Does the FOIA exemption for 'county or municipal parks and recreation department records' shield all county records or only county parks-department records?
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This page answers the general question as of 2016. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Arkansas law, with citations.
Plain-English summary
Arkansas Secretary of State Mark Martin asked the AG to clarify the scope of Act 1015 of 2015, which added a new FOIA exemption to the Arkansas Code. The amendment (codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105(b)(22)) protects "date of birth, home address, email address, phone number, and other contact information from county or municipal parks and recreation department records of a person who was under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the request." The question was whether the exemption covered (a) any county records, or (b) only county parks and recreation department records.
Attorney General Leslie Rutledge concluded the exemption covers only parks and recreation department records. Read naturally, "county or municipal parks and recreation department records" means "county parks and recreation department records or municipal parks and recreation department records." The phrase "parks and recreation department" modifies both "county" and "municipal." That reading also avoids the implausible result of treating the exemption as one that simultaneously shields all county records and only one small slice of municipal records.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 2016. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Why the AG rejected the alternative reading
The opinion identified two possible readings of the operative phrase "county or municipal parks and recreation department records":
- Both modified. "Parks and recreation department" modifies both "county" and "municipal," so the exemption reaches only parks-department records at either level.
- Last antecedent only. "Parks and recreation department" modifies only "municipal," so the exemption reaches all county records and only municipal parks records.
The AG settled on reading 1 for several reasons:
- Natural reading. Reading 2 is grammatically possible but "highly strained" as an English construction. A normal reader would not parse the sentence that way.
- Plain-language rule. Rea v. State directs courts to give a statute its plain meaning if the language is clear, without resorting to interpretive canons.
- Drafting common sense. If the legislature meant to exempt all county records and only municipal parks records, it could have said so directly by inserting one word: "information from county records or municipal parks and recreation department records."
- Noscitur a sociis. State v. Oldner applies this canon (meaning is known from associates). The phrase "parks and recreation department" is a specific category. It is implausible the legislature meant to combine a broad shield over one form of local government (all county records) with a narrow shield over another (only municipal parks records).
- Implausibility of the alternative. A statute is not ambiguous when one reading is highly likely and the other is theoretically possible but not plausible (Manning v. State).
The AG acknowledged the rule of the last antecedent (McCoy v. Walker), which would generally have "parks and recreation department" modify only "municipal," but concluded a contrary intention is evidenced by the language, grammar, and syntax the legislature chose.
What the opinion explicitly preserves
The AG was careful to note that the conclusion did not mean all other county records containing similar information are subject to disclosure. Other FOIA exemptions under Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105(b) might apply, and McCambridge v. City of Little Rock and Ark. Code Ann. § 14-14-110(b) protect certain information through other channels. Act 1015 was simply narrower than one reading would make it.
Common questions
What is the practical effect for parks departments?
County and municipal parks and recreation departments can decline to disclose the date of birth, home address, email, phone number, and other contact information of any person who was under 18 at the time of the FOIA request. Other custodians cannot use Act 1015 to shield similar data.
What about a school district's records on a child?
School districts are not "county or municipal parks and recreation departments," so Act 1015 does not apply. School student-record protections come from federal FERPA and Arkansas state-level student-record statutes, which were not at issue in this opinion.
Could a sheriff's office use Act 1015 to redact a child's address from a public report?
No. The sheriff is not a parks and recreation department. Other FOIA exemptions or the constitutional privacy doctrine would have to be the basis for redaction.
Source
Subject
Whether the records described in Act 1015 of 2015, An Act to protect the identity and contact information of children and create an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), are any county
Source
Official summary
Whether the records described in Act 1015 of 2015, An Act to protect the identity and contact information of children and create an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), are any county records, generally, or county parks and recreation departments specifically? RESPONSE: In my opinion, the records described in the applicable portion of Act 1015 are records of a county parks and recreation department, not all records of a county generally.
Original opinion text
Opinion No. 2015-114
January 12, 2016
The Honorable Mark Martin
Secretary of State
STATE OF ARKANSAS
ATTORNEY GENERAL
LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Arkansas State Capitol, Room 256
Little Rock, AR 72201-1094
Dear Mr. Martin:
I am writing in response to your request for an opinion on Act 1015 of 2015,
which amended the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to add an
exemption from the FOIA's public-records disclosure requirements.
As amended, the relevant law provides:
(b) It is the specific intent of this section that the following shall not be
deemed to be made open to the public under the provisions of this chapter:
(22) The date of birth, home address, email address, phone number, and
other contact information from county or municipal parks and recreation
department records of a person who was under eighteen ( 18) years of age
at the time of the request made under this section.1
You ask whether the records described in Act 1015 "are any County records,
generally, or County parks and recreation departments [records] specifically."
1 Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105(b )(22) (Supp. 2015).
