Can an Arkansas county use excess law library funds to finish out courthouse space for the juvenile court?

Plain-English summary

Representative John Payton asked AG Dustin McDaniel whether the Cleburne County Law Library Board could spend roughly $25,000 of its accumulated $90,000-plus law library balance to finish unused office space in the new county court building. The space would house the juvenile court judge and two or three staff members who were then operating several blocks away. The AG examined A.C.A. § 16-23-102(c)(2), which lets a county law library board spend any "excess funds . . . not needed for the operation and maintenance of the county law library" on "any other purpose necessary for improvement in the administration of justice in the county." Reading that phrase together with A.C.A. § 16-23-101 (which expressly allows library funds for "construction, renovation, and maintenance of facilities") and A.C.A. § 14-14-802 (which makes the county responsible for "the administration of justice through the several courts of record"), the AG concluded that finishing courthouse space for juvenile court staff is a lawful "administration of justice" purpose. Two factual predicates — that the funds are genuinely "excess" and that the expenditure is "necessary" — were outside the AG's scope and assumed for purposes of the opinion.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2014. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

What the AG concluded

The AG identified three statutory predicates for spending excess law library money:

1. Are the funds truly "excess" (not needed for library operation and maintenance)?
2. Is the proposed "other purpose" "necessary"?
3. Is the proposed "other purpose" one for "improvement in the administration of justice"?

The first two are factual questions the AG could not decide, so he assumed they were met for purposes of the opinion. He focused on the third and answered yes. Two interlocking reasons supported that conclusion:

Reading 1: The library statute itself contemplates facilities expenses.
A.C.A. § 16-23-101(b)(1) lets a board use law library funds for "any purpose relating to the establishment, maintenance, and operation of a county law library, including construction, renovation, and maintenance of facilities to house such libraries." If facilities construction is plainly within library-related expenses, then the broader phrase "improvement in the administration of justice" in § 16-23-102 should be read at least that broadly when applied to courthouse space.

Reading 2: Other county-government statutes treat courthouse space as part of the administration of justice.
A.C.A. § 14-14-802(a)(1) directs the quorum court to provide "the administration of justice through the several courts of record of the county." The Arkansas Supreme Court in Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996), read that to include "the costs of courthouse space, operating expenses for the office of the judge and prosecutor, court and prosecuting attorney personnel, public defender staffs, and court clerk staffs and operating expenses." The AG concluded that "improvement in the administration of justice" in § 16-23-102 should be read in pari materia with that case-confirmed scope.

Common questions

Q: How was the law library accumulating excess money in the first place?
The opinion noted (in a footnote) that the funds at issue were presumably moneys allocated to the County Law Library Fund from the County Administration of Justice Fund under A.C.A. § 16-10-307 (part of Act 1256 of 1995, which set up uniform state costs and fees for the judicial system).

Q: Could the same logic let a law library fund a new sheriff's office?
Probably not. The Villines court list of "administration of justice" costs is court-system-focused: judges, prosecutors, public defenders, clerks. Sheriff's office facilities lie outside that list. The AG did not address that case but its rationale (administration of justice = court system) would not naturally extend to general law enforcement office space.

Q: Who decides whether the funds are "excess" and the purpose is "necessary"?
The Law Library Board, in the first instance. The AG noted that the word "necessary" is "susceptible of various meanings," ranging from absolute physical necessity to "that which is only convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or conducive to the end sought." The AG read it as the more flexible standard in this context.

Q: Does the board need to use an appropriation ordinance or another formal mechanism?
The AG noted (in a footnote) that he assumed "there will be some record reflecting the direction of the funds for this purpose — such as an appropriation ordinance or perhaps some specific order — to ensure that the funds are properly expended." That is a recommended best practice, not a hard statutory requirement specified in the opinion.

Q: What is ejusdem generis and why didn't it apply here?
Ejusdem generis ("of the same kind or class") is a rule of statutory construction. If a list of specific items is followed by general words ("any other"), the general words are limited to things similar to the listed items. The AG explained (in a footnote) that ejusdem generis did not apply because the statute used "any other purpose" after only a single item ("operation and maintenance of the county law library"), not after an enumeration.

