Can an Arkansas county quorum court require the county judge to get the quorum court's approval before buying specific vehicles, when the funds for those vehicles have already been appropriated?

Plain-English summary

Arkansas counties have a structure that looks a lot like state government in miniature. The quorum court is the county's legislative branch: it makes ordinances and, importantly, appropriates the county's money. The county judge (despite the title, the judge is an executive, not a judicial officer) is the county's executive: she carries out the laws and spends the appropriations. The Arkansas Supreme Court has been clear since at least Walker v. Washington Co. in 1978 that this separation works the same way at the county level as at the state level.

The Cleburne County Quorum Court passed Ordinance No. 2014-037, which required the county judge to get the quorum court's prior approval before buying a vehicle that (a) had a gross vehicle weight rating over 14,000 pounds and (b) cost more than $20,000. State Representative Josh Miller asked the AG whether the ordinance was lawful.

Question 1: Is the ordinance an impermissible legislative encroachment on the executive branch? AG Leslie Rutledge said yes. Amendment 55, § 3 of the Arkansas Constitution vests in the county judge, not the quorum court, the authority to "authorize and approve disbursement of appropriated county funds." A.C.A. § 14-14-1102(b)(2)(C)(ii) confirms that authority. The 1929 Supreme Court case Smith and Buechley v. Hempstead County had already held that "the Legislature did not vest in the quorum court the power to make contracts for the expenditure of money appropriated by it." The AG had reached the same conclusion in three prior opinions (2001-305 on a county-collector software purchase; 2000-262 on sheriff expenditures; 89-206 on the general rule). Once the quorum court properly appropriated money for vehicles, requiring the judge to come back for sign-off on each specific purchase crossed the constitutional line. A reviewing court, in the AG's view, would likely strike the ordinance down.

Question 2: Could the quorum court impose more restrictive vehicle purchasing requirements than state law? The AG declined to answer. She could not tell from the question what "more restrictive" meant in context without construing the local ordinance, and the AG's office is "not authorized or equipped to construe local ordinances when rendering official opinions." She pointed Representative Miller to the answer on Question 3 for some guidance.

Question 3: Could the quorum court require the county to buy vehicles only from the State Procurement Bid (the contract that the Office of State Procurement awards for state agencies)? No. Two reasons. First, that direction would once again intrude on the county judge's spending discretion. Second, state law in A.C.A. § 14-22-106(17) specifically exempts county purchases of "new motor vehicles purchased from a licensed automobile dealership located in Arkansas for an amount not to exceed the fleet price awarded by the Office of State Procurement" (plus up to $600 for options) from the formal bidding requirements. The Legislature contemplated that counties could buy from Arkansas dealers at fleet price; an ordinance limiting that to state-contract vendors would conflict with state law, which A.C.A. § 14-14-805(13) forbids.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2015. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

Arkansas Constitution Amendment 55, ratified in 1974, restructured county government and established the modern division between the legislative quorum court and the executive county judge. Section 3 vests the county judge with authority to "authorize and approve disbursement of appropriated county funds." The Code of Local Government (A.C.A. Title 14) carries the constitutional design forward. A.C.A. § 14-14-502 sets out the separation of powers framework. A.C.A. § 14-14-1102(b)(2)(C)(ii) gives the county judge authority to "enter into necessary contracts or other agreements to obligate county funds and to approve expenditure of county funds appropriated therefor in the manner provided by law." A.C.A. § 14-14-805(13) restricts the quorum court from any "legislative act that is contrary to the general laws of the state."

County purchasing is governed by A.C.A. §§ 14-22-101 to -106. Formal bidding is required for any single purchase costing $20,000 or more (§ 14-22-102, with the procedure in §§ 14-22-101(2) and 14-22-104). A list of exemptions follows in § 14-22-106. Subsection (17) exempts new vehicles bought from a licensed Arkansas dealer at or below the fleet price awarded by the Office of State Procurement (plus up to $600 in options). For state agencies, the State Procurement Bid is mandatory under A.C.A. § 19-11-223; for counties, it is one available option but not the only one.

Three earlier AG opinions had already laid out the separation-of-powers principle for county spending: Op. Att'y Gen. 2001-305 (quorum court could appropriate money for a software system but could not dictate which system the county collector should buy); Op. Att'y Gen. 2000-262 (quorum court could not condition a sheriff's expenditures on quorum court approval); Op. Att'y Gen. 89-206 ("[A]n effort to permit expenditures of appropriations only upon approval of the Quorum Court violates the separation of powers doctrine.").

Common questions

What is a quorum court in Arkansas?

The quorum court is the legislative body of each Arkansas county, made up of justices of the peace elected from districts within the county. It passes county ordinances and appropriates the county's budget. Its powers and limits are in Amendment 55 of the Arkansas Constitution and A.C.A. Title 14, Chapter 14. It does not run day-to-day county operations. That role belongs to the county judge.