323 CENTER STREET, SUITE 200 · LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72201
TELEPHONE (501) 682-2007 · FAX (501) 682-8084
ARKANSASAG.GOV The Honorable Mark Martin
Secretary of State
Opinion No. 2015-114
Page 2
RESPONSE
In my opinion, the records described in the applicable portion of Act 1015 are
records of a county parks and recreation department, not all records of a county
generally.
DISCUSSION
[Arkansas courts] construe [a] statute just as it reads, giving the words
their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language, and if
the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear
and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory
. . 2 mterpretation.
Act 1015 amended the FOIA to provide an exemption from disclosure for certain
"county or municipal parks and recreation department records." In my opinion,
this language plainly means the same thing as "county parks and recreation
department records or municipal parks and recreation department records." The
common and natural understanding of the language used-"county or municipal
parks and recreation department records"-is that "parks and recreation
department" modifies both the word "municipal" and the word "county."3
I acknowledge that there is an alternative possible reading of the statute that limits
"parks and recreation department" to modifying only the term "municipal" but not
the term "county." Under this reading, the specific FOIA exception would apply
to (a) all county records, but only (b) municipal parks and recreation department
records.
While this alternative reading of the statute is possible, I do not believe it is
plausible. Such a reading is highly strained and would represent an unnatural
manner of conveying information. Moreover, if the legislature wanted the FOIA
exception to reach all county records, but only municipal parks and recreation
records, it would have said so in a much more straightforward manner. For
2 Rea v. State, 2015 Ark. 431, *4, _ S.W.3d _, 2015 WL 7305090.
3 The law expressly authorizes Arkansas counties to provide "[p ]ark and recreation services." Ark. Code
Ann. § I 4-I 4-802(b)(2)(C)(vi) (Rep I. 2013). At least one county has a parks and recreation department. See
Sebastian County Parks & Recreation, http://www.sebastiancountyar.gov/Parks-Rec (last visited January 7,
2016). The Honorable Mark Martin
Secretary of State
Opinion No. 2015-114
Page 3
example, the legislature could have added a single word to the statute, so that the
relevant language would read, "information from county records or municipal
parks and recreation department records."
A statue is not ambiguous where one reading of it is highly likely and the other
reading, while theoretically possible, is not plausible.4 Because I perceive no
statutory ambiguity, there is no reason or occasion to apply rules of statutory
interpretation to determine the language's meaning. Even if one deemed the
relevant language to be ambiguous, however, application of a familiar canon of
statutory interpretation supports my interpretation of the statute. Noscitur a sociis,
which translates as "it is known from its associates," is a doctrine that provides
that the meaning of a word may be determined by reference to the words
accompanying it.5 In this instance, the meaning of the phrase "municipal parks and
recreation department" is clear beyond doubt, and refers to one segment-not the
entirety-of municipal government. It seems quite unlikely that the General
Assembly meant to establish an exemption with respect to both one relatively
small segment of one form of local government, and the whole of another form of
local government. 6
I conclude that the county records described in Act 1015 are records of a county
parks and recreation department, not all records of a county generally.
Accordingly, in my opinion, Act 1015 does not establish a FOIA exemption with
respect to county records other than certain records of a county parks and
recreation department.
The fact that Act 1015 covers only records of parks and recreation departments
does not, of course, mean that other county records containing the type of
4 Cf Manning v. State, 330 Ark. 699, 702, 956 S.W.2d 184 (1997) (statute not ambiguous if one of two
possible readings amounts to "subtle and forced construction for the purpose of limiting or extending"
statute's reach).
5 See, e.g., State v. Oldner, 361 Ark. 316, 206 S. W.3d 8 I 8 (2005).
6 J acknowledge that another rule of statutory construction provides that where no contrary intention
appears, a qualifying phrase (like "parks and recreation department" here) modifies only the last antecedent
(here, "municipal"). See, e.g., McCoy v. Walker, 3 I 7 Ark. 86, 876 S.W.3d 252 (1994). Jn my view,
however, a contrary intention is indeed evidenced here. As previously noted, J believe the most common
and natural understanding of the language used by the legislature is that "parks and recreation department"
modifies both "municipal" and "county." Jn my opinion, the intention of the legislature-as expressed by
the words, grammar, and syntax they chose to use in the Act-was to exempt certain records of local parks
and recreation departments, regardless of whether the department belongs to a municipality or a county. The Honorable Mark Martin
Secretary of State
Opinion No. 2015-114
Page 4
information described in Act 1015 are invariably subject to disclosure. Such
records may be exempt under another FOIA exemption, or possibly under some
other provision of statutory or constitutional law. 9
Sincerely,
~/~ ~
LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General
8 See generally Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105(b ).
9 See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 14-14-1 IO(b) (Repl. 2013), McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark.
219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989).
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