Background and statutory framework

A.C.A. § 16-23-102(c)(2) is the statute at the center of the opinion. It allows the law library board to spend excess funds on "any other purpose necessary for improvement in the administration of justice in the county." The AG used standard Arkansas statutory-construction tools: read words in their ordinary sense (Weiss v. McFadden), give every word effect (Ozark Gas Pipeline Corp.), and read statutes in pari materia with related provisions (MacSteel v. Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corp.; City of Blytheville v. McCormick).

The opinion connects three related provisions: § 16-23-101 (uses of library funds), § 16-23-102 (excess library funds for administration of justice), and § 14-14-802 (county obligations including administration of justice). Together with Villines v. Tucker's reading of § 14-14-802, those provisions support the conclusion that courthouse space for court staff is a permissible expenditure of excess law library funds.

Citations

Statutes

• A.C.A. § 16-23-102 (excess county law library funds for administration of justice)
• A.C.A. § 16-23-101 (uses of county law library funds, including facilities)
• A.C.A. § 16-10-307 (County Administration of Justice Fund; uniform costs and fees)
• A.C.A. § 14-14-802 (county obligations to provide services, including administration of justice)

Cases (all Arkansas Supreme Court unless noted)

• Weiss v. McFadden, 353 Ark. 868, 120 S.W.3d 545 (2003)
• Ozark Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 342 Ark. 591, 29 S.W.3d 730 (2000)
• MacSteel v. Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corp., 363 Ark. 22, 210 S.W.3d 878 (2005)
• Thomas v. Cornell, 316 Ark. 366, 872 S.W.2d 370 (1994)
• Burford Distributing, Inc. v. Starr, 341 Ark. 914, 20 S.W.3d 363 (2000)
• Bd. of Trustees v. Stodola, 328 Ark. 194, 942 S.W.2d 255 (1997)
• Chism v. Phelps, 228 Ark. 936, 311 S.W.2d 297 (1958)
• City of Blytheville v. McCormick, 56 Ark. App. 149, 939 S.W.2d 855 (1997) (Arkansas Court of Appeals)
• Stribling v. United States, 419 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1969) (Eighth Circuit)
• Agape Church v. Pulaski County, 307 Ark. 430, 821 S.W.2d 21 (1991)
• Woodruff v. Shockey, 297 Ark. 595, 764 S.W.2d 431 (1989)
• Parker v. Pace & Davis, 190 Ark. 950, 182 S.W.2d 259 (1935)
• Madison County v. Simpson, 173 Ark. 755, 293 S.W. 34 (1927)
• Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996)

Prior AG opinions referenced

• Op. Att'y Gen. 99-348

Source

• Landing page: https://arkansasag.gov/divisions/opinions-foia/attorney-general-opinions-search/

Original opinion text

STATE OF ARKANSAS

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DUSTIN McDANIEL

Opinion No. 2014-016

April 2, 2014

The Honorable John Payton
State Representative
Post Office Box 181
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179-0181

Dear Representative Payton:

You have requested my opinion regarding A.C.A. § 16-23-102, which in relevant part addresses the expenditure of excess county law library funds. You have asked "whether an expenditure from the County Law Library Fund to finish space in the new Cleburne County Court Building is a lawful expenditure of funds 'necessary for improvement in the administration of justice in the county' pursuant to A.C.A. § 16-23-102." As background for this question, you state:

The Cleburne County Law Library Board, established pursuant to A.C.A. § 16-23-102, (hereinafter the "Board") has accumulated some $90,000 plus in the County Law Library Fund. The Board has tentatively agreed to contribute $25,000 to the County General Fund for the purpose of completing an unfinished portion of the Court Building in order to house juvenile court staff. The total proposed project will cost approximately $50,000 and will take unfinished, unused space and put up walls, ceilings and utilities so that it may be occupied by the current Juvenile Court Judge and 2-3 staff members. These court personnel are presently housed elsewhere in the County several blocks away from the Court Building where court is conducted. It would be advantageous to have the court personnel in the Court Building for convenient access to the courtroom.

