Should Jonesboro and Monette get a 60/40 or 50/50 share of Craighead County road tax, and are the underlying 1921 and 1925 acts still constitutional?
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This page answers the general question as of 2014. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Arkansas law, with citations.
Plain-English summary
Senator John Cooper asked AG Dustin McDaniel whether the county road tax collected within Jonesboro and Monette city limits should be split 50/50 with Craighead County (the default under A.C.A. § 26-79-104) or 60/40 in favor of the cities (under Act 8 of 1925 for Jonesboro and Act 431 of 1921 for Monette). The default statute itself allows a "special act" exception, and the two named acts are exactly that. The harder question was whether those old acts survived constitutional challenge. The AG concluded yes: neither act ran afoul of the local-or-special-legislation prohibitions in Ark. Const. art. 5, § 24 and art. 12, § 2 as they stood when the acts were passed, and Amendment 14 (adopted in 1926) limits new special legislation but does not repeal pre-existing acts. So Jonesboro and Monette continue to get three-fifths of in-city collections.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 2014. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
What the AG concluded
Constitutionality. The pre-Amendment 14 prohibitions on local/special acts (Ark. Const. art. 5, § 24 and art. 12, § 2) banned only specific kinds of laws — changing venue in criminal cases, granting divorces, vacating roads, "conferring corporate powers," and a few others. Acts 8 and 431 did not take any of those prohibited actions, so they were not unconstitutional when passed. The AG cited the 1912 Arkansas Supreme Court decision in Sanderson v. City of Texarkana upholding a similar three-fifths-share act for Texarkana.
Effect of Amendment 14. Adopted in 1926, Amendment 14 says: "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special act. This amendment shall not prohibit the repeal of local or special acts." The AG read the second sentence as preserving the legislature's discretion to repeal existing special acts but not requiring it to do so. Amendment 14 did not, by its own force, invalidate Acts 8 and 431.
Equal protection. A footnote addresses the possible equal protection angle. Because no suspect class or fundamental right is at stake, the classification is reviewed for rational basis. Differential road-tax sharing among cities can be supported by any "conceivable rational basis," and the AG saw no obstacle to articulating one.
Whether the acts are still in effect. The AG searched and found nothing repealing or supplanting Acts 8 and 431. The Arkansas Code Revision Commission's tables list them as "Spec." (special or local), not as "Repealed," "Unconst.," or "Superseded." So the AG assumed they were still in force.
Bottom line. Jonesboro and Monette should continue to receive three-fifths of county road tax collected on property within their city limits.
Common questions
Q: What is the default split between county and city for road tax?
A.C.A. § 26-79-104 splits it 50/50. The same statute, however, allows "special act" exceptions, which is how Acts 8 and 431 fit in.
Q: Why did the legislature give Jonesboro and Monette better terms than the default?
The AG did not address that question. Historically, special road-tax acts often reflected county-by-county political negotiations or recognized that the city was building and maintaining roads the county would otherwise have to pay for.
Q: What does Amendment 14 actually forbid?
It forbids the legislature from passing new local or special acts. It does not retroactively void pre-1926 special acts, and the legislature has discretion (not a duty) to repeal them.
Q: Could Craighead County argue Amendment 14 implicitly repealed Acts 8 and 431?
The AG pointed to a post-Amendment 14 Supreme Court case (City of Siloam Springs v. Benton County and the follow-on Benton County v. City of Bentonville) where the trial court dismissed a city defendant because its favorable special act predated Amendment 14. The Arkansas Supreme Court twice mentioned that dismissal without criticism. That practice supports the AG's reading.
Q: Is there an equal protection problem in treating Jonesboro and Monette differently from other Arkansas cities?
The AG covered this in a footnote: rational-basis review applies, and the rational basis test is highly deferential. The AG could think of conceivable rational bases for distinguishing certain cities. That is enough to defeat a constitutional challenge.
