to be an expert in the subject or having to guess."

The contract-fees provision and constitutional self-amendment. The proposal said "[t]he Arkansas Constitution shall impose no restrictions on the right of a client to contract with an attorney and no limitations on the terms or fees for legal services." Read literally, this would prevent future constitutional amendments under Article 5, Section 1 (initiative and referendum) or Article 19, Section 22 (legislative proposal) from imposing such restrictions. The AG cited Parker v. Priest, 326 Ark. 123 (1996), and Dust v. Riviere, 277 Ark. 1 (1982), for the proposition that the initiative power is "a cornerstone of our state's democratic government." A provision that quietly removed the people's amendment power for one substantive area was a profound change requiring clear disclosure in the ballot title.

Common questions

Why so many separate issues in one amendment?
The opinion does not say. As a tactical matter, sponsors sometimes bundle several reforms into one ballot measure to maximize coalition support. Constitutional law in Arkansas does not require single-subject restrictions for initiative amendments (unlike some other states), so the bundled approach is technically permissible.

Did the legislature later pass anything similar?
Acts of the Arkansas General Assembly in subsequent sessions did include some campaign-finance disclosure reforms and tort-reform measures. The opinion is silent on the specific legislative aftermath of this rejection.

What did "preserve the right of juries to set damages" mean in tort-reform context?
This was the part of the amendment most clearly aimed at tort reform. Section 4(a)(3) added to Amendment 80 § 3 would have stated: "The General Assembly shall enact no law that abridges, limits or impairs a jury's right to determine damages in a civil action, and Article 5, Section 32 of the Arkansas Constitution, as it existed prior to approval of this amendment by voters, shall remain inviolate." Article 5, Section 32 is Arkansas's longstanding ban on caps on damages in personal-injury and wrongful-death actions. The amendment would have re-entrenched that ban as part of Amendment 80.

Why was a separation-of-powers analysis necessary?
The amendment would have shifted significant authority. The Ethics Commission would gain broad rule-making power without legislative oversight. The General Assembly would gain authority to override Supreme Court rules of procedure. The Governor would face a higher veto-override threshold. Each of these is a separation-of-powers shift that voters need to understand before voting. The ballot title did not adequately convey those shifts.

Could a sponsor sometimes get the AG to substitute a corrected ballot title?
Yes, when the underlying proposal text is clear and only the title needs cleaning up. The AG cannot substitute when the proposal itself is internally inconsistent or ambiguous, because that would amount to drafting (Roberts v. Priest, 341 Ark. 813 (2000)).

Source

• Landing page: https://arkansasag.gov/divisions/opinions-foia/attorney-general-opinions-search/

Original opinion text

Opinion No. 2017-078
July 14, 2017

Scott C. Trotter, Attorney at Law
Trotter Law Firm
425 W. Capitol Avenue, Suite 216
Little Rock, AR 72201

Dear Mr. Trotter:

I am writing in response to your request for certification, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-107 (Supp. 2015), of the popular name and ballot title for a proposed initiated measure.

At the outset, I wish to make clear to you that the decision to certify or reject a popular name and ballot title is in no way a reflection of my view of the merits of a particular proposal. I am not authorized to, and do not, consider the merits of the measure when making my determination to certify or reject a popular name and ballot title.

The Attorney General is required, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-107, to certify the popular name and ballot title of all proposed initiative and referendum acts or amendments before the petitions are circulated for signature. The law provides that the Attorney General may, if practicable, substitute and certify a more suitable and correct popular name and ballot title. Or, if the proposed popular name and ballot title are sufficiently misleading, the Attorney General may reject the entire petition.

Section 7-9-107 neither requires nor authorizes this office to make legal determinations concerning the merits of the act or amendment, or concerning the likelihood that it will accomplish its stated objective. In addition, consistent with Arkansas Supreme Court precedent, unless the measure is "clearly contrary to law," this office will not require that a measure's proponents acknowledge in the ballot title any possible constitutional infirmities. Consequently, this review has been limited primarily to a determination, pursuant to the guidelines that have been set forth by the Arkansas Supreme Court, discussed below, of whether the popular name and ballot title you have submitted accurately and impartially summarize the provisions of your proposal.

The purpose of my review and certification is to ensure that the popular name and ballot title honestly, intelligibly, and fairly set forth the purpose of the proposed amendment or act.

REQUEST

You have requested certification, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-107, of the popular name "An Amendment Preserving the Right of Juries to Set Damages, Requiring Disclosures in Elections, Addressing Separate Powers of the Three Branches of Government, and Imposing Limits on the Legislature" and a multi-section ballot title that would amend Article 19 (campaign-finance disclosure / Ethics Commission rules), Amendment 14 (legislator earmarking ban), Article 6 § 15 (two-thirds veto override), and Amendment 80 § 3 (legislative authority to amend Supreme Court rules; jury damages right; attorney-fee contract right). The full text is reproduced in the certification packet enclosed with this letter.