RESPONSE

Resolution of this question turns, as an initial matter, on whether the funds to be devoted to the project are "excess" and "necessary" for the stated purpose. Because these criteria essentially entail factual determinations outside the scope of this opinion, I will assume they are met for purposes of your question. The remaining issue is a legal one — whether the expenditure of law library funds to finish space in the court building for housing juvenile court staff is a purpose for "improvement in the administration of justice in the county." The answer to that question is "yes," in my opinion.

DISCUSSION

The controlling statute, A.C.A. § 16-23-102, states in relevant part:

Any excess funds in the county law library book fund not needed for the operation and maintenance of the county law library may be expended by the board for any other purpose necessary for improvement in the administration of justice in the county.

In considering this subsection, we are guided by well-established principles of statutory interpretation:

The first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Weiss v. McFadden, 353 Ark. 868, 120 S.W.3d 545 (2003). We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant; and meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute if possible. Ozark Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 342 Ark. 591, 29 S.W.3d 730 (2000). When the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Weiss v. McFadden, supra. When the meaning is not clear, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject. Id.

Guided by these principles, I interpret the words "any other purpose" under subsection 16-23-102(c)(2) just as they read to mean a purpose other than "operation and maintenance of the county law library." The "purpose" is qualified, however, by the requirement that it be one "necessary for improvement in the administration of justice in the county." Read as a whole, therefore, the statute contains three predicates for the redirection of funds from law library operation and maintenance, which I will identify by question:

1. Are there "excess funds?"
2. Is the "other purpose" a "necessary" one?
3. Is the "other purpose" one for "improvement in the administration of justice?"

The first two criteria for assessing the legality of the proposed expenditure require factual analyses that I am neither equipped nor authorized to undertake in the context of this opinion. The inquiry thus focuses on the third element. The phrase "administration of justice" is not defined. This gives rise, in my opinion, to some uncertainty as to the "other purposes" covered by the statute. Of course, the basic rule of statutory construction to which all other interpretive guides must yield is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. To reiterate in this regard, the Arkansas Supreme Court looks to appropriate sources that clarify the matter, including the language of the statute and its object and purpose, as well as other statutes relating to the same subject matter. Additionally, the rules of statutory construction require that undefined terms be placed beside other statutes relevant to the subject and given a meaning and effect derived from the combined whole.

The application of these principles leads me to conclude that finishing out space in a courthouse to be occupied by juvenile court staff is a lawful purpose under A.C.A. § 16-23-102(c)(2). This conclusion finds initial support in subsection 16-23-101, which authorizes the use of law library funds for "for any purpose relating to the establishment, maintenance, and operation of a county law library, including construction, renovation, and maintenance of facilities to house such libraries." It seems evident from this provision that the phrase "improvement in the administration of justice" in section 16-23-102 should be read to include the expense of facilities construction and renovation.

This reading is buttressed, moreover, by A.C.A. § 14-14-802, a part of the County Code that includes the "administration of justice" among the "necessary services" that must be provided by the county:

A county government, acting through the county quorum court, shall provide, through ordinance, for the following necessary services for its citizens:

(1) The administration of justice through the several courts of record of the county[.]

This statute does not define "administration of justice" services; but as interpreted by the Arkansas Supreme Court, this language plainly includes "the costs of courthouse space." If faced with the question, the court in my opinion would say the same of the phrase "improvement in the administration of justice in the county" under A.C.A. § 16-23-102(c)(2). When placed beside A.C.A. § 14-14-802(a)(1), this language can be understood as recognizing the county's obligation to provide for the administration of justice. I believe it reasonably follows that the proposed improvements to the courthouse to support the operation of the juvenile court constitute an administration-of-justice purpose for which excess county law library funds may be expended.

Deputy Attorney General Elisabeth A. Walker prepared the foregoing opinion, which I hereby approve.

Sincerely,

DUSTIN MCDANIEL
Attorney General

DM:EAW/cyh