Why is the "county judge" an executive officer and not a judge?

History. The county judge title goes back to a time when Arkansas counties combined administrative and minor judicial functions. The 1874 constitution kept the title, but Amendment 55 (1974) refined the role into pure executive administration. The county judge presides over the quorum court but does not vote (except to break ties), and carries out the laws and budgets the court enacts.

What is the separation-of-powers principle the AG applied here?

Once the legislative body has appropriated money (decided how much can be spent for what general purpose), the executive branch decides how to spend it within that appropriation. The legislature cannot retain a "veto" over specific purchases that come within an already-approved appropriation. That principle, articulated for state government in Federal Express Corp v. Skelton (1979) and Chaffin v. Arkansas Game and Fish Comm'n (1988), applies in equal force to county government per Walker v. Washington Co. (1978).

Could the quorum court achieve its goal a different way?

Possibly. The quorum court has full control over the appropriation itself. It can appropriate less money for vehicles, or appropriate money in a way that funds different categories of vehicles separately, or refuse to appropriate at all for a category it does not want the county to buy. What it cannot do is appropriate money and then require its approval each time the executive spends within the appropriation.

Does the State Procurement Bid apply to counties?

No. The State Procurement Bid (the contract issued by the Office of State Procurement under A.C.A. § 19-11-223) is mandatory only for state agencies. Counties may use it, and A.C.A. § 14-22-106(17) explicitly allows counties to buy new vehicles from any licensed Arkansas dealer at or below the fleet price awarded under that contract. Counties are not required to use the state contract vendors.

Why did the AG decline to answer Question 2?

Question 2 asked whether the quorum court could impose "more restrictive" requirements than state law. The AG said she could not tell what "more restrictive" meant without interpreting the local ordinance, and the AG's office does not construe local ordinances in formal opinions. The cross-reference to Question 3 was the AG's way of giving partial guidance: where the local rule contradicts a state-law authorization (like the dealer-flexibility in § 14-22-106(17)), it cannot stand under § 14-14-805(13).

Citations

Constitutional authority: Ark. Const. art. 4, §§ 1 and 2 (state separation of powers, applied by analogy); Ark. Const. amend. 55 (county government); Ark. Const. amend. 55, § 3 (county judge's authority to disburse appropriated funds).

Statutory authority: A.C.A. § 14-14-502 (county separation of powers); A.C.A. § 14-14-1102(b)(2)(C)(ii) (county judge contracting and expenditure authority); A.C.A. § 14-14-805(13) (quorum court cannot legislate contrary to state law); A.C.A. § 14-22-101(2) (formal bidding definition); A.C.A. §§ 14-22-102, -104 (county formal bidding for $20,000+ purchases); A.C.A. § 14-22-106 (exemptions); A.C.A. § 14-22-106(17) (new vehicle exemption); A.C.A. § 19-11-223 (state procurement contracts).

Cases: Walker v. Washington Co. (1978) (separation of powers at county level); Federal Express Corp v. Skelton (1979) (classic division of powers); Chaffin v. Arkansas Game and Fish Comm'n (1988) (legislative body cannot administer appropriations after passing them); Smith and Buechley v. Hempstead County (1929) (quorum court cannot contract for expenditure of appropriated funds).

Prior AG opinions: 2001-305, 2000-262, 89-206 (separation-of-powers limits on quorum court control of county judge spending); 2012-025 (AG does not construe local ordinances).

Source

• Landing page: https://arkansasag.gov/divisions/opinions-foia/attorney-general-opinions-search/

Original opinion text

Opinion No. 2015-020
April 9, 2015
The Honorable Josh Miller
State Representative
Post Office Box 814
STATE OF ARKANSAS
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Heber Springs, Arkansas 72543-0814
Dear Representative Miller:

This is in response to your request for an opinion on several questions concerning
a particular ordinance passed by the Cleburne County Quorum Court. As
background for your questions, you state:

The Quorum Court passed Ordinance No. 2014-037 which requires
the County Judge to seek the prior approval of the Quorum Court
before buying a vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of 14,000
pounds and at a purchase price greater than twenty thousand dollars
($20,000.00). This ordinance, which is attached, does not address
the County Judge's line item appropriations, which are more than
sufficient at seventy five thousand dollars ($75,000.00) to cover any
purchases in this category. This ordinance does not address state
procurement statutes which are very specific regarding lawful
purchasing procedures for vehicles, which have been followed.

With this background in mind, you ask the following questions:

(1) Is this ordinance an unlawful encroachment by the legislative
branch into the discretion granted an official of the executive branch
under the separation of powers doctrine?

