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AR Opinion No. 2014-0100 December 11, 2014

Can an Arkansas city bill the county for the cost of retrieving a felony suspect, or does the city have to absorb the expense?

Short answer: The county is likely not obligated to reimburse the city absent a separate written agreement. State law gives cities and counties no general authority to bill each other for the cost of obtaining a criminal conviction; only a court can order costs, and only against the defendant or, in some cases, the county where conviction is had.

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This page answers the general question as of 2014. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Arkansas law, with citations.

Currency note: this opinion is from 2014
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Arkansas Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Arkansas attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

The Texarkana Arkansas Police Department (TAPD) ran up costs sending officers and equipment, or hiring an extradition service, to retrieve suspects who had left the jurisdiction on TAPD-issued felony warrants. The City of Texarkana wanted to bill Miller County for those costs (felony prisoners eventually go to the Miller County Detention Center, after initial booking at the Bi-State Justice Center). Prosecuting Attorney Carlton Jones asked the AG who actually bears the cost.

AG Dustin McDaniel's answer: absent an enforceable agreement between the City and the County, the County is under no obligation to pay.

The AG's reasoning works from a foundational principle: a public entity's right to collect any expenses or fees incurred to obtain a criminal conviction is wholly dependent on statutory authorization. There is no general common-law right to bill another government for those costs. The Arkansas Supreme Court has consistently held that fees may be charged by public officials only if a statute or rule authorizes them (Atkens v. State).

Even when costs are properly chargeable, they have to be entered as a "judgment for costs" by a court. A.C.A. § 16-90-113(a) directs that in any conviction the court shall render a judgment for costs in addition to the punishment. The clerk taxes the costs, and they are paid as directed in the act regulating criminal proceedings (A.C.A. §§ 16-92-101 through -105).

Under that scheme, costs adjudged by the court are paid by the defendant; the defendant's property may be seized and sold to satisfy them (A.C.A. § 16-92-101 et seq.; § 12-41-505(c)). If costs go uncollected in a felony case, the county where the conviction is had may be responsible (A.C.A. § 16-92-105 and § 16-90-113(b)). But this fallback runs to the county of conviction, not to the city that incurred the costs in the first place.

None of the cost-of-prosecution statutes authorize a city to collect such costs from a county. The AG also concluded that Title 16, chapters 90, 92, and 93 so pervasively cover the field of judgment, sentence, costs, fees, and fines that local regulation in the area is preempted. Even if Texarkana tried to pass a city ordinance creating a billing mechanism, the ordinance would likely fall to state preemption under City of Piggott v. Eblen.

The escape hatch is contract. If the City and the County negotiate an enforceable interlocal agreement specifically addressing felony retrieval costs, the agreement controls. Without one, the City eats the cost.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2014. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Why can't a city just charge another government for actual costs it incurred?
Because Arkansas Supreme Court precedent (and a tradition going back to Jefferson County v. Hudson in 1861) holds that public officials and entities can only charge fees and costs that a statute or rule specifically authorizes. There is no implied authority to bill.

Who actually pays the costs in a criminal case?
First the defendant, against whom the judgment for costs is entered. A.C.A. § 12-41-505(c) authorizes seizing and selling the defendant's property to satisfy the costs. If the defendant cannot pay, in felony cases the county where the conviction occurred may be responsible (A.C.A. § 16-90-113(b)). The chain stops there; the county does not then back-bill a city.

What if the costs were incurred before any conviction?
Same rule. Statutory authorization to collect is required. The court's "judgment for costs" only comes after conviction, and the cost categories that get folded into the judgment are themselves limited by statute. Sunk costs incurred during investigation or apprehension generally are not recoverable in the judgment.

Could Texarkana enter an interlocal agreement with Miller County to share these costs?
Yes, that is the AG's explicit escape hatch. An enforceable agreement allocating felony retrieval costs would control. The Interlocal Cooperation Act (A.C.A. §§ 25-20-101 et seq.) provides the framework.

Why does state preemption matter here?
Because even if the City tried to pass a local ordinance imposing a billing structure on the County, that ordinance would be void for conflict with state law. Kollmeyer v. Greer and City of Piggott v. Eblen hold that where the General Assembly has pervasively regulated a field, local regulation is preempted. The AG read Title 16, chapters 90, 92, and 93 as that kind of pervasive scheme.

Background and statutory framework

Arkansas's cost-of-prosecution machinery sits in Title 16, chapters 90, 92, and 93, supplemented by Title 12, chapter 41 (county jails) and Title 5 (criminal code).

A.C.A. § 16-90-113(a) requires the court to render a judgment for costs in addition to other punishment; the clerk taxes the costs; the judgment is for the benefit of the officers rendering the service. Subsection (b) provides the safety net: if the defendant fails to pay, the costs shall be paid by the county where the conviction is had.

A.C.A. §§ 16-92-101 through -105 implement that machinery, including the seizure-and-sale procedure for the defendant's property.

A.C.A. § 12-41-505(b) (cross-referenced by § 16-90-113) and subsection (c) reinforce that the defendant's property may be subjected to the payment of expenses.

The AG drew on the broader doctrine that government entities have only the authority their legislatures give them. Atkens v. State sums up the rule: "fees may only be charged by public officials if authorized by a statute or rule." The Supreme Court has applied that rule consistently to sheriff fees (Jefferson County v. Hudson), county costs (Wood v. Tyler), and similar contexts.

The preemption analysis draws on Kollmeyer v. Greer, where the Arkansas Supreme Court treated pervasive state regulation as displacing local regulation in the field, and City of Piggott v. Eblen, which voided a municipal ordinance conflicting with state statutes on the same subject.