RESPONSE

It is my opinion that the popular name and ballot title you have submitted fail to meet the legal guidelines set forth by the Arkansas Supreme Court for certification of initiated measures.

Popular Name

Your proposed popular name refers to the measure as an amendment "preserving the right of juries to set damages." Although the amount of a damages award rests largely within the jury's discretion, Arkansas courts have inherent power to reduce jury awards. It is therefore misleading, and potentially partisan, to suggest that juries have an absolute "right ... to set damages" and that your amendment, if adopted, will preserve such a right.

I believe it is also misleading to call the proposed measure an amendment "requiring disclosures in elections." Article 19, Section 28 of the Arkansas Constitution and Ark. Code Ann. § 7-6-201 et seq. (Repl. 2004 and Supp. 2015) require disclosure of contributions and expenditures (as defined therein) in elections. Your popular name may lead voters to mistakenly think there currently are no Arkansas laws requiring disclosures in elections. The popular name's misleading tendency in this regard is compounded by the ballot title's failure to adequately inform voters of the changes in election-related disclosure requirements under your proposed constitutional amendment (as discussed below).

I believe it is also impermissibly vague and likely partisan to characterize the proposed amendment as "imposing limits on the Legislature." This language carries a connotation regarding the Legislature that may appeal to voters who would be favorably disposed, in the abstract, to placing "limits on the Legislature." The Arkansas Supreme Court has made clear, however, that a proposed measure cannot contain "inviting catch words" or "catch phrases or slogans that tend to mislead or give partisan coloring to a proposal." The use of such words and phrases is to promote by implication, not to summarize, a proposal.

I must therefore conclude that your proposed popular name is unacceptable under the standard set by the court.

Ballot Title

It is also my opinion that a number of additions or changes to your ballot title are necessary in order to more fully and correctly summarize your proposal. I cannot, however, at this time, fairly or completely summarize the effect of your proposed measure to the electorate in a ballot title without the resolution of the ambiguities in the text of the measure itself. And thus I cannot determine precisely what changes to the ballot title are necessary to fully and correctly summarize your proposal. It is therefore not appropriate, in my opinion, for me to try to substitute and certify a more suitable and correct popular name and ballot title pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-107(b). Instead, you may, if you wish, redesign the proposed measure and popular name and ballot title, and then resubmit for certification.

In order to aid your redesign, I highlight below the more concerning ambiguities in the text of your proposal.

1. Section 1 of your proposal amends Article 19 of the Arkansas Constitution to add a new section 32, entitled "Arkansas Ethics Commission's Rules on Elections."

There are several fundamental ambiguities regarding the Arkansas Ethics Commission ("Commission") "proposals" under your measure. As an initial matter, the term "proposals" in the context of your measure is likely misleading, absent some explanation of the respective roles and authority of the Commission and the General Assembly under the proposed Article 19, section 32. A "proposal" in common parlance is a suggestion or recommendation. In the context of administrative bodies, a "proposed regulation" is a "draft administrative regulation that is circulated among interested parties for comment." Whether used as a common or technical term, therefore, "proposal" connotes a lack of finality or force of law. Thus, when the proposed Article 19, section 32 states, under subsection (a), that the General Assembly "shall enact laws" that are "consistent with [Commission] proposals," the implication is that such proposals will not control the laws to be enacted. This further implies that the General Assembly is empowered to pass enabling legislation that will define words used in the new Article 19, section 32, and otherwise clarify the rights and obligations affected by the new constitutional provision.

Subsections (e) and (f) of the proposed Article 19, section 32 state, however, that the enacted laws "shall be subject to the rule-making, compliance, and enforcement authority of the Arkansas Ethics Commission" and that "[t]he General Assembly shall have no authority to approve or disapprove rules or regulations adopted by the Arkansas Ethics Commission." (Emphasis added.) The precise scope of the Commission's rule-making authority is not clear because the measure is silent on this point. But this grant of authority to the Commission may suggest that the new constitutional provision will ultimately be implemented through Commission rule-making. If that is the case, the Commission "proposals" will obviously have more force than that term ordinarily implies. And the charge to the General Assembly to enact laws "consistent with [Commission] proposals" should be read more as "pursuant to" or "in accordance with" Commission proposals.

Your proposed measure is therefore ambiguous, and potentially misleading, in stating both that the General Assembly shall enact laws consistent with Commission proposals and that such laws shall be subject to Commission rule-making.