(2) Does the Cleburne County Quorum Court have the authority to
impose more restrictive vehicle purchasing requirements, such as
Ordinance 2014-037, than currently set out in state law?

(3) Does the Cleburne County Quorum Court have the power to
direct that the County only purchase vehicles through the State
Procurement Bid?

RESPONSE
The answer to Question 1 is "yes," in my opinion. The ordinance constitutes an
impermissible legislative encroachment on the executive branch because a county
quorum court cannot constitutionally require the county judge to obtain the
quorum court's approval before making specific purchases with funds that have
been properly appropriated. I am unable for the reasons explained below to
provide a definitive answer to Question 2. It is my opinion that the answer to
Question 3 is "no."

DISCUSSION

Question 1: Is this ordinance an unlawful encroachment by the legislative
branch into the discretion granted an official of the executive branch under the
separation of powers doctrine?

Similar to the state government, county government in Arkansas is comprised of
separate branches in order to provide a system of checks and balances. Under the
classic division of the powers, the legislative branch makes the laws and
appropriates public revenues, the executive branch administers the laws and
expends the appropriations, and the judicial branch interprets the laws.

While the power of the legislative branch of government to appropriate is
therefore beyond question, it does not follow that a legislative body retains the
right to administer a previously approved appropriation. To the contrary, section
3 of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution provides that the county judge,
not the quorum court, will "authorize and approve disbursement of appropriated
county funds." Consistent with this constitutional imperative, the County Code
vests the county judge with the authority to "enter into necessary contracts or other
agreements to obligate county funds and to approve expenditure of county funds
appropriated therefor in the manner provided by law."

Because the county judge has been granted authority and responsibility to enter
into contracts and approve expenditures, it would constitute a violation of the
principle of separation of powers for the quorum court to dictate to the county
judge the details of such authority and responsibility. More specific to your
question, once a quorum court has made a proper appropriation, it normally cannot
regulate an executive official's expenditure of the appropriated amount.

With regard, therefore, to the Cleburne County ordinance at issue, this ordinance
plainly purports to condition the purchase of used vehicles costing more than
$20,000 upon the prior approval of the Quorum Court. Presuming, as was stated
in the above background information, that the Quorum Court has appropriated
monies for such items and that there are sufficient funds in the appropriation to
cover such a purchase, it is my opinion that a reviewing court likely would see this
as an impermissible breach of the separation of powers between the county's
legislative and executive branches.

Question 2: Does the Cleburne County Quorum Court have the authority to
impose more restrictive vehicle purchasing requirements, such as Ordinance
2014-037, than currently set out in state law?

I cannot provide a definitive answer to this question. I am uncertain what is meant
by the phrase "more restrictive vehicle purchasing requirements," particularly in
reference to the county ordinance that is the subject of your request for my
opinion. Determining the meaning of that phrase in connection with the ordinance
would require me to attempt to construe a local ordinance. This office is not
authorized or equipped to construe local ordinances when rendering official
opinions. Please note, however, that my response to Question 3 may provide
some guidance.

Question 3: Does the Cleburne County Quorum Court have the power to direct
that the County only purchase vehicles through the State Procurement Bid?

At the outset, let me state that I understand this question to refer only to new
vehicle purchases because the "State Procurement Bid" only applies in the
purchasing of new vehicles. I understand the term "State Procurement Bid" to
refer to the state vehicle contract solicited and issued by the Office of State
Procurement, which is mandatory for state agencies in purchasing new vehicles.
This contract is awarded to only a limited number of vendors.

With this understanding in mind, in my opinion, the quorum court may not direct
the county executive to purchase vehicles only from the state contract. State law
governing county purchasing requires county officials to use formal bidding
procedures for any purchase costing $20,000 or more. But the law also provides
a list of exempt purchases that county officials are free to make without soliciting
bids. These exemptions include one for "[n]ew motor vehicles purchased from a
licensed automobile dealership located in Arkansas for an amount not to exceed
the fleet price awarded by the Office of State Procurement. . . ."

The scenario posed in Question 3 purports to direct the county executive to take a
specific action with respect to an appropriation, that is, to only buy vehicles from
the state contract. As noted above, the power to appropriate rests exclusively with
the quorum court, and the authority and responsibility to enter into contracts and
approve expenditures subject to such appropriations lies with the county judge.
Moreover, state law in this instance gives the county executive the flexibility to
make new motor vehicle purchases from licensed Arkansas dealers. In my
opinion, an effort by the quorum court to limit the county executive to making
vehicle purchases only from the limited vendors awarded the state contract would
be both an improper breach of the separation of powers doctrine and contrary to
A.C.A. § 14-22-106.

Assistant Attorney General Ray Pierce prepared this opinion, which I hereby
approve.

LR/RP:cyh