Citations

  • A.C.A. § 16-90-113 (judgment for costs)
  • A.C.A. §§ 16-92-101 through -105 (cost collection procedure)
  • A.C.A. § 16-92-105(a), (b) (county responsibility for uncollected felony costs)
  • A.C.A. § 12-41-505(b), (c) (cross-reference and property subject to costs)
  • Atkens v. State, 368 Ark. 641, 249 S.W.3d 788 (2007) (fees require statutory authorization)
  • Wood v. Tyler, 317 Ark. 319, 877 S.W.2d 582 (1994)
  • Huddleston v. Craighead County, 128 Ark. 287, 194 S.W. 17 (1917)
  • Jefferson County v. Hudson, 22 Ark. 595 (1861)
  • Kollmeyer v. Greer, 267 Ark. 632, 593 S.W.2d 29 (1980) (state preemption of local rules)
  • City of Piggott v. Eblen, 236 Ark. 390, 366 Ark. 192 (1963) (local ordinance void where conflicting with state law)
  • Op. Att'y Gen. 2008-088 (history of § 12-41-505)
  • Op. Att'y Gen. 2005-018 (preemption analysis)

Source

Official summary

Which entity bears the cost of retrieving a suspect on a felony warrant obtained by the Texarkana Arkansas Police Department (TAPD), the City of Texarkana, Arkansas or Miller County, Arkansas?

RESPONSE: It is my understanding that your question is prompted by an effort on the part of the City to collect these costs from the County. Absent some enforceable agreement between the City and the County that would support such a collection effort, it is my opinion that the County is likely under no obligation to pay the City for costs of this sort. The right of a city (or county) to collect any expenses or fees incurred in order to obtain a criminal conviction is wholly dependent upon statutory authorization. Additionally, a "judgment for costs" must be entered by a court before any such expenses or fees can be collected. A.C.A. 16-90-113(a). In some circumstances, a county may be responsible for costs of prosecution. But only a court can speak to whether any particular expenses or fees may lawfully be included in the final judgment for costs. Most importantly for purposes of your question, none of the statutorily-prescribed procedures governing the payment and collection of these costs offers authority for a city to collect such costs from a county.

Original opinion text

STATE OF ARKANSAS

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Dustin McDaniel

Opinion No. 2014-100

December 11, 2014

The Honorable Carlton D. Jones
Prosecuting Attorney
Eighth Judicial District South
Miller County Courthouse, Room 6
Texarkana, Arkansas 71854

Dear Mr. Jones:

You have requested my opinion concerning costs incurred by the Texarkana Arkansas Police Department (TAPD) in retrieving suspects on felony warrants obtained by the TAPD. You identify the costs as those incurred in sending officers and equipment to retrieve a suspect who has left the jurisdiction; or alternatively, the cost of employing an extradition service to return the suspect for service of the warrant. As further background for your question, you report that the City of Texarkana, Arkansas primarily uses its bed allotment in the Bi-State Criminal Justice Center ("Justice Center") to hold misdemeanor offenders, and that felony prisoners are booked in at the Justice Center and subsequently transported to the Miller County Detention Center.

You ask in this regard: "Which entity bears the cost of retrieving the suspect on the felony warrant obtained by the TAPD, the City of Texarkana, Arkansas or Miller County, Arkansas?"

RESPONSE

Some initial clarification of the question is necessary. It is my understanding that your question is prompted by an effort on the part of the City to collect these costs from the County. That is, the City seeks to bill the County for the costs you have identified.

Absent some enforceable agreement between the City and the County that would support such a collection effort, it is my opinion that the County is likely under no obligation to pay the City for costs of this sort.

DISCUSSION

The right of a city (or county) to collect any expenses or fees incurred in order to obtain a criminal conviction is wholly dependent upon statutory authorization. Additionally, a "judgment for costs" must be entered by a court before any such expenses or fees can be collected:

In judgments against the defendant, a judgment for costs, in addition to the other punishment, shall be rendered. This judgment shall be taxed by the clerk and shall be for the benefit of the officers rendering the service.

Costs included in the judgment are to be "paid as directed in the act regulating criminal proceedings." This refers, in relevant part, to A.C.A. §§ 16-92-101-105 (Repl. 2006). Under that set of laws, costs that have been adjudged by the court are to be paid by the defendant, and the defendant's property may be seized and sold for that purpose. If uncollected, the costs adjudged in a felony case may be the responsibility of the county where the conviction is had.

The allowance and recovery of the costs of prosecution thus depend wholly upon statutory authorization. In some circumstances, a county may be responsible for costs of prosecution. But only a court can speak to whether any particular expenses or fees may lawfully be included in the final judgment for costs.

Most importantly for purposes of your question, none of the statutorily-prescribed procedures governing the payment and collection of these costs offers authority for a city to collect such costs from a county. Nor has my research yielded any other source of authority for a collection effort of this sort. Arkansas Code Title 16, chapters 90, 92 and 93, address, respectively, the issues of judgment and sentence, costs, fees and fines. In my opinion, this set of laws so pervasively covers the field that it is likely intended to be exclusive, thus precluding any local regulation in the area.

Absent some enforceable agreement between the City and the County, therefore, it is my opinion that the County is likely under no obligation to pay the City for the costs you have identified.

Deputy Attorney General Elisabeth A. Walker prepared the foregoing opinion, which I hereby approve.

Sincerely,

DUSTIN McDANIEL
ATTORNEY GENERAL

DM/EAW:cyh

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