Citations
Statutes and constitution
- A.C.A. § 26-79-104 (default 50/50 county-city road tax split, with special-act exception)
- A.C.A. § 26-79-104(c) (the special-act allowance)
- Ark. Const. art. 5, § 24 (pre-1926 limits on specific local/special legislation)
- Ark. Const. art. 12, § 2 (pre-1926 limit on conferring corporate powers by local act)
- Ark. Const. amend. 14 (1926 broader local/special legislation ban)
- Act 8 of 1925 (60/40 split favoring Jonesboro)
- Act 431 of 1921 (60/40 split favoring Monette)
Cases (all Arkansas Supreme Court)
- City of Little Rock v. Campbell, County Judge, 223 Ark. 746, 268 S.W.2d 386 (1954)
- Street Improvement Dist. Nos. 481 & 485 v. Hadfield, 184 Ark. 598, 43 S.W.2d 62 (1931)
- City of Siloam Springs v. Benton County, 350 Ark. 152, 85 S.W.3d 504 (2002)
- Benton County v. City of Bentonville, 373 Ark. 356, 284 S.W.3d 52 (2008)
- Sanderson v. City of Texarkana, 103 Ark. 529, 146 S.W. 105 (1912)
Prior AG opinions referenced
- Op. Att'y Gen. 2011-097, 2011-047
Source
Original opinion text
STATE OF ARKANSAS
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DUSTIN McDANIEL
Opinion No. 2014-019
March 18, 2014
The Honorable John Cooper
State Senator
62 CR 396
Jonesboro, Arkansas 72401
Dear Senator Cooper:
This is my opinion on your questions about dividing county road tax revenues between Craighead County and the City of Jonesboro, and between Craighead County and the City of Monette.
The law provides that county road tax money collected on property within city limits is divided equally between the county and the city unless a special act dictates some other division.
You included with your request copies of Act 8 of 1925 and Act 431 of 1921, which provide for Jonesboro and Monette, respectively, to receive three-fifths of in-city collections.
You ask whether Acts 8 and 431 are constitutional and whether Jonesboro and Monette should receive three-fifths, or half.
RESPONSE
In my opinion, neither Act 8 nor Act 431 is unconstitutional local or special legislation, and, assuming the Acts are still in effect, Jonesboro and Monette should receive three-fifths of the county road taxes collected on property within city limits.
You suggest no constitutional grounds on which the Acts might be questioned. But similar acts have been successfully challenged as constitutionally-prohibited local or special legislation and I assume your question is directed to that issue.
When Acts 8 and 431 were enacted in 1925 and 1921, the constitution prohibited only those local and special laws that took a specified action, namely "changing the venue in criminal cases; changing the names of persons, or adopting or legitimating children; granting divorces; vacating roads, streets or alleys;" or "conferring corporate powers." In my opinion, the Acts do not take any such action and so are not unconstitutional under either of the quoted provisions.
My opinion is supported by a 1912 Supreme Court case upholding a 1911 act giving Texarkana three-fifths of in-city collections. The Court acknowledged that the act was "in the nature of special legislation" but noted that the constitution did not prohibit all such legislation and deferred to the Legislature's judgment that a special law was appropriate in the circumstances.
Amendment 14, adopted in 1926, provides: "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special act. This amendment shall not prohibit the repeal of local or special acts." The amendment restricts the General Assembly's power but does not purport to repeal local or special acts on the books in 1926 or require the General Assembly to do so. Under the amendment's second sentence, the General Assembly has implied discretion to repeal existing local and special acts or to let them stand. Amendment 14's adoption did not in my opinion affect the constitutionality of Act 8 or 431.
My opinion is supported by a post-Amendment 14 case wherein the county challenged acts favoring cities in the division of county road taxes and the Supreme Court twice noted without criticism the trial court's dismissal of a city defendant because the act giving it a favorable share predated Amendment 14.
I have concluded that the Acts are not unconstitutional. It is accordingly my opinion, assuming the Acts are still in effect, that Jonesboro and Monette should receive three-fifths of the county road taxes collected on property within city limits. The law otherwise requiring an equal division allows exceptions by "special act," including, in my view, Acts 8 and 431.
Assistant Attorney General J. M. Barker prepared this opinion, which I approve.
Sincerely,
DUSTIN McDANIEL
Attorney General
DM:JMB/cyh
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