Additionally, there are no clear guidelines or procedures for developing the Commission proposals. I believe the process for developing Commission "proposals" under the new Article 19, section 32, will be of significant interest to voters. However, your measure identifies no clear process in this regard. It states only that the proposals are to be made "after notice for public comment and hearing." It is unclear whether this means the proposals will be subject to the notice and public-comment requirements of the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), which applies to proposed "rules" and "rule making." By way of comparison, pursuant to Article 19, section 28 and its implementing legislation, the APA plainly applies to Commission rule-making regarding "contributions" and "expenditures" as defined therein. There are no such clear guidelines or procedures for developing Commission proposals under your measure. The applicable process cannot be adequately summarized in a ballot title without clarification of this important matter.

2. As noted above, Section 1 of your proposal also adds two subsections to the new section 32 of Arkansas Constitution Article 19, stating that the laws enacted by the General Assembly pursuant to this new constitutional provision "shall be subject to the rule-making, compliance, and enforcement authority of the Arkansas Ethics Commission" and "[t]he General Assembly shall have no authority to approve or disapprove rules or regulations adopted by the Arkansas Ethics Commission."

The measure is unclear with respect to the procedures governing Commission "rule-making" and "enforcement authority." The measure addresses new election-related spending requirements distinct from current requirements. Hence, the Commission's "rule-making, compliance, and enforcement authority" is presumably also new. But the measure is silent regarding the applicable procedures. This silence introduces additional ambiguity and uncertainty on an essential matter, given the potential scope and effect of the Commission rules, as discussed above.

The significance of this ambiguity concerning Commission rules is compounded by the measure's reference, in subsection (d) of the proposed, new Article 19, section 32, to the Commission "defining expenditures and contributions." The meaning of these terms is plainly an essential fact that would give voters serious ground for reflection. This further heightens the concern that the process for Commission rules promulgation be clear. The absence of definitions, coupled with uncertainty regarding the rule-making process, could be important factors in a ballot title challenge, where the Court, in assessing the ballot title's sufficiency, will be deciding how necessary and appropriate it is to interpret the language of your proposal. I believe the Arkansas Supreme Court would be particularly concerned regarding the voters' ability to fully understand and appreciate the issues related to expenditures and contributions presented by the proposed amendment. In sum, I believe it will be critical to a sufficient ballot title that the voters have an intelligible idea of the respective roles and authority of the Ethics Commission and the General Assembly as to the "disclosure requirements and contribution limits" under your proposed amendment.

In addition, your proposal may, in effect, reverse the usual roles and functions of the executive and legislative branches of government in the context of this measure's subject matter. This would mark a significant change in the "separation of powers" between the branches. The ballot title you have submitted does not, however, adequately convey this potential change in law so that voters will have a fair understanding of the issues. The Arkansas Supreme Court has elaborated on the duty to describe the changes in law under a ballot proposal:

It is evident that before determining the sufficiency of the present ballot title we must first ascertain what changes in the law would be brought about by the adoption of the proposed amendment. For the elector, in voting upon a constitutional amendment, is simply making a choice between retention of the existing law and the substitution of something new. It is the function of the ballot title to provide information concerning the choice that he is called upon to make. Hence the adequacy of the title is directly related to the degree to which it enlightens the voter with reference to the changes that he is given the opportunity of approving.

The Court has held that "a ballot title is not insufficient merely because it fails to reflect the current state of the law." But a ballot title will be deemed insufficient if it does not give the voters a clear understanding of the "extent and import" of the proposal, particularly when they are being asked to amend the constitution:

If the voter knows the extent and import of such a proposal, it is the voter's decision, not ours, as to the wisdom of the proposal. But at the same time the voters have placed on this court the duty and responsibility to see that when they vote that change, or decline to vote that change, especially one to alter their constitution, they are allowed to make an intelligent choice, fully aware of the consequences of their vote.

Without resolution of the above ambiguities, I believe it will be impossible to construct a ballot title that explains these important features in adequate detail.

3. Section 1 of your proposal also adds a subsection to the new section 32 of Arkansas Constitution, Article 19, stating that the Ethics Commission proposals "shall include provisions requiring disclosure of the sources of funds transferred to facilitate contributions otherwise subject to disclosure under subsection (a) of this section." (Emphasis added).

In addition to the uncertainty, noted above, regarding the meaning of "contributions," the emphasized language is of uncertain meaning. The words "sources," "funds transferred," and "facilitate" have no "general currency among the public" such that it can be assumed most voters will readily understand what these terms entail in the context of your proposed amendment. Without definitions or some other clarification, therefore, the voter will be placed in a position of having to guess as to the meaning of these terms.

4. Section 2 of your proposal amends Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 14 to add a subsection prohibiting the enactment or execution of an act that "allows, or results in, an individual legislator or group of individual legislators designating, directly or indirectly, (1) the manner in which appropriated funds are spent, (2) the entities on whose behalf the appropriated funds are spent, or (3) to whom appropriated funds are provided, whether by grant or otherwise." (Emphasis added).

The "group of individual legislators" language is unclear. Although it is unlikely this is intended to include groups such as the Joint Budget Committee or the Legislative Council, the meaning is sufficiently uncertain such that these sub-groups of the General Assembly might be included by virtue of their roles in connection with state budgeting and contracting. This would have obvious implications for those processes under current state law. Until the ambiguity created by the reference to "group of individual legislators" is clarified, this provision cannot be adequately summarized in the ballot title.

5. Section 4 of your proposal amends Arkansas Constitution Amendment 80, section 3 (regarding rules of pleading, practice, and procedure) to add subsection (a)(2), stating that "the General Assembly may enact laws that amend any provision of [such a rule] prescribed by the Supreme Court after January 1, 2019 if the General Assembly finds that such provision abridges, enlarges or modifies any substantive right." (Emphasis added).

The term "substantive right" is a technical term in the context of rules of pleadings, practice, and procedure. It will not be readily understood by most voters. The Court has consistently disapproved the use of technical terms:

We have disapproved the use of terms that are technical and not readily understood by voters, such that voters would be placed in a position of either having to be an expert in the subject or having to guess as to the effect his or her vote would have. ... Without a definition of [a technical term], the voter would be in the position of guessing as to the effect his or her vote would have unless he or she is an expert in the legal field. In other words, the voter would be unable to reach an intelligent and informed decision for or against the proposal without an understanding of the terms and the consequences of his or her vote.

The undefined use of the term "substantive right" in your proposed ballot title consequently does not meet the legal requirements for initiated measures.

6. Section 4 of your proposal also adds subsection (a)(3) to Arkansas Constitution Amendment 80, section 3, stating: "The General Assembly shall enact no law that abridges, limits or impairs a jury's right to determine damages in a civil action...." (Emphasis added).

The emphasized language suggests that juries have an absolute right to set damages. As noted above regarding your proposed popular name, however, Arkansas courts have inherent power to reduce jury awards. It is therefore misleading, and potentially partisan, to suggest in the ballot title for your proposal that juries have an absolute "right ... to set damages" and that this constitutional amendment, if adopted, will preserve such a right.

7. Section 4 of your proposal also adds subsection (a)(4) to Arkansas Constitution Amendment 80, section 3, stating: "The Arkansas Constitution shall impose no restrictions on the right of a client to contract with an attorney and no limitations on the terms or fees for legal services provided to a client by his or her attorney, nor shall the General Assembly enact laws that impose such restrictions or limitations."

The statement that "[t]he Arkansas Constitution shall impose no restrictions ... and no limitations on the terms or fees for legal services" is extraordinarily broad language that gives rise to uncertainty regarding possible unintended consequences or implications. Under a plain reading, this indicates that there can be no future amendments to the Constitution imposing any such restrictions or limitations. So read, this provision would seemingly amend by implication Article 5, section 1 and Article 19, section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution, which authorize, respectively, Arkansas legal voters and the Arkansas General Assembly to propose amendments to the state constitution through certain established procedures. Your proposal's effect on these constitutional provisions must be acknowledged in the ballot title. The ballot title is plainly insufficient without an acknowledgement of such an extremely significant change in current constitutional law.

Even if this part of the measure is clarified to make clear it will not prevent future amendments to the Constitution pursuant to existing procedures, the scope and effect of this prohibition on "the Arkansas Constitution" will remain uncertain absent some clarification. For example, it is unclear whether the measure would exempt legal services from a future constitutional amendment that controls the terms or fees of service for commercial transactions generally.

CONCLUSION

The ambiguities noted above are not necessarily all the ambiguities contained in your proposal, but they are sufficiently serious to require me to reject your popular name and ballot title. I am unable to substitute language in a ballot title for your measure due to these ambiguities. Further, additional ambiguities may come to light on review of any revisions of your proposal.

My office, in the certification of ballot titles and popular names, does not address the merits, philosophy, or ideology of proposed measures. I have no constitutional role in the shaping or drafting of such measures. My statutory mandate is embodied only in Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-107, and my duty is to the electorate. Based on what has been submitted, my statutory duty is to reject your proposed popular name and ballot title for the foregoing reasons and instruct you to redesign the proposed measure and ballot title. You may resubmit your proposed amendment along with a proposed popular name and ballot title at your convenience.

Sincerely,

LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General

